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 This dissertation is an historical comparative examination of economic 
globalization (i.e., global market integration) effects on state political economic 
capacities in Québec and Canada. The central goal of the project is to understand how 
global market integration has altered the policy capacities of state institutions. 
Specifically, this dissertation examines Canadian multiculturalism and Québec 
interculturalism as social policy responses to ethno-cultural diversification resulting from 
increased global market integration. I argue that increased global market integration 
decreases state capacity to enact economic protections, but not the demand for 
protections from national populations. The result of these changes (ethno-cultural 
diversification and decreased economic policy capacity) is a shift in social policy 
capacity toward control and management of national cultural definitions, symbols, and 
structures of meaning. That is, as state capacity to meet national protectionist demands 
through economic policy decreases as a result of global market integration, the state must 
seek out alternative means of meeting national protectionist demands. These means are 
found in the management and control of national culture. The dissertation further 
concludes that this political re-orientation enables national populations to increases their 
relative power with respect to the state. This has placed the state in a precarious position 
between the powerful demands of global market proponents and the increasingly 
powerful demands of national populations for protections from the adverse affects of 
market integration.   
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Part I Introduction 
 
 Part I, consisting of Chapters One and Two, provide methodological and 
theoretical frameworks that guide this dissertation project. The project itself is divided 
into three parts: (1) providing a conceptual framework, (2) detailing national historical 
backgrounds of both Canada and Québec, and (3) a comparative analysis of global 
market integration, demographic change, and state policy responses of Canada and 
Québec. The purpose of these sections is to develop a more comprehensive understanding 
of how economic globalization (global market integration) has impacted the 
contemporary nation-state with the larger goal of understanding what capacities and roles 
define the contemporary nation-state. The larger arguments and the development of an 
orienting analytical framework is the goal of Part I. 
 Chapter One defines specific concepts and goals of the project as well as 
providing the methodological framework to which the larger project must conform. The 
chapter provides a conceptual and methodological foundation on which larger theoretical 
and analytical components of the project can be built. 
 Chapter Two provides theoretical orientation that allows for the analysis of Part 
III to be properly contextualized. The state and globalization processes are theoretically 
examined and conceptualized in order to understand the experience of Canadian and 
Québec global market integration as well as the impact of this process on both respective 
national populations and state institutions.  
 The overall dissertation seeks to answer a central question: what are the 
contemporary capacities of the core nation-state? Part I provides the methodological and 
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theoretical framework to begin this analytical project. Part II offers historical background 
information on Canada and Québec, respectively. These chapters support the 
methodological contention that these two governmental entities have distinct national 
histories resulting in distinct state social policy goals. Part III constitutes the analytical 
portion of this project. Specifically, the chapters examine global market integration and 
the effect of economic globalization on Canada and Québec; examine one of the most 
dramatic effects of globalization, ethno-cultural diversification through labor and other 
migrations; and an examination of multicultural and intercultural policies as state social 
political responses to national demographic changes resulting from globalization.  
 The dissertation concludes with a brief chapter that discusses the theroretical 
conclusions of the project as well as specific methodological conclusions. The final 














Conceptualizing and Analyzing the Contemporary Nation-State 
 
This dissertation examines the development and evolution of social policy 
responses by Canadian and Québec state institutions in response to pressures to national 
cohesion and stability brought by increasing global market integration. Specifically, I 
examine the roles of multicultural and intercultural policies in Canada and Québec, 
respectively. The main effect of economic globalization (or global market integration) 
that I examine is the process of ethno-cultural diversification through labor migration and 
other categorical immigration. In this project I view policy as an institutional form of 
social practice intended to reconcile national histories, stabilize national populations, and 
facilitate economic growth through fully global market participation. In addition, this 
project seeks to understand the role of culture, specifically the role and use of local 
(national) culture, in relation to nation-state integration within the global market 
economy. I will argue that the role of culture must be more sufficiently understood as a 
legitimation mechanism given the decreasing capacities of the nation-state to control and 
protect national economic interests due to increased global market economic integration.  
This dissertation is intent on answering a central question: how has the advanced 
capitalist nation-state changed in response to the challenges posed by globalization? This 
question is the logical outcome of an extended debate over the continued viability of the 
nation-state as a focus of analysis in an era of increasing global market integration, 
political interdependence, international non-governmental organizations, and processes of 
cultural homogenization. Few state theorists would argue that the power of globalization 
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has not transformed the capacities of the nation-state. The central debate concerns the 
extent of these changes and whether or not the nation-state can still be understood as a 
central actor with respect to issues of economics, politics, and cultural change. While this 
debate is both fruitful and interesting, the contending proponents are largely concerned 
with large-scale change. In other words, we know that globalization has impacted the 
traditional nation-state, but our deeper understanding of how the nation-state has been 
impacted, and more importantly how it has adapted to meet these challenges, is relatively 
limited. Little attention is paid to local processes of change, which results in a limited 
understanding of the importance or role of nation-states in an era of globalization. This 
project addresses this problem through a historical-comparative analysis of nation-state 
formation and maintenance in response to increasing transformative pressures of global 
economic, political, and cultural processes. 
I will argue that the nation-state has lost much of its capacity to control economic 
and political outcomes due to the assumption of these responsibilities by globalization 
vehicles (a global market economic system and international (IMF, World Bank) and 
supranational (G-8, European Union) non-governmental organizations, for instance). The 
global market economic system, however, requires stability and locations of both 
production and consumption. Nation-states are commonly defined by their 
responsibilities for ensuring stable space for productive and consumptive process to occur 
(Giddens 1990, 70; Panitch 1994, 75). This project the role of social policy in the process 
of creating national stability and facilitating global market integration. If policy is, 
indeed, a form of institutional social practice, what can policy analysis tell us about the 
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contemporary role of the state? Particularly, what can social policy tell us about the role 
of culture in nation-state mechanical functioning as a subordinate economic entity? 
This chapter provides a conceptual and methodological framework to examine the 
transformation of the modern nation-state as a result of the growing power and capacities 
of political and economic globalization processes. The project is a comparative-historical 
study examining the evolution of the federal government in Canada and the provincial 
government in Québec. This dissertation examines the changing role of the nation-state 
through the mechanism of social policy, specifically analyzing the emergence, 
motivations, and changes of Canadian multicultural policy and Québec intercultural 
policy. The chapter consists of four parts: (1) establishing necessary preliminary 
assumptions, (2) conceptualizing and defining the concepts of nationalism and cultural 
structure, (3) a justification and description of the comparative methodological approach 
and resolving possible comparative problems in the study of Canada and Québec, and (4) 
a brief overview of the chapter content comprising the remainder of the dissertation. 
1. Founding Assumptions  
As previously stated, I examine social policy development and evolution in 
political economic and historical context as a mechanism to observe and measure the 
actions of the state as an institutional social actor.  I believe that the observation of state 
actions will be telling in terms of understanding the contemporary role and capacities of 
the contemporary core nation-state. In order to begin the process of answering these 
central questions I must begin with a series of orienting assumptions.  
First, the state has, historically, served as the locus of political and economic 
institutional power. The institutional capacities of the state are reflected in the political 
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actions taken by institutional representatives and can be understood through such 
mechanisms as the construction and alteration of policies intended to steer the political 
economic direction of a respective nation-state.  
Second, the nation serves as the power base for each respective state providing 
legitimation and granting authority to state institutions. In return for this legitimation of 
authority the state is responsible for providing national social protections. These 
protections can be as overt as military defense or as intangible as the provision of moral 
support to the nation or groups within the nation. In sum, the maintenance of state 
authority and power is contingent on its ability to provide adequate social protections for 
national populations. Any breakdown in the capacity to protect the social welfare of the 
nation can result in a withdrawal of legitimating authority and thus threaten the continued 
capacity of the state to control established political economic mechanisms.  
Third, the policies that direct political economic action are not static and are 
regularly altered, maintained, or discarded as their perceived utility is compromised or if 
political economic conditions shift to further reduce the effectiveness of respective 
policies. This process of alteration, maintenance, or rejection can be used as a 
methodological window to historically observe the political responses of a respective 
state to larger socio-economic motivations for change. This assumption implies that the 
nation-state is not supreme in its ability to motivate large-scale social, political, or 
economic change.  
Fourth, the state alters policies and actions in response to external socio-economic 
structures that motivate political change within the nation-state. These socio-economic 
structures are not conscious manipulators of human action. Instead, they can themselves 
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be altered as understanding of the structures and mechanics governing them is developed 
by social actors. In other words, the relationship between social structures and social 
actors, in this sense, has the potential to be reciprocal. That is, once an actor has sufficient 
knowledge of how structures manipulate and control, that same actor then has the 
potential to influence those structures for specific purposes. Given the power and 
capacities of state institutions the ability to understand and subsequently influence 
structural controls is much greater than that of the individual social actor in any given 
society. Alternatively, the effects of such state influence over structural controls can have 
adverse effects. In this case state attempts to influence or manipulate external socio-
economic structures in a liberal capitalist society generate a national reaction that must, in 
turn, be recognized by the state. As shown in the previous second assumption, the 
necessity of national pacification is required to impart a level of legitimate authority to 
the state in order for power relationships to be maintained1.  
This process of political economic change and nation/state interaction can be 
viewed through an historical exemplar. The period of European exploration and capitalist 
expansion was largely governed by the political economic structure of mercantile trade 
relationships. Briefly, each colonial possession was beholden to trade only with the 
parent state and under conditions imposed by the parent state. The 1648 Peace of 
Westphalia promoted the emergence and growth of the modern nation-state as an 
institutional protector and caretaker of national economic interests. Thus the nation-state 
                                                 
1 This dissertation does not understand this relationship to be egalitarian in any way. The process of state 
negotiation with the nation is predicated on hierarchical authority. Only when macro-level socio-economic 
structures and state complicity cause broadly negative social outcomes will the possibility of national 
resistance threaten the maintenance capacities of the state. My understanding of this nation-state 
relationship is based on maintenance of elite position, authority, and control at the expense of the greater 
national population.  
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achieved a level of supremacy with respect to political economic controls and constructed 
policies to support these existing relationships. It should be noted that this period of 
autocratic state rule is not indicative of the above assumed relationships between state 
and nation. The power of the nation in support of autocratic or despotic rule is, 
understandably, limited.  
The rise of liberal ideology following the French Revolution in 1789 threatened 
the traditional political power structures that, in turn, supported the systemic structure of 
mercantilist capitalism. As political power shifted from autocratic to limited forms of 
liberal democratic governance, so too did the understanding of the current capitalist 
socio-economic structure. The injection of liberal political ideology into systemic 
economic understanding shifted the capitalist economic structure away from 
mercantilism and toward the promotion of liberal market economic “free trade.” State 
institutions and institutional actors as well as non-state actors who stood to profit from 
reorientation promoted this shift in political economic ideology (Friedrich Hayek, David 
Ricardo, and Adam Smith to name but a few influential proponents). The emergent 
relationship of institutional state actors and non-governmental economic actors would 
continue through a later period of corporatist change that solidified the dominance of the 
liberal capitalist structure over the state.   
In sum, the state has, since 1648, been the primary institution of national 
economic control. The emergence of liberalism as a viable political economic ideology to 
both pacify growing national dissent and (arguably more importantly) increase the 
growth potential of capitalist production led to a new relationship between state 
institutions and national populations. The emergence of liberal democratic states now 
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required a level of granted legitimacy from national populations. Liberal economic 
strategies resulted in increased economic growth but required new forms of promoting 
legitimate authority as a result of the extension of liberal (i.e., democratic) ideology to the 
national population through national political processes.  
As this process of liberal and capitalist integration was completed, the previously 
mentioned assumptions became apparent. That is, state control over respective economic 
spheres (in the case of mercantile capitalism) was supplanted by the marriage of 
liberalism and capitalism (in the case of laissez-faire market capitalism). States were 
required to play a larger role in the social welfare protection of the nation, even as 
corporatist relationships ensured the acceleration of liberal capitalism at the expense of 
the nation. In fact, it was the rapid acceleration of liberal capitalism and its excessively 
negative impacts on respective national populations that led to various ideological 
reactions, for example Marxism and its political manifestation, communism. While 
Marxism and communism provide simply one example of articulated resistance to the 
expansion of unrestrained liberal capitalism it is illustrative of resistive national 
responses to lack of state social protections. It could be argued that the imposition of 
Keynesian economic reforms following the Second World War represented the Western 
capitalist alternative to these national demands for increased social protections. This 
increase in state involvement in economic policy indisputably demonstrates yet another 
shift in state reaction to liberal capitalism.  
Respective states attempted to restrain the structure of liberal capitalism to 
counter the threat of communist and socialist alternatives to liberal capitalist structures 
through the enactment of social welfare provisions and increased domestic industrial 
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production. The expanded social protections inherent in Keynes’ economic strategies 
accomplished their intended goal, but at the expense of the unrestrained growth of liberal 
capitalism. The decline of the Soviet Union and the increasingly obvious failure of the 
Soviet communist socio-economic model in the late 1970s worked in concert with the 
successful exportation of capitalist ideology to the developing world accompanied by 
massive foreign direct investment. Increased ability to promote industrial capitalist 
development in the developing world was coupled with a resurgence of liberal 
democratic ideology that served specific political purposes for respective state leaders, 
but also provided ideological justification for the ubiquitous application of liberalism 
across political and economic spheres.  
These conditions resulted in respective states dismantling the social protections of 
the Keynesian period and rapidly expanding liberal market economics on an increasingly 
global scale. This historical process formed the current era of globalization and provides 
the structural backdrop for this dissertation project.  
The purpose of this excursus is to provide an illustration of the relationship 
between state and nation. Clearly, this relationship shows a level of power inherent in 
state controls and capacities as well as national power largely through the process of 
granting legitimate authority to the state. This relationship indicates an ebb and flow with 
respect to state capacities and controls as well as an adaptive ability on the part of the 
state to both facilitate economic growth as well as pacify national economic concerns. 
This state role, as facilitator of market integration and promoter of pacific domestic 
conditions, is the conceptual definition of the state used in this study.   
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1a. A Polanyian Perspective  
The role of the state, based on the above assumptions and exemplar, serves as the 
mechanism through which liberal capitalism is facilitated and national social protections 
assured. This framework is established in Karl Polanyi’s masterwork, The Great 
Transformation (2001 [1957]). Specifically, his conceptualization of a double movement 
explains the contradictory responsibilities of the contemporary nation-state: to facilitate 
liberal capitalism and to provide a level of social protection for its national population. 
For Polanyi, the mechanism of human agency is important in understanding the nature of 
the double movement through the process of national demands for protection from the 
adverse effects of liberal capitalism. The complicity of the state in facilitating liberal 
capitalism can be viewed through the political (i.e., policy) actions of institutional agents 
and non-governmental proponents2. In fact, the structure of laissez-faire liberal capitalism 
is an obvious human construction that requires constant maintenance and political 
manipulation to ensure its continued “success” (Polanyi 2001, 145). Thus the structure of 
liberal capitalism, while possessing clear levels of transformative ability, is reliant on a 
level of state support for its mechanical maintenance.  
Conversely, the national protectionism necessary for the state to maintain its 
legitimated authority within a liberal democratic political system is relatively organic.   
While laissez-faire economy was the product of deliberate State action, 
subsequent restrictions on laissez-faire started in a spontaneous way. 
Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not (Polanyi 2001, 147).   
 
                                                 
2 In Polanyi’s view the emergence of economists such as Hayek and Smith as well as liberal theorists such 
as Spencer and Sumner provided intellectual and scientific legitimacy for the expansion of liberal 
capitalism after the 1930s. This expansion is viewed through the mechanism of policy actions on the part of 
Pitt and Peel in England during the mid-Nineteenth Century (Polanyi 2001, 143-144). 
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Thus, a Polanyian understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the modern nation-
state would be that it is primarily concerned with facilitating the growth and expansion of 
the liberal market economic system. These efforts cannot be undertaken and 
accomplished without restraint as demands of the national population require that the 
state engage in some form of protective or pacific behavior to regain the legitimate 
authority granted by the national population. This is a modern historical condition that is 
completely reliant on the ideological and practical requirements demanded by the 
synthesis of liberalism and capitalism.  
2. Conceptualization and Preliminary Definitions 
 The purpose of this introduction is to provide a conceptual foundation based on 
consistent definitions. My stated assumptions and Polanyian orientation work to 
conceptualize the modern nation-state as a location of interaction and conflict between 
those profiting from liberal capitalist social structure and those adversely affected by 
these same structural conditions and demands. This is not to establish a false dichotomy, 
but to orient the reader to my understanding of the agency inherent in the process of 
structural alteration. Two issues arise from this series of assumptions and orienting 
statements: (1) the concept of the nation-state includes a necessary division between 
national populations and state institutions of elite control and (2) that social structure 
must be understood as a mutable concept that both motivates human agency as well as 
being subject to the desires and alterations of resourceful agents.   
2a. Nationalism 
The division between the nation and the state is a relatively new conceptualization 
of a much longer tradition of subsuming the nation under the auspice of the state 
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exemplified in the work of Hobsbawm (1990), Kedourie (1960), Smith (1971), and many 
others. The conceptual division between nation and state is largely derived from two 
sources: studies of civil society and the premise of Anderson’s (1983) “imagined 
communities.”  
The development of civil society is commensurate with the emergence of liberal 
democracy. As political rights expand, so to do political responsibilities. Sociological 
examinations of civil society engaged in several intellectual projects including Gramsci’s 
(1999) attempt at understanding the hegemonic processes that subjugated civil society to 
the whims and desires of the capitalist class, Ferguson’s (1966 [1767]) efforts to 
understand civil society as complementary institutions that provided protectionist 
services in support of liberal capitalism, and the current understanding of a more 
autonomous civil society that is able to challenge existing state authority (Alvarez et al. 
1998; Kaldor 2003; Waisman 1999).  
 The nationalist interpretation of the civil society distinction has largely relied on 
the work of Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), and Renan (1882). These theories rely on 
subjectivist understandings of the nation as being a largely reactive and nativist response 
to external challenges or the internal manipulations of charismatic actors. These 
“imagined communities” are reliant on common meanings and symbolic interpretation 
often disseminated through communications technologies and thus able to be controlled 
and manipulated by resourceful agents. This susceptibility to manipulation is evident in 
the work of Hobsbawm (1990, 1992) and Gellner (1983) and has contributed to a 
negative view of nationalism as a “top-down” effort on the part of interested elites to 
ensure systemic maintenance or engage in a process of power consolidation. 
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 This negative view of nationalism and national projects in general has prompted a 
critical response from those who view the purely ideological orientation of Anderson and 
Gellner as being analytically impotent. Castells (2004), for one questions the utility of a 
theoretical orientation that relies solely on ideology and a subjectivist view of culture: 
But if the meaning of the statement is, as it is explicit in Gellner’s theory, 
that nations are pure ideological artifacts, constructed through arbitrary 
manipulation of historical myths by intellectuals for the interests of the 
social and economic elites, then the historical record seems to belie such 
an excessive deconstructionism (Castells 2004, 32).    
 
Indeed, it is the twin dangers of assumed manipulation and pure subjective existence that 
scholars such as Castells, Keating (1995), and Renault (1991) argue against. Through 
traditional perspectives on nationalism, we find very little evidence of active agency on 
the part of the nation to resist these manipulative efforts on the part of elites. Any cursory 
glance at the history of social movements and subaltern resistance would lead most to 
question the assumption that nationalism is neither tangible nor devoid of independent 
agency. Indeed, many movements of colonial liberation and revolts against autocratic 
rule have utilized a nationalist context and rhetoric to mobilize effective resources and 
support. Aside from embracing a critique of traditional theories of nationalism, this 
project is concerned with establishing justification for the analytical division between the 
nation and the state. Recent work on the nation as a viable social actor with the power to 
influence and motivate state action has been a central feature of the research performed 
by the previously mentioned Castells, Keating, and Renault along with others such as 
Brubaker (1992) and Pincus (1999).  
 This analytical distinction between the nation and state, as well as the 
understanding that the nation is not simply an amorphous mass responding to the 
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commands of elite masters, provides important conceptual support for the remainder of 
the project. A Polanyian perspective of the nation-state implies this type of reciprocal 
relationship between nation and state. The use of the “double movement” as a 
methodological tool or framework enables state analyses to transcend the divisions 
among theorists of nationalism. Therefore, this project recognizes the contributions of the 
debate on nationalism, but circumvents the issue methodologically by incorporating an 
established Polanyian concept, the “double movement.” Using this concept to inform a 
primary conceptual framework also enables the analysis to extend beyond the traditional 
view of the nation-state as an autonomous or insular entity. This is particularly important 
as economic globalization processes become dominant in their ability to dictate national 
economic production and capacities for economic controls. This point will be discussed 
at length in the following chapter. 
2a1. A Note on the Comparability of Québec and Canada 
 A brief note on the use of Québec as a comparative example of a nation-state is 
required. A cursory glance would show a methodological level of analysis problem that 
works to undermine any theoretical conclusions before the analysis has even taken place. 
This need not be a problem either on an empirical level or in terms of generating a 
theoretical understanding of nation-state construction and transformation. I argue that the 
unique history of Québec, including the cultural process of nation-building that has 
occurred concurrently with the Canadian nationalist project, as well as the development 
of autonomous governmental controls and authority make it relatively simple to show 
that Québec operates as a limited but functional nation-state both domestically and 
internationally. Castells makes a similar conceptual leap with his term “national quasi-
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state” to describe the experience of Québec as exemplary of “the development of nations 
that stop at the threshold of statehood, but force their parent state to adapt, and cede 
sovereignty…” (Castells 2004, 55). While this articulation of Québec as a limited nation-
state is helpful, his understanding that the province “stop[ped] at the threshold of 
statehood” is limiting but not surprising. Castells’ project is clearly focused on an 
understanding of the nation as a concept of increasing importance. His project is centered 
on the proposition that nations have increased in importance while states have 
simultaneously declined in their capacity as institutions of power. This proposition is 
supported by the established understanding that the nation is implicitly distinct from the 
state and thus enables the dual motions of national ascendancy and state decline in this 
contemporary era.  
This perspective ignores the historic increase in autonomous state authority 
granted to Québec by the Canadian government in the fields of education, diplomacy, 
immigration, and trade. Granted, this autonomy is limited and any statement that 
understands Québec as a fully autonomous nation-state would be erroneous. Analytically, 
however, the increase in Québec state autonomy is undeniable and has created a situation 
in which the authority of Québec supersedes that of the Canadian federal government in 
many situations. Of course, the converse is true as Québec must defer to Canadian 
authority in many more instances. I would argue that the autonomy of the Québec state, 
particularly with respect to immigration and culture, in conjunction with a strong 
nationalist project creates a situation in which the nation-state designation can be 
analytically applied to both Canada and Québec. As I will show in subsequent historical 
background chapters, both Canada and Québec have struggled to construct viable nation-
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states since the mid-1700s and a superficial assumption that Québec cannot be defined as 
a form of nation-state due to its subsumed provincial position within Canada is incorrect 
and belies a limited view of both nation and state.  
I would argue that the realities of global interdependence weaken full and 
complete autonomy on the part of a respective state and can no longer be used as a 
definition of a nation-state. Between nation-states, power and influence play significant 
roles in establishing state hierarchies, but more to the point the global market economic 
system has assumed a larger role in dictating economic and social policies in all nation-
states. The ability of a nation-state to adapt and survive in this accelerating era of 
globalization becomes a more useful definitional tool. I will show that Québec has 
performed on par with Canada in its response to the challenge of globalization and thus 
must be considered, at some level, a nation-state. 
In addition to previous arguments for the comparability of Canada and Québec as 
nation-states, this analysis raises the possibility that conventional definitions of the 
“state” and “nation-state” may be inadequate. Recent discussion of the demise of the 
nation will be elaborated in the following chapter; however, shifting state capacities raise 
the possibility that defining the state has become a much more ambiguous process. My 
general definition of a state-as a social institution that is able to function with some level 
of political autonomy in decision-making and policy-construction through the process of 
national legitimation-must include exemplars such as Québec that previously would not 
be formally defined as nation-states. The question of level of political autonomy must 
also be considered a weak criterion in defining what is and is not a state. The simple fact 
that globalization institutions and processes have usurped many of the political economic 
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capacities that were traditionally the responsibility of respective states requires a more 
broad understanding of “autonomy” with respect to the policy-making process.  
For example, Canada is subject to the judgments of the NAFTA Binational 
Adjudication Panel as well as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body with respect to national 
economic protections such as tariffs and subsidies. Does this reduction of political 
autonomy make Canada less of a state? Does the fact that Québec has been able to 
establish state-owned utilities (Hydro-Québec, for example) and enact autonomous 
immigration and cultural policies, often against the wishes of Ottawa, make Québec more 
of a state? Clearly, my definition of the state is inclusive of both realities due to its focus 
on autonomous policy-making and not on a higher-level of overall political autonomy. 
3. Culture, Structure, and the Methodological Utility of Social Policy 
 This project argues that culture must play a much more central role in analytical 
studies of the interaction between the state, globalization processes, and national 
populations. As such we must engage in a brief discussion of how culture has been 
understood, particularly with respect to its epistemological foundations. Debates over 
these epistemological assumptions have engendered a useful literature that attempts to 
integrate conflicting epistemological views of culture and make the concept more 
sociologically useful.  
Recently, scholars have shown considerable interest in examining the concepts of 
social structure and human agency. While most of these analyses have been in the form 
of isolated examinations of one or the other exemplary work has been done on the 
interactive relationship between structure and agency. The work of Bourdieu, Giddens, 
and Habermas has generated relatively complementary approaches to the theoretical 
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integration of structure and agency. Common to these (and other) integrative approaches 
is an analysis of culture as a significant force shaping human interaction.  
 The fact that culture surfaces so commonly in integrative theories of structure and 
agency should surprise few. A common (but by no means conclusive) definition of 
culture as “systems of meaning and the practices in which they are embedded” 
(Steinmetz 1999, 7) shows the ability of the concept to incorporate systemic or structural 
elements that possess ability to pattern human action. Conversely, the subjective 
elements inherent in the word “meaning” attribute some level of individual control over 
the definition and understanding of such “meanings.” Clarity has never been a term used 
to describe any conceptual understanding of culture. What is clear though is that 
investigations of culture show a level of disagreement over the ontological location of 
culture. Does our definition of culture empower the individual human agent or attribute 
causal authority to structures that undergird systems of meaning? This is particularly 
important in understanding the potential role of culture with respect to national social 
policy. That is, in order to view culture as having the potential to be used to influence or 
facilitate larger structural conditions, we must be able to move beyond traditional (strict) 
subjectivist approaches to the concept. 
 The purpose of this section is to articulate an understanding of culture that will be 
useful in establishing a defensible position in the debate concerning the interaction of 
social structure and human agency. The goal of clarifying these concepts is to establish a 
clear methodological framework that is able to incorporate the dynamic nature of culture 
as both enabling and constraining human action. In other words, can culture motivate 
human action as well as be influenced or manipulated by human agents? 
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3a. Culture: A Structure/Agency Approach  
 The concept of culture succeeds in deflecting any effort toward developing a 
consensus definition. The oft-cited Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) classic, Culture: A 
Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, identifies more than 150 distinct definitions 
and uses of the concept. Given their efforts were published in the early 1950s, one can 
safely assume that the remainder of the Twentieth Century added more than a few 
definitions and applications to the list. This project is not interested in contributing to 
culture’s problem of over-definition (however, defining an operational variable is 
unavoidable), nor is the purpose to clarify one of the myriad conceptualizations of 
culture. This project is concerned with the implications of how culture has been used in 
the process of nation-building and in the process of nation-state reaction to encroaching 
globalization forces. Thus, the empirical and theoretical “how” of culture is much more 
important to this work than any definitional or conceptual “what.” 
 In order to answer the question of how culture relates to the contemporary nation-
building process I must first state a definition then operationalize that definition within 
some sort of methodological framework. The former is the task of this section, and the 
latter will be accomplished in the following section.  
 This project views culture as the active and passive manifestation of collective 
understandings of norms and beliefs. In other terms, culture can be viewed through 
normative behavior and actions. In addition, the concept of culture must itself incorporate 
an element of action as cumulative norms pattern present and future human action 
through their very being. Thus, an operational definition of culture can be stated as a 
collective systemic understanding of normative behavior that relies on human agents for 
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dissemination and maintenance. This definition is heavily reliant on the understanding 
that ideology and culture are inexorably connected. In a practical sense, the promotion of 
a dominant ideology, in this case Canadian and Québécois nationalism, is linked with 
cultural symbols and structures of meaning. In the words of Sutton, “ideology is the 
pattered reaction to the patterned strains of a social role (1956, 307-308).” In this sense 
we can understand the process of nation-building as partly a process of ideological 
conditioning (patterned reaction) through the construction and manipulation of national 
cultural symbols and definitions. Nationalism is a monolithic project, which is reflected 
in the promotion of a singular culture through ideological means. In other words, the 
ideology of nationalism drives the manifestation of national cultural symbols and 
definitions.  
Culture itself cannot be understood as a social actor – for instance, in the same 
way that an economic market can retain no level of human agency – however, the human 
manipulation or maintenance of culture attributes the appearance of action on the part of 
culture.  
 This definition does sublimate culture to a position of subservience to human 
agents, however the definition also attributes a level of causal efficacy to culture – it also 
patterns human action – and thus, must be understood as a dynamic and dialectical 
concept. Clearly, this definition of culture incorporates conventional understandings of 
normative, ideological human agency. It also understands culture as being inherently 
structural in its ability to guide human action. Traditional sociological and philosophical 
approaches to the study of culture have largely recognized both conceptual positions, but 
have also shown a tendency to pick one position over the other. These tendencies are 
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reflected in the historical rise and fall of subjectivist and positivist approaches in the 
social sciences. This cyclical pattern of intellectual inquiry is eloquently described in 
Thomas McCarthy’s exhaustive introduction to the English edition of The Theory of 
Communicative Action (Habermas 1984, ix-xiv).  
Briefly, the initial Cartesian empowerment of the individual served the 
Enlightenment ideal of empowering individual human agency and ability over the 
empirically constraining forces of political and cultural structures of oppression (i.e., 
Church, monarchical political systems, etc…). The dominance of the subjectivist 
approach to understanding human nature was challenged by more structuralist and 
positivist approaches to socials scientific inquiry. From Marx’s historical materialism to  
Compte and Durkheim’s positivism provided structured critiques of the impact of both 
the Enlightenment and subjectivist idealism on traditional social conditions. In dialectical 
fashion, the dominance of structural approaches to social theory took an antithetical turn 
with the emergence of phenomenological and existential approaches in the Twentieth 
Century. McCarthy argues that social scientific inquiry has reacted yet again to this 
subjectivist turn with increased emphasis on structural variables and a structuralist bias in 
social theoretical development. 
  The purpose of this discussion is two-fold. First, a look at the intellectual history 
of subjectivist and structural dominance in social theory shows a larger problem of 
dichotomous reasoning that ultimately endangers the theoretical utility of any perspective 
that fails to incorporate both in understanding the interactive dynamics of the social 
world. In addition, the theoretical promotion of either subjectivist or structuralist 
perspectives may be more indicative of the historically temporal world from which the 
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theory emerged which in turn complicates theoretical utility. This is commonly illustrated 
in the historical development of sociology as an academic discipline. The subjective 
ideals of the Enlightenment found their most dramatic personification in the French 
Revolution. The conservative reaction to such wholesale social change resulted in an 
epistemological shift in social scientific inquiry.  
Second, the attempt to link individual agency with social structure requires a 
common denominator. In this study that denominator is, of course, culture. Culture is a 
conceptual common thread throughout the historical cycle of subjectivist and structuralist 
theories. All general social theorists are required to address the role of traditions, 
common language, religion, symbols (both material and ideological), and systems of 
belief in order to provide a full understanding of how society functions. The concepts of 
alienation and anomie are, in fact, attempts to address the problem of culture in the 
emergence of a modern liberal capitalist society. More specifically, as material 
conditions and structural shifts impact the occupational and material lives of individual 
actors, those actors will seek alternative means of social comprehension, largely through 
the development of common meaning and group identification. In other words, as 
individuals become more alienated their desire for social interdependence increases. This 
search for meaning and cohesive membership is a largely cultural process. 
My conceptual use of culture in this project is as a vehicle to understand how the 
nation-state has changed in response to the emergence of a global market political 
economic system. This conceptualization is clearly centered on incorporating a 
structurally-sensitive understanding of culture. My position is informed by the work of 
Robert Wuthnow (1987; Wuthnow et al. 1984). I am particularly indebted to Wuthnow’s 
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methodological approach examining observable practice as distinct from a purely 
subjectivist conceptualization of culture:   
Rather than it consisting of attitudes, beliefs, and values, it is characterized 
by boundaries, categories, and elements. In the structural approach, culture 
is portrayed as an object amenable to observation. It consists of discourse 
that can be heard or read or other kinds of gestures, objects, acts, and 
events that can be seen, recorded, classified, and so forth. It does not 
consist of or ultimately reflect subjective states of the individual 
(Wuthnow 1987, 12).  
 
Wuthnow’s major contribution is the justification for analyzing culture through patterned 
action, or structure. This position assumes that culture is able to structure human action 
as well as be shaped and altered by a variety of social actors, both subjectivist and 
structural qualities that will be integrated into this project. The theoretical implication of 
this position will be examined later in this project. What is required now is the provision 
of a methodological mechanism that will allow this dynamic definition to be applied to 
empirical cases. 
3b. Methodological Precedent and Framework 
 As I have consistently stated, this project is built on the work of others. My 
reliance on a Polanyian understanding of state and national interaction, my embrace of 
the subjectivist-structuralist philosophical debate, and the problems inherent in 
incorporating a dynamic view of culture all rely on existing concepts, interactive 
understandings, and theoretical frameworks. Methodologically, this project is no 
different. 
 This project utilizes social policy as a methodological mechanism to observe and 
illustrate the historical change that has occurred with respect to (1) the state’s capacity to 
control economic, political, and cultural processes and (2) to illustrate the double 
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movement between the state’s promotion of the global market economic system and the 
nation’s demand for social protections from that same economic system. The work of 
Giddens (1984), Habermas (1998; 1984), and Bourdieu (1977) will be most helpful in 
achieving these ends, however my use of each of the theorists will be purely 
methodological, as the point of this project is not to resolve the structure/agency debate, 
but to gain a more clear understanding of the contemporary nation-state. I will briefly 
illustrate the utility of each before stating my methodological position.  
3b1. Structuration, Habitus/Field, and Communicative Action 
 While the theoretical positions of Giddens, Bourdieu, and Habermas are unique in 
their details, they all utilize a common methodological position. In all three theories, 
social practice is used as a tool to observe and measure the level of social action and 
influence on the part of social structures and human agents. This position is entirely 
consistent with Wuthnow’s (1987) requirement that culture must be observed in order to 
be analytically viable. I argue that social policy will tell us how the state mediates 
between global political economic forces and national social protections. The medium of 
social practice is the methodological tool that makes this type of analysis possible. 
Specifically, I will examine multicultural policy in Canada and intercultural policy in 
Québec as indications of state practice. That is, the development and evolution of social 
policy, specifically multicultural and intercultural policies, is indicative of actions taken 
by the state as an institutional actor. We can observe and analyze the actions and abilities 
of the Canadian and Québec states through their promotion, adaptation, and reduction of 
these social policies. More to the point, I argue that examination of these policies will tell 
us a great deal about how the Canadian and Québec states have adapted to the emerging 
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global market economic system. The previously stated emphasis on the work of Giddens, 
Bourdieu, and Habermas is detailed here in support of my connection between social 
policy and social practice.        
 Giddens’ theory of structuration understands practice as being the observable 
reality of human societies. Analytical approaches that locate causal authority to either 
structures or agents are missing the reality of interactive processes.  
The basic domain of the study of the social sciences, according to 
the theory of structuration, is neither the experience of the 
individual actor, nor the existence of any form of social totality, 
but social practices ordered across time and space (Giddens 1984, 
2). 
 
Giddens attributes a high level of power to agency and human agents in his work (too 
much power some, such as Craib (1993), have argued), but the basic intent of his position 
is to emphasize the duality of social structure as having the power to both constrain and 
enable human action. That Giddens seems to often favor agency in his analyses is a 
critique better suited to a theoretical discussion of structuration. Of specific importance 
here is the dual nature of structure and agency in Giddens’ methodology. The 
methodological utility of structure is viewed as offering opportunity as well as oppression 
while human agency is able to manipulate structural controls as well as be controlled by 
those same structures. This methodological position offers a dynamic framework on 
which to build a larger study of interaction between the nation, state, and globalization.     
The emphasis on practice as an analytical mechanism allowing for the observation 
of social interaction is echoed in Bourdieu’s work. If possible, Bourdieu seems even 
more adamant about dismissing the division between structure and agency than Giddens. 
His extensive reviews of structuralist and subjectivist excesses ensure that the only 
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logical outcome of his work is a methodological position focused on a dynamic 
relationship between structures and agents. This position shapes his approach to practice 
as being central to an empirically-informed understanding of human society (Bourdieu 
1977; 1990). 
Bourdieu believes that practice is the empirical result of the interaction between 
social structures and human agency and thus becomes the logical methodological lens to 
observe this interactive process. This position is quite similar to Giddens’ and aids in the 
contribution of a useful methodological framework for the current study. Major 
differences between Bourdieu and Giddens become apparent if one moves beyond the 
limited methodological similarity of practice as an analytical tool. While Giddens 
emphasized the importance of human action, Bourdieu’s twin concepts of habitus and 
field show a structuralist tendency. Superficially, habitus can be understood as the 
conceptualization of human agency, while field represents more traditionally understood 
social structures. A deeper look, however, highlights structural tendencies in Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus. Bourdieu implies a latent subordination of agency due to habitus 
being “the product of the internalization of the structures [represented by his concept of 
fields]” (Bourdieu 1989, 18). This is simply an observation of Bourdieu’s differing 
theoretical conclusions and biases when compared to those of Giddens. His 
understanding of habitus and field is informed by a study of social practice, which again 
shows its methodological utility in transcending the problems of structure and agency and 
particularly as a methodological tool useful in the investigation of the dynamic 
relationship between actors and structures of control.  
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 Habermas views the problem of structure and agency as a similar analytical 
problem, but does more than either Giddens or Bourdieu in putting his theory to an 
empirical test. The theory of communicative action is best summed up by Habermas: 
If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially 
coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination is 
established through communication-and in certain central spheres through 
communication aimed at reaching agreement-then the reproduction of the 
species also requires satisfying the conditions of rationality that is inherent 
in communicative action (Habermas 1984, 397).  
 
We see, again, twin concepts being used to conceptualize human agency and social 
structure: the lifeworld and the social system. Both work to shape the social world and 
both maintain a level of autonomy and causal efficacy. As was the case with Bourdieu 
however, Habermas attributes a level of supremacy to social structure with his extended 
discussion of the process of social system colonization of the lifeworld in which human 
agency is becoming increasingly controlled by the formal rationality of the social system 
(Habermas 1987).  
 The methodological approach that Habermas uses to understand the lifeworld and 
social system is discourse, or communication. Discursive interaction between actors and 
groups patterned by the social system becomes the lens through which these processes of 
colonization and integration can be observed. As a methodological framework, this is 
nearly identical to the approach used by Giddens and Bourdieu – albeit in the 
construction of divergent theoretical conclusions. Habermas attempts an application of 
his communicative action theory in Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a 
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1998).  
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  In this work, Habermas seeks to bridge the structural system (facts) and the 
subjective lifeworld (norms) by analyzing the discursive process of negotiating, creating, 
and altering law and the political process of democracy. He agrees with the common 
contention that the structure/agency divide is useless, but also implies that this is not only 
a theoretical evolution but also historical:  
…modern societies have become so complex that these two conceptual 
motifs-that of a society concentrated in the state and that of a society made 
up of individuals-can no longer be applied unproblematically (Habermas 
1998, 1-2). 
 
The premise of the text is, in part, an examination of the dual nature of law in modern 
societies. One could argue that Habermas makes the case that law serves dual purposes 
by enforcing central authority (of the state, for instance) through retributive punishment 
and also gleaning legitimate authority from those over whom it maintains control. For 
Habermas, this process of “Law as Social Mediation between Facts and Norms” occurs 
through communication and, if participating groups have sufficient power, negotiation. 
The issue at hand is Habermas’ utilization of law as a methodological tool to examine the 
process of political adaptation and change (as implied in the previous quote on the 
increasing complexity of modern societies).  
 Habermas views law as the logical outcome of the process of discursive 
interaction between the state and the nation. In this way, his methodological approach is 
consistent with the methodological responsibility Giddens and Bourdieu place on social 
practice, albeit in a more explicit and applied manner. These approaches assist in the 
construction of a methodological framework that will be incorporated into this 
examination of the contemporary nation-state. 
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3b2. Methodological Framework       
 This project seeks to understand the capacities and role of the contemporary 
nation-state and how those capacities and roles have changed as a result of accelerating 
globalization processes. I will argue that the modern nation-state has, in fact, reduced 
abilities to affect economic policy or substantive political change. Its reconceptualized 
role is to maintain stable social conditions to ensure productive and consumptive growth 
in accordance with market economic requirements. The modern nation-state must rely on 
its ability to manufacture, control, and maintain structures of culture in order to ensure 
such stability. Culture has become the focal arena of state control efforts due to the 
reduction in authoritative capacity with respect to economic and large-scale political 
policies.  
 I propose to examine the validity of these claims through a comparative-historical 
analysis of changes in state capacities, ultimately resulting social policy outcomes, from 
1944 through the present. I will compare the nation-states of Canada and Québec relying 
on the previously stated justification on comparability. My specific focus on social 
policy, in this case federal multicultural and provincial intercultural policy emergence, 
development, and change, serves as the methodological tool allowing the project to 
illustrate the dynamic relationship between national actors, state institutions, and global 
political economic structures. In other words, this project utilizes policy as a mechanism 
that illuminates the active interaction and mediating processes of the state in accordance 
with the Polanyian concept of the double movement between market economic predation 
and national social protection.  
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 This project will be able to show not only the current capacities and abilities of 
the state to maintain effective legitimate authority, but more importantly how these 
capacities have changed through the examination of general political economic change 
over time and the use of social policy evolution as a tool to view state action in response 
to those general political economic changes. Changes in state policies over time are 
juxtaposed with the emergence and rise of globalization processes to show the process of 
change and the transitioning of power from the nation-state to global institutions and 
processes. An historical approach allows for the application of the study of social practice 
as exemplified in the work of Giddens, Bourdieu, and Habermas. By combining 
historical-comparative and social practice methodological approaches the mechanism of 
social policy is able to be used to illustrate and understand the dialectical relationship 
between globalization processes and national populations – with the express intent of 
understanding the mediating role of the state and developing a more precise theoretical 
understanding of how the nation-state has been affected by expanding and empowered 
globalization institutions and processes.  
3b3. Data Collection and Sources  
 This project is a large-scale comparative policy analysis that requires significant 
contextual understanding with respect to economic and demographic development. In 
addition to multicultural and intercultural policy development analyses, the project 
required an understanding of historical national development/experience in relation to 
increasing global market integration of both Canada and Québec.   
Data for this project are from two primary sources: policy development 
documents and statistical economic and demographic data. Policy development materials 
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are largely research studies, inter-departmental correspondence, and evaluation 
information concerning economic development strategies, international trade, domestic 
economic protection, demographic change, and social policy responses to both economic 
and demographic change. Much of this historical policy development information was 
obtained at the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa as well as the Archives nationales 
du Québec in Montréal.  
More contemporary information was obtained at federal government institutions 
such as the Canada Economic Development for Québec Regions, Heritage Canada, 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, International Trade Canada, and Foreign Affairs 
Canada. Provincial government sources of information included the Ministère de la 
Culture et des communications; Développment économique, Innovation et Exportation; 
Ministère de l’Immigration et des Communautés culturelles; Investissement Québec; 
Hydro-Québec; and the Ministère des Relations internationales. 
 Statistical data on economic and demographic conditions and change was 
obtained from Statistics Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Additional 
secondary data and analyses were obtained from researchers at McGill University, 
Université de Montréal, Université de Québec à Montréal, the University of Ottawa, and 
Carleton University. 
4. Dissertation Structure 
 The present chapter is designed to offer a brief introduction to the intent of the 
study and to offer operational definitions of concepts and positions taken by the author. 
The extended discussion of methodology is also intended to provide a conceptual 
foundation upon which a cumulative theoretical position can be built.  
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 Chapter Two offers that cumulative theoretical position as well as providing a 
review of relevant theories of the state and globalization processes. This theoretical 
review is designed to both support the presented hypothetical theory of the author and 
also to point out weaknesses in existing perspectives on the state and globalization. This 
chapter also focuses on the debate concerning multiculturalism and its conflict with the 
liberal democratic ideology that supports both nation-states and globalization processes.  
 Chapters Three and Four offer brief historical background information on both 
Canada and Québec, respectively. Both histories are designed to highlight the nation-
building process in each example and thus are written from a more subjectively-informed 
nationalist perspective. The narrative of both Canadian and Québec national development 
and state formation depict a process of continual adaptation and struggle to construct and 
maintain cohesive national identities as well as construct state institutions that adequately 
reflect national impulses and requirements of each respective nationalist project.   
 Chapter Five describes the development and emergence of a global market 
economic system beginning with the Bretton Woods Agreements in 1944 and continuing 
through the post-NAFTA present. The chapter deals exclusively with the impact of 
globalization’s acceleration on both Canada and Québec, but also must address larger 
macro socio-economic developments that drive nation-state level conditions and change.  
 Chapter Six adds a level of specificity in discussing the ethnic diversification of 
Canada (as an exemplar of the Western World) as a result of accelerating globalization 
processes and the solidification of liberal market economics as the dominant political 
economic paradigm throughout the latter half of the Twentieth Century. The 
diversification of socio-cultural national demography plays a significant role in 
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determining the state’s response to the requirements of globalization and works toward 
understanding the impact of globalization processes on the nation-state, particular with 
respect to culture. 
 Chapter Seven is the analytical culmination of the dissertation. This chapter 
chronicles the development and evolution of multicultural and intercultural policies in 
Canada and Québec, respectively. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the 
interactive role of policy in the state’s current responsibilities within the global political 
economic system as well as illuminating the capacities of the contemporary nation-state 
in both promoting the globalization project and maintaining the stability and complicity 
of national populations.  
 Chapter Eight provides a conclusion intended to complete the theoretical project 
of developing a more empirically-informed theory of how modern democratic nation-
states have changed as a result of globalization processes as well as clarifying the current 
capacities of the nation-state with respect to ensuring legitimate authority over respective 
national populations. This chapter also addresses future possibilities with respect to the 
relationship of the state to globalization and the future roles of the nation-state in an 









Toward an Embedded Analysis of the Nation and State in Globalization Studies 
 
The current historical epoch is conventionally understood as a shrinking world in 
which communications, production, conflict, and even culture are being brought closer 
and closer to a singular norm. Phrases such as “globalism,” “global community,” and of 
course “globalization” imply some sense of a singular and interdependent world. These 
notions are continually challenged by instances of ethno-national conflict, inter-national 
conflict, and the persisting reality that the nation-state remains a singular institution 
capable of autonomous action that does not always conform to dominant global political 
economic demands. The ascendance of socialist and ethno-nationalist political parties in 
Latin America and the election of Hamas in Palestine are just two of many contemporary 
examples demonstrating the continued importance of the nation-state as a local institution 
of power. 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the effect of economic globalization 
on the Western, advanced capitalist nation-state. This chapter examines various 
perspectives attempting to understand the nation-state and how this institution has 
adapted to the apparent rise of global economic processes and forces of political 
economic dominance. Before the process of answering the overall question can begin, the 
project must first establish a basic theoretical understanding of (1) the nation-state and (2) 
the nature of economic globalization and its complementary projects of ideological and 
cultural integration.  
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In order to answer these questions two main issues must be resolved. First, it is 
assumed that a change in the capacities of the nation-state has already occurred due, in 
some part, to the many processes defined as “globalization.” Any relevant discussion of 
the contemporary nation-state or globalization must first address these shifts in power. If 
we claim to be looking at a new form of nation-state as an evolved form of state 
institutions, a component of an emerging global system of social authority, or even some 
combination of other less apparent changes we must first demonstrate that the nation-
state has, in fact undergone substantial change.  
Second, an understanding of how the nation-state has changed due to increasing 
globalization forces is required. Any observation on socio-political, socio-economic, or 
socio-cultural change that simply demonstrates the occurrence of change without 
analyzing the (multiple) causal motivations and outcomes of said change is doomed to 
remain superficial in its analytical utility. This chapter will address the question of what, 
in terms of nation-state capacities and roles, has changed as a result of globalization 
processes. The chapter will also provide further justification for the positions taken and 
concepts formulated in this dissertation project. The question of how the state is impacted 
and altered by globalization processes and how the state, in turn, adapts to these changing 
conditions is the analytical project of Part Three. 
Specifically, this chapter will (1) propose a theoretical position with respect to the 
role of culture in the contemporary nation-state; (2) justify this theoretical position 
through the use of existing studies of (a) state theory and (b) globalization theories; (3) 
provide an exemplar that illustrates the conflictual nature of the “double movement,” 
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specifically focusing on the problems of implementing multiculturalism in a liberal 
society. 
1. Theoretical Foundation 
As stated in the previous chapter, this project uses policy development and 
evolution as a mechanism for observing and analyzing state adaptive processes.  This 
project is designed to examine the questions of: (1) how economic globalization impacts 
the political economic capacities of the Western, advanced capitalist (core) nation-state, 
(2) how global market integration impacts and affects national populations of core nation-
states, and (3) how states respond to the dual requirements of global market integration 
and maintaining national social cohesion and stability. 
The argument put forth in this project is that the process of global market 
integration is desirable for core states, yet requires a level of labor migration that is 
increasingly diverse in its ethno-cultural composition. This requirement of an ethno-
culturally diverse labor pool contributes to rapid ethno-cultural diversification of core 
national populations. The challenge of diverse cultural norms and traditions to pre-
existing cultural and social institutions of control (nationalist culture, religious 
hegemony, etc…) creates strain and the potential for social destabilization. States must 
respond to dual pressures of systemic global economic integration and national 
population demands for stability. 
Specifically, this project compares the global market integration experiences of 
Canada and Québec. Both states desire global market integration, both states have 
experienced commensurate ethno-cultural diversification as a result of this integrative 
process, and both have responded to these changes through social policy solutions 
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advocating multicultural and intercultural (Canada and Québec, respectively) solutions to 
these challenges motivated by economic globalization. 
1a. Culture as a Mechanism of State Control 
 The original purpose for nation-state organization in a traditional Westphalian 
context was for national economic protection and inter-national trade support. As many 
scholars have stated, and as we will see shortly, globalization processes have reduced the 
ability of the nation-state to fulfill its traditional purpose. The nation-state, however, 
continues to maintain a significant role as an institutional of legal, political, and cultural 
authority. I argue that the decline of state capacity to control or protect nation economic 
interests has resulted in a commensurate shift in political attention to the control and 
management of national cultural symbols, ideology, and structures. Specifically, the state 
must now rely on the management of cultural structures in order to pacify national 
populations. The work of Ulf Hannerz contributes to this perspective: 
The second framework of cultural process is that of the state, not as a 
bounded physical area but as organizational form. The state is engaged in 
the management of meaning in various ways. To gain legitimate authority 
state apparatuses nowadays tend to reach out with different degrees of 
credibility and success toward their subjects to foster the idea that the state 
is a nation, and to construct them culturally as citizens. This involves a 
degree of homogenization as a goal of cultural engineering. On the other 
hand, the state also takes an interest in shaping such differences among 
people as are desirable for the purpose of fitting categories of individuals 
into different slots in the structure of production and reproduction 
(Hannerz 1997, 112-113). 
 
This statement raises several interesting points, the first being an apparent compatibility 
with this perspective and Wuthnow’s integration of structure and culture through the 
production of meaning (see the previous chapter). “The management of meaning” for 
Hannerz is a primary goal for the contemporary state and thus implies a capacity to 
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construct and alter structures of control - at least to the extent that these structures are 
defined as cultural. For both Hannerz and Wuthnow, “meaning” serves as a method to 
investigate these structures; in other words, normative meaning and symbols are the 
outcome of the process of structural construction on the part of concerted social actors 
(for Hannerz, the organizational state). In understanding “meaning” as a construct of 
larger cultural structures, we are able to move beyond limited subjectivist determinations 
of culture and understand the potential of culture to be used as an institutional mechanism 
of larger control structures. 
By examining structures or systems of meaning as causal outcomes, we are able to 
view the process of this construction or investigate the (potentially) multi-causal 
processes that led to this process in the first place. The examination of practice, in this 
case through the construction of social policies designed to construct or alter structures of 
culture, illuminates the process of meaning creation, including the motivations and 
purposes of such political action. It is here that Hannerz’ comments can be most 
effectively tied to the methodological focus on practice.  
 Hannerz comments that homogenization and diversity are twin requirements of 
the construction of social controls and labor market management. In effect, by focusing 
on the issue of cultural homogenization or targeted diversification for labor purposes we 
are left with a very focused view of the state’s relationship with structures defining 
meaning (read: culture), however that is all we are able to discern. By ignoring the 
motivations of state manufacturing and maintenance of cultural structures, Hannerz is 
unable to fully integrate his analysis with larger political economic and structural 
processes. To be fair, his analysis is intended to do exactly this and provides an excellent 
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theoretical overview of the processes of cultural change that drives the process of 
creolization of peripheral culture that informs better-known theories of “glocalization” 
(Escobar 2001; Robertson 1995; Roudometof 2003). I would argue that Hannerz offers a 
very interesting and potentially promising beginning, but his interests lead him away 
from exploring this contention that states are active in the construction of cultural 
structures of control. I believe that investigating the question further is essential in 
understanding the contemporary role of the nation-state.   
An older conceptualization of state control over culture and meaning can be found 
in the work of Louis Althusser. His concept of an ideological state apparatus (ISA) 
serves as the structural mechanism that enables the Gramscian concept of hegemony. 
Gramsci (1999) developed the concept in order to understand the process of consensual 
domination, or why those being exploited by the same system so readily reproduce the 
social conditions of capitalist class domination. The two concepts were meant to be 
complementary, however a significant methodological difference can be identified.  
For Gramsci, the centers of societal reproduction and hegemonic maintenance 
were located within the confines of civil society and distinct from that of “‘political 
society’ or ‘the State’” (Gramsci 1999, 12). Althusser, while implicitly agreeing with the 
concept of hegemony and the process of hegemonic authority, differed with Gramsci on 
the mechanical nature of social reproduction necessary for the continuation of a systemic 
capitalist project. For Althusser, both Marx and Gramsci underestimated the ability of the 
state to control ideology for the purpose of reproducing conditions favorable to capitalist 
production (Althusser 2001). 
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Althusser’s description of state control over cultural institutions of control is, for 
the purposes of this project, overly focused on state structures. There is relatively little 
motivation for agent centered change in Althusser’s thinking and therefore an 
incompatibility with the central framework of this essay; namely, the national 
protectionist impulse inherent in the “double movement.” Critics of structuralism in 
general and Althusser in particular have made similar critical claims that his perspective 
suffered from both structural determinism and ahistoricity (Schmidt 1981; Thompson 
1978).  
This project focuses on the dual responsibilities of the contemporary nation-state: 
to facilitate globalization (or global market integration) and to ensure domestic stability 
by responding to national protectionist demands resulting primarily from this process of 
global market integration. Theoretical perspectives that limit themselves to isolated issues 
of structural control or subjectivist conceptualization of “meaning” are incapable of 
generating the holistic perspective optimal for answering the question of how the 
contemporary nation-state has changed as a result of global market integration.  
This project is designed to understand the role of culture in a contemporary state 
impacted by globalization processes. There exists a scholarly tradition examining the role 
of culture as constitutive of state controls over nation populations. This dissertation seeks 
to understand the contemporary nature and role of culture in nation states that are 
increasingly subordinated to global political economic interests.  
The following section focuses on the state as a socially embedded institution 
requiring attention to national social concerns/demands and global economic demands. 
The review of both state theory and theories of globalization will illustrate the necessity 
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for a more dynamic approach to understanding the nation-state as an institution that is 
increasingly subjected to dual pressures of external global economic demands and 
internal national population demands. The issue of culture will also be examined with 
respect to its complementary position as a facilitator of economic globalization processes.  
2. Theories of the State and Globalization 
 Theories of the Western, advanced capitalist state have largely adhered to two 
dominant perspectives: Marxian state theory and Weberian-inspired, state-centered 
theories. This dissertation employs a variant of state-centered approaches, social 
embeddedness, in conceptualizing the contemporary nation-state. This approach is 
superior in its ability to incorporate national population demands into a theoretical 
understanding of the state. A more detailed explanation of the theoretically affinity of a 
social embedded approach to this project follows, but first a brief discussion on the 
development of state theory is required. 
2a. Marxist and State-centered Theories of the State 
 Contemporary Marxian theories of the state emerged during the same period 
(1960s and 1970s) that saw the rise of conflict theory as a response to the dominance of 
structural-functionalist theorizing. In fact, variants of Marxian state theory largely 
emerged as a response to the dominance of pluralism as a theory of political society in 
democratic states. The acquiescent position of the repressed and exploited in Western 
capitalist society was, in the view of pluralist theories, a function of the “basic idea of 
normative consensus” (Vincent 1987, 182). This consent was managed through a 
diversity of groups that were accorded the ability to negotiate for power and resource 
allocation through the institutions of modern democratic processes. The ideal of political 
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pluralism, particularly with respect to the state, is similar to that of ethnic or cultural 
variants of pluralist thought as “political pluralism recognizes the existence of diversity in 
social, institutional and ideological practices, and values that diversity” (Dunleavy and 
O’Leary 1987, 13). In fact, the development of pluralist political theory occurred as a 
result of elite theorizing that was seen as leading “to the systematic misreporting of facts 
and the formulation of vague, ambiguous, unrealistic, and unprovable assertions about 
community power” (Polsby 1960, 475; see also Dahl 1961; 1958; Long 1958; Long and 
Belknap 1956). The apparent reactionary position of pluralist theory in the defense of the 
status quo was consistent with some functionalist analyses of the time and served as a 
theoretical alternative to the “stratification” approach of radical elite theorists such as 
Hunter (1953), Mills (1956), and Warner (1943).  
The seemingly benign ideals of plural democracy hid, in the eyes of many critics, 
a conservative bias that was designed to hide conditions of domination and exploitation 
through the promotion of a pluralistic façade. The pluralist proposition that has proven 
most contentious is that the potential influence (monopolistic or unified group control, as 
emphasized in elite theory) of a single group over the interests of others is negated by the 
diversity of intra-group interests thus resulting in minimal net influence. This system of 
empirical checks has been called into question by those who examine influence and 
oligarchical control (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998; Domhoff 1967; Dye 2002). 
These debates between elite and pluralist theorists partly motivated the development of a 
more explicit Marxist response to these theories of the state. 
 Marxist state theory is understood as having a single methodological division 
between those who view the state as an instrument of a dominant capitalist class 
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(instrumentalist) and those who view the state as providing a structural function in 
support of the system of capitalism (structuralist). Both view the state as a subordinate of 
larger class interests and not capable of manufacturing large-scale social change contrary 
to capitalist class interests. 
 The instrumentalist critique of the state examines the relationship between the 
capitalist class and state institutions. In simplest terms, the state is the “instrument” being 
played or controlled by an active and resourceful capitalist class (Miliband 1968; Barrow 
1993; Domhoff 1987). This condition of complete control is weakened by an historical 
record that illustrates dissent and conflict that does not seem to support a thesis of 
instrumental control by a single class. The relationship between state institutions 
(administration, military, judicial, executive, etc…) does allow for some forms of state 
power to be diversified, thus creating limited autonomy within the state due to competing 
or conflicting institutional interrelationships. The dominant class must ensure these 
relationships, as well as the reproduction of positive conditions for capitalism, through 
active mechanisms of control. 
 This view is countered by structuralists who understand the state as having limited 
or “relative autonomy” from the capitalist class that allows for a state that is 
institutionally responsible for addressing two major problems with any capitalist system: 
1) economic crises and 2) labor insurgency. Thus the state is required to periodically 
maintain the primacy of the capitalist class and socioeconomic system, but is not 
implicitly tied to the class in any instrumental manner. Systemic maintenance is essential 
due to the “contradictory class practices, dislocations, and crisis tendencies” of the 
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capitalist mode of production and thus requires a functional requisite in order to maintain 
itself (Poulantzas 1978; Abraham 1977; Jessop 1990). 
 State-centered theories of the state emerged in response to a perceived inability of 
Marxist state theories to adequate explain state actions in contradiction to dominant 
capitalist class interests. Dissenting scholars found support for an alternative thesis in the 
larger work of Max Weber, specifically his conceptual understanding of bureaucratic 
institutions and emphasis on interpretive methodology. 
 Weberian state theorists base their assumptions of the state on the concept of a 
rational bureaucracy that acts in a manner, at times, fully autonomous of any class 
controls. The perception that the state is autonomous serves to explain state actions that 
may be counter to capitalist class interests thus providing a powerful corrective to a major 
perceived weakness in Marxian analyses. In fact, it is this criticism of Marxian state 
theory concerning the perceived autonomy of the state that forms the crux of Weberian 
state-centered approaches: 
…virtually all neo-Marxist writers on the state have retained deeply 
embedded society-centered assumptions, not allowing themselves to doubt 
that, at base, states are inherently shaped by classes or class struggles and 
function to preserve and expand modes of production. Many possible 
forms of autonomous state action are thus ruled out by definitional fiat 
(Skocpol 1985, 5). 
 
This “orthodox” state-centered view of the state provided an immediate corrective to 
weaknesses in existing Marxist state theories. The corrective was, in turn, subjected to 
increased scrutiny as some of its original proponents began to retreat from the proposition 
that states maintain full bureaucratic autonomy from capitalist class controls.  
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 The concept of embedded autonomy is an attempt to transcend the limitations of 
an “isolated autonomy” approach to state theory. The foundational work of Peter Evans 
(1995; 1989) is most applicable to this discussion. His original formulation of the concept 
was designed to highlight the necessity of bureaucratic autonomy in conjunction with 
complementary levels of embeddedness within strategically identified institutions within 
any respective social systems. Thus, states are both autonomous in the sense that their 
bureaucratic functions and decision-making are relatively isolated from any special 
interests of the national population and “embedded in a concrete set of social ties that 
binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual 
negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies (1995, 12).” 
 The incorporation of an embedded approach to the state is welcome; however, 
with respect to this project it is also problematic. The focus of Evans (and later, Weiss 
1998) is to explain the economic interdependence necessary to create “developmental 
states.” As Seabrooke (2002) states “the key point here-and one that produces a clear 
common ground between Weiss and Evans-is the notion that embeddedness must occur 
between the state and the dominant economic class, specifically, the capitalist class (p. 
12-13).” A critic of the embedded autonomy approach could make the claim that, outside 
of serious methodological differences, proponents of this neo-Weberian approach provide 
some level of affirmation for the relative autonomy thesis of structural Marxian state 
theory. 
 For the purposes of this project, however, this observation is extraneous. While 
the issue of autonomy forms a link between Marxian and Weberian variants of state 
theory, neither is able to adequately understand how national populations play a role in 
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motivating state actions and policies. Taking a “vulgar” look at both perspectives would 
yield the conclusion that national populations have either no, or relatively little, impact 
on the functions of the state, exclusive of a vast minority of powerful capitalists. To this 
point, it seems that the only perspectives allowing for any sensitivity to the role of 
national populations have been pluralist in nature. Given the serious theoretical problems 
with pluralist approaches already mentioned, it seems that an alternative 
conceptualization is necessary if we are to grant any social power to general populations. 
2b. Social Embeddedness and the Polanyian Link 
 My criticism of orthodox approaches to state theory is echoed by those that 
advocate a social embeddedness approach to the study of the state. This perspective 
questions the theoretical limitations imposed by simply viewing state power and capacity 
as being controlled by a dominant capitalist class. Proponents of social embeddedness 
offer evidence that such class reductionism (ironic for Weberian theorists) ignores an 
obvious and important relationship between the state and inclusive national populations 
(Hobson 2000; 1997; Ikenberry 1986; Migdal 1988). For Hobson particularly, the main 
issue ignored by state-centered theories is that national populations grant state legitimacy 
and that this process of legitimation must be continually reproduced to maintain stability. 
This process creates a condition of interdependence between state and nation that is not 
addressed in existing Marxian or Weberian theories of the state (Hobson 1997, 237). 
 The perspective of the social embeddedness approach illustrates the dangers of a 
simple focus on autonomy or social class in theories of the state. Original state-centered 
approaches engage in a sort of “political reductionism” by focusing on the ‘full’ 
bureaucratic autonomy of the state to refute class reductionism in Marxian theories of the 
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state. Weberian state theorists are correct in that Marxian state theory is unable to 
adequately explain state action contrary to capitalist class interests. Conversely, Weberian 
state theorists have neglected the external (to the state) influence of national populations 
on state policy and the importance of national populations on state composition itself. 
Social embeddedness proponents would argue that both “orthodox” state-centered theory 
and embedded autonomy approaches to state theory incorporate an inherent functionalist 
bias (Seabrooke 2002, 18). This bias is the main reason that such approaches are unable 
to move beyond either issues of autonomy (in the case of Skocpol) or issues of class 
reductionism (in the case of Evans) (Hobson 2000, 174-175). Social embedded 
perspectives offer the opportunity to examine the interactive relationship between nation 
and state in a way not always possible using more traditional state-centered approaches. 
Hobson is much more concerned with establishing an understanding of power 
relationships in his theory of social embeddedness: 
In order to maximize their capacity, states need to gain insulation from 
private demands (institutional autonomy) and simultaneously engage in 
competitive-cooperation with key social actors (interactive embeddedness) 
(Hobson 1997, 240).  
 
Interestingly, we again are confronted with the lingering impact of pluralist thought in 
that the evolution of state theory is increasingly concerned with understanding levels of 
national autonomy from the state. In other words, national populations retain a level of 
power that is exclusive of state control. This question of national political capacity, 
however, is rarely addressed even in social embeddedness approaches due to the manifest 
focus on the state. Hobson has been the most adamant in addressing this problem, 
particularly with his structuration-inspired theory of the state in which he attempts to 
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blend state-centered and society-centered approaches in order to transcend the theoretical 
limitations of both (Hobson 2000, 217-218). 
 Hobson (and other scholars focused on the issue of social embeddedness3) 
understands the central purpose of the state as managing economic relationships and 
setting policy that is nearly exclusive in its emphasis on economic issues. This view of 
the state as being an institution designed to control and manage a national economy is 
one rooted in history. A question that must be raised, however, is also an historical one: 
has the state changed in its role and specific responsibilities in stabilizing national 
populations? I would argue that social embeddedness, while useful in resolving a number 
of significant theoretical problems, should be focused on answering this question. It 
would seem that attention to the mechanical relationship between state and society 
singularly based on economics is premature given the large-scale historical changes 
wrought by the acceleration of globalization following World War II. In this sense, the 
current project does not refute social embeddedness approaches to state theory, but seeks 
to provide a deeper historical analysis of the nature and role of the nation-state that could 
augment such holistic attempts at developing a theory of the state.  
Understanding the mechanics and capacities of the state is clearly important; 
however state theory has been criticized for its limited ability to locate the state in an 
increasingly dominant global market economy. Hobson’s (2000) synthetic approach 
illustrates the fact that theories of the state and even the concept of the state itself are 
increasingly questioned in light of the emergence of a global socio-economic system. 
                                                 
3For example see Hobson and Seabrooke 2001; Block 1990; and Granovetter 1985 for orienting examples 
of this perspective that seeks to view economic relations through a socially embedded lens.   
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While state theorists are acutely aware of the influence of globalization and its ability to 
restructure and reorient state capacities, their response has been largely to retrench 
arguments in defense of the state as an analytical concept (Hobson 1997; 2000; Levi 
1988; Weiss 2003, 1998).  
This response has resulted in two general outcomes: (1) a reactionary state-
centrism and (2) a return to economic determinism. The issue of state-centrism is not 
necessarily fatal to state-theory; however I would advocate an approach that is more 
responsive to issues and conditions of globalization. Globalization has affected the 
structure and capabilities of the nation-state, but the nation-state remains an empirical 
institution of social power. How can we reconcile a seemingly contradictory process of 
adaptation that sees a decline in economic capacity and a retention or even growth of 
other powers and authorities? 
 The second issue of economic determinism is largely due to the massive number 
of analyses focused on the trans-nationalization of capital, internationalization of 
production, and dominance of global financial institutions. In other words, the emphasis 
on processes and mechanics of economic globalization has predictably generated a like 
response from state theorists who seek to defend the theoretical and empirical concept of 
the nation-state. This project seeks to move beyond these debates and develop a more 
historically informed view of how the nation-state has responded to the challenge of 
globalization, how its maintaining structures have been adapted to maintain power, and 
how to understand the contemporary role and nature of the nation-state in proper 
historical context, not necessarily contingent on economic capacities. 
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 As a general theoretical framework, the social embeddedness approach is 
complementary to this project. It is possible to utilize this approach in a way that will 
illuminate historical changes in economic structures, but caution is needed to avoid 
becoming overly deterministic. Take for example the work of Fred Block. His socially 
embedded analysis of postindustrial theory and societies “rests on the claim that the 
international economy represents a less important constraint on the structure of the 
domestic U.S. economy than is generally believed” (Block 1990, 19).  
Block understands this claim to be true due to the postindustrial shift in the U.S. 
to a service-based economic system. Thus, while industrial production has undergone 
massive transnationalization, service industries have replaced them as domestic bases for 
consumption. In addition, this decrease in demand for manufactured goods has created 
stronger domestic economies that are less dependent on international trade as commonly 
thought (Block 1990). He uses this foundation to build a general critique of neo-classical 
economics and advocate an approach that is sensitive to the social costs of economic 
growth and capitalist expansion4. 
Despite the desire to socially embed economic analysis, Block and other theorists 
remain staunchly focused on the realm of economic relations. I believe social embedded 
approaches should have the ability to go further in their investigation of historical social 
change. This, of course, includes economic change, but cannot ignore the fact that to be 
                                                 
4 This understanding that national economic interests are not qualitatively constrained by the global 
economy is increasingly problematic given the institutionalization of both regional and global economic 
controls. For example, trade agreements such as NAFTA and international institutions such as the World 
Trade Organization have emerged in the 1990s as significant constraints on state capacities to protect 
nation economic interests. I would argue that in light of contemporary global economic expansion and 
institutionalization the claim that respective states can protect national economic interests is greatly 
weakened. 
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truly embedded in a Polanyian sense we must also embed economic analyses in a more 
holistic social contextual framework. This is a difficult line to walk and Block’s work 
shows us why. While social embeddedness is the goal, empirical evidence and analyses 
point to the primacy of economics in contemporary social relations. Giddens (1990) even 
points to the disembedding of the economic from the social world as being one of the 
defining conditions of modernity. We cannot escape this fact, but we can be cognizant of 
its problematic nature.  
This project recognizes the dominant position of economic relations in 
contemporary Western society. It also argues, however, that national populations have the 
ability to affect pressures on state institutions and policy development processes. This 
emphasis on national populations is directly derived from the Polanyian “double 
movement.” For Polanyi, the double movement represented an explicit process: 
For a century the dynamics of modern society was governed by a double 
movement: the market expanded continuously but this movement was met 
by a countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions. Vital 
though to such a movement was for the protection of society, in the last 
analysis it was incompatible with the self-regulation of the market, and 
thus with the market system itself (Polanyi 2001, 136). 
 
It is this explicit definition of the “double movement” that this dissertation calls into 
question, although not in a way critical of the concept itself. If, in fact, we are seeing an 
adapted state – a state subordinate to an institutionally governed global economic system 
– then the concept of the double movement must be similarly adapted to provide any 
analytical viability.  
 The project of adapting the “double movement” to a new conceptualization of 
nation-state capacity is best saved for the conclusion, however it is important to note, 
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once again, the methodological framework focusing on the reciprocal relationship 
between the state and both liberal economic forces and national protectionist forces. It is 
the “movement” that is important at this point, particularly in its ability to provide 
methodological orientation with respect to the state. Without legitimating processes 
occurring between the nation and the state as well as between the global economic system 
and the state, the potential for state destabilization increases. This basic theoretical 
understanding is consistent with a social embedded approach to the state. The project 
now must turn to a review of globalization theories, particularly of an economic and 
cultural nature, in order to fully understand current perspectives on how the state is 
understood within the context of a globalized world.  
3. Theories of Globalization 
Theoretical perspectives on the complex and diverse processes that form the 
process of globalization are generally broken down into three general categories: 
economic, political, and cultural. Economic globalization is generally viewed as an 
expansion of liberal capitalism. As such the theoretical orientation of this project focuses 
on theories of trans-national capitalism (TNC). The founding assumptions of world-
system theory play an important role in the development of TNC, however the ability of 
TNC to adequately explain current trends in economic globalization and its impact of 
individual nation-states is most appropriate for this project.  
This project also seeks to address the role of culture in the contemporary nation-
state. This section will also examine cultural globalization theory as a complementary 
project in support of the global market economy. Cultural globalization theories are 
dominated by the question of cultural homogeneity. The process of ideological 
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“colonization” has prompted several perspectives that examine (1) the process of 
homogenization and its many alternative possibilities and (2) a theoretical shift toward 
theories of consumption that seek to understand why cultural homogenization is a 
desirable goal. These perspectives typify macro-sociological analyses of cultural 
globalization, although the bulk of work examines the effects of globalization on identity 
formation in micro-level analyses. As this project is focused on explaining macro-level 
change the previously stated bias should be self-explanatory. 
Perspectives on political globalization largely center on the twin process of 
democratization and liberalization, primarily on their ability to both create a common 
political discourse and to facilitate processes of economic globalization. This project 
understands political globalization processes as also complementing the larger project of 
global market integration. That is, the project of neoliberalism, as a political ideology 
with tangible political economic demands (reduced state spending and tariff reduction 
being most apparent), actively facilitates global market integration by providing “rules” 
to which participating states must adhere.  
Polanyi argued, “economic liberalism was the organizing principle of society 
engaged in creating a market system” (Polanyi 2001, 141). It is difficult to argue that 
Western societies are “creating” a market system, but economic globalization theorists do 
tell us that the expansion of market (read: liberal) capitalism is the quintessential feature 
of globalization. I agree with this point. As such, this project views cultural 
homogenization and liberalization processes as similar complementary processes 
intended to facilitate economic globalization. I will return to the issue of liberalism as a 
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tool for ideological organization, but I will apply it specifically to the debates over the 
compatibility of liberal economic and multicultural ideologies. 
It should be noted that these theoretical divisions are not viewed as an entirely 
positive project. Scholte (2000) argues for a more general definition of globalization 
following the conceptualization of Giddens (1990) and Held et al. (1999) that focuses on 
the territorial breakdown that the process of globalization engenders. A focus on the 
breakdown of territorial affinity encompasses economic, political, and cultural spheres, 
which allows analyses to focus on the process of interconnectedness and linkages that 
form as a result of globalization processes (Scholte 2000, 46). This process would be 
congruent with Castells’ (1996) larger emphasis on network development as a 
methodological vehicle for his theory of globalization.  
The danger of such an approach lies in the tendency to view globalization as a 
consistent and universal process. It is difficult to argue against the deterritorialization and 
linking definitions of globalization, however we cannot assume that globalization is 
either applied or felt in any sort of similar fashion. Instead of critiquing the 
universalization/deterritorialization perspective, this project seeks to develop a deeper 
analytical understanding of how globalization has impacted national populations with 
distinct histories. This can be more effectively accomplished by viewing globalization as 
made up of component parts and projects.  
Empirically, evidence has been elusive in showing that the active and intentional 
promotion of liberal market economics is connected with similar intentional efforts to 
transform traditional cultures. It does seem likely that these processes are happening 
simultaneously regardless of intent. How are we then to understand the multifaceted 
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nature of these economic, political, and cultural processes as a comprehensive whole? 
This project will show that while definite trends toward increased global linkages and 
networks are obvious, divergent histories require finite focus and specificity. Declarative 
attempts to identify some form of dialectical (in the Hegelian sense) globalization seem 
premature before we completely understand the transformative ability of these intricate 
processes. It is through the power of comparative methodology that the ground-level 
effects of this seemingly ubiquitous process of globalization are made apparent and clear.   
3a. Economic Globalization 
 The focus on globalization as a primarily economic phenomenon should not be 
surprising. Political economic analyses of global capitalism inform and inspire many 
contemporary critical examinations of globalization. Beginning with Marx’s (1955) belief 
that capitalism would eventually develop into a truly global system before its inevitable 
demise, economic functions and systemic mechanics provided the primary focus of 
analysis. Lenin’s (1939) understanding that capitalist expansion through imperialism 
gave new life to a doomed system and staved its eventual demise provided an additional 
political component to orthodox Marxism, but retained the centrality of Marx’s capitalist 
critique. Both world-system and transnational capitalist theories are built on these central 
Marxian tenets of capitalist critique and thus necessitate a focus on economic systems 
exclusive of other social spheres. 
 This section describes the development of a dominant global market economy. 
Globalization theorists generally view the state as a limited unit of analysis given the 
systemic nature of a global (not international) market economic system. With respect to 
this dissertation, we must understand the systemic nature and position of the global 
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economy and particularly its impact on state capacities to protect national economic 
interests and in promoting global political economic interdependence. The central 
question of this project is centered on the state, namely on the contemporary capacities of 
the nation-state. If we can assume (given the following theories of economic 
globalization) that the state is a subordinate economic entity, what are its contemporary 
capacities? Of course, answering this question requires attention to the economic 
subordination process itself, which is the purpose of this section. 
 Immanuel Wallerstein developed world-system theory as a systemic approach to 
understanding Marx’s global capitalism thesis. The development of a capitalist world-
system was, for world-system theorists, as realization of the historical-materialist 
requirements of persistent capitalist logic. Specifically, that the requisite growth of 
capitalism required an ever expanding scope of both material resources and production. 
In this way, world-system theory can be largely considered the first sociological theory of 
economic globalization. World-system theory provides an understanding that there has 
existed, since approximately 1500, a global capitalist system that links nation-states and 
provides the structure necessary to pattern the action of those same nation-states.  
The debate over the relative “newness” of globalization in our contemporary era 
is, for world-system theorists, incorrect. Globalization is not a novelty for world-system 
proponents due to the transitional requirements of capitalism. In other words, for 
capitalism to continue to function and grow, systemic adaptation has become the 
historical norm. Therefore the current period of “globalization” can be understood as yet 
another in a long line of systemic adaptations. This is a point of significant contention 
between world-system proponents and other supporters (Frank 1998; Hirst and 
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Thompson 1996; Sen 2002; Wallerstein 1999) and those who argue that the current era is 
fundamentally distinct (Albrow 1997; Robertson 1992; Robinson 2004; 1996). 
World-system theory, particularly the use of systems theory to understand 
capitalist expansion, provides the foundation on which theories of economic globalization 
rest. One of several approaches that could be considered significant in the study of a 
global economic system is that of transnational capitalism. 
3a1. Transnational Capitalism  
Theories of transnational capitalism (TNC) rest on a critical point: while we can 
understand globalization as another “stage” of capitalist development, the economic 
conditions of globalization constitute a distinct era. This belief is hardly the exclusive 
domain of TNC theorists. Other analysts of globalization are often forced to reconcile (at 
one level or another) this debate in their own work – to maintain a world-system 
approach focused on the Longue durée or recognize a distinct and novel set of conditions 
and structures defining a new political economic age of global capitalism. Many that 
believe that the current era of globalization is at some level a distinct historical era have 
come to be termed globalization theorists. Weiss (2003) provides a succinct 
categorization of these globalization theorists as being either radical “hyper-globalists” or 
members of a more moderate “constraints school.”  
“Hyper-globalists” can best be described as those who understand globalization 
processes as being so powerful and transformative that even entrenched socio-political 
institutions such as the nation-state cannot survive its surge (Guéhenno 1995; Horsman 
and Marshall 1994; Ohmae 1990). Predictably, these scholars have come to be associated 
with this “end of the state” predictive capacity and are largely dismissed by both 
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moderate globalists and obviously state theorists. I would argue that while the 
conclusions of “hyper-globalists” are often quite extreme, maintaining a simple focus on 
a single declaration that the nation-state is “dead” allows state theorists to dismiss the 
larger arguments for the development of regional economies and the possibility of 
“borderless” economic systems. For example, regional liberal economic cooperative 
efforts have led to a reduction in ability of respective states to enact trade restrictions to 
protect national economic sectors – a point that is endangered by a cursory dismissal of 
the “hyper-globalist” perspective. 
The “constraints school” is largely defined as being those remaining globalization 
theorists who do not hold such an extreme view with respect to the irrelevance of the 
modern nation-state. 
This constraints view of globalization has many adherents, and although 
they disagree about many things, they are united in the view that changes 
in the international political economy have radically restricted policy 
choice and forced policy shifts that play to the preferences of global 
investors and mobile corporations, rather than to the needs of the domestic 
political economy and its citizenry (Weiss 2003, 3). 
 
TNC theory can safely be located within the broad confines of the “constraints school” 
and shares the common belief that the state, while not irrelevant, is diminished in its 
decision-making capacity. It should be noted that this is a theory of economic 
globalization and thus is vulnerable to charges of reductionism. Interestingly, it is the 
economic reductionism that unites “hyper-globalists” and the “constraints school” much 
more than their disagreement on the nature of the modern nation-state divides them. This 
perspective (TNC), while not indicative of any unified theory of economic globalization, 
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is fairly representative of the perspectives and approaches taken by other scholars of 
economic globalization (for example Cerny 1996; 1994; Cox 1997; Falk 1999). 
The idea of international economic co-operation and transnational business 
practice is not new. Outside of the copious material produced by world-system scholars, 
other historical evidence of international economic co-operation is found from the ancient 
world through the modern era. The significance and uniqueness of the contemporary era 
of globalization is defined, according to TNC theory, by the active and intentional 
character of global capitalism based on the interconnected action of a transnational 
capitalist class. Robinson refers to this situation with specific reference to the 
intentionality of this capitalist class: 
TNCs supply “domestic” markets around the world through a growing 
web of local factories and offices rather than through exporting from home 
countries, which suggests that much of world trade is in fact planned trade. 
Contrary to mainstream economic theory, the global economy is decidedly 
not a free-market economy…but a planned oligopolist economy 
(Robinson 2004, 28).  
 
This view of super-national class co-operation is supported by many scholars who not 
only view the contemporary era of globalization as distinct, but also argue that its 
distinctive nature is entirely manufactured through economic market and production 
relationships (Cox 1987; Gill 1990; Sklair 2001; 1995).  
The work of Sklair and Robinson does much to specify distinct political processes 
that both motivate and support the globalization process. Their work adds a specific class 
component to the study of international business/economic cooperation; namely, that a 
transnational capitalist class actively influences the direction of globalization or the 
global capitalist system. There are differences between these two leading theorists of 
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TNC. Sklair (1995) makes a concerted effort to understand the larger political process of 
transnationalist class formation and interaction. He intentionally integrates the 
sociological trinity of economics, political, and culture in his understanding of the holistic 
nature of transnational class formation. To the obvious economic leadership of a 
transnational corporate elite, Sklair adds a global political elite focused on the promotion 
of democratization and an accompanying liberal ideology that supports larger economic 
goals. His cultural component of the transnational capitalist class is made up of a 
“consumerist elite” that uses telecommunications technologies to promote the ideology of 
consumption that defines cultural homogenization processes of globalization (see the 
later section on cultural globalization).  
 Robinson begins his development of TNC theory in a similar fashion, specifically 
focusing on the political actions and functioning of the transnational capitalist class. He 
understands the political mechanics of the larger economic system and the necessity of 
fusing political and economic analysis: 
The logics of local and global accumulation increasingly coincide. The 
central concern of this study is to show how new instruments of political 
intervention, originally developed in the United States and then applied 
around the world in the name of “democracy promotion,” are aimed at 
suppressing the demands of popular sectors in the [Global] South” 
(Robinson 1996, 34). 
 
This emphasis on political processes has shifted in recent years to comprise a more 
explicitly economic theory of global capitalism. Robinson’s most recent theoretical 
project returns to TNC’s Marxist roots, particularly with his emphasis on production as a 
response to market-centered critiques of globalization (Robinson 2004, 22). 
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 TNC theory can be safely categorized as the most currently significant theory of 
global capitalism, or economic globalization. Unfortunately, in answering the question of 
“what now the nation-state?” TNC theory leaves us wanting. First, the increasingly 
economic deterministic position of TNC creates limitations that are not as obvious with a 
more inclusive approach, such as Sklair. Even so the focus on issues of economics, while 
comprising a significant empirical portion of the social composition of nation-states, tells 
only part of the story. Clearly, the state has taken a subordinate role in controlling 
national economic capacities. This conclusion, however, returns us to the original 
question of what the “globalized state” actually does control. We can see that a process of 
economic subordination has occurred but we are still left without an understanding of 
how the nation-state has adapted. 
The second criticism of TNC is one that is less easily resolved. Robinson and 
Sklair, while differing on minor conceptual and methodological issues, are united in their 
belief that “state-centric” analyses are misguided and incorrect.  
Here we can anticipate the argument I develop in subsequent chapters 
regarding the pitfall of what I refer to as nation-state centrism, or the 
tendency to take the nation-state as an autonomous unit of analysis and to 
gather and interpret data on the basis of this tendency…The problem here 
is the use of data collected and registered in nation-state terms to measure 
phenomena that are transnational (Robinson 2004, 29). 
 
This concern is methodologically appropriate but stands on the assumption that all 
analyses must now focus on the global capitalist system as a primary social 
organizational mechanism. Historical and geographic specificity are disregarded in the 
face of a reified global capitalist system that functionally imposes structure throughout 
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the world. Many have argued that the conclusive and final tone of TNC theory limits 
analysis in both theoretical and ontological manners (Block 2001; Went 2001-2002).  
The central point of contention is, again, the issue of whether the nation-state 
remains a viable unit of analysis. The existence of increasing transnational production, 
capital flows, and foreign direct investment cannot be discounted and provide a strong 
level of empirical evidence to the claims of TNC theorists. Yet the nation-state serves as 
a very real mechanism for social organization throughout the world. The importance of 
including economic globalization in any analysis of super-national social change is 
obvious. The real question for this project is how to develop an understanding of the 
contemporary nation-state that is sensitive to the effects of globalization. Clearly, a focus 
on TNC or another theory of globalization is as inadequate as a “nation-state centric” 
theoretical foundation. A dynamic alternative is needed.  
The remainder of this chapter will begin to build a case for such an alternative by 
showing the interconnected nature of global political and ideological processes and 
promoting an interactive model that is able to adequately examine the state as a locus of 
interaction between global and national-level processes.  
3b. Political Globalization 
Political globalization can be understood as the promotion of the specific ideology 
of liberal democracy in support of liberal economic integration. I would argue that the 
promotion of democracy is consistent with the logic of capitalism that undergirds 
Marxian analyses of capitalist expansion. In short, the ideological marriage of liberalism 
and capitalism are manifested politically in the form of modern democratic institutions. 
As liberalism provided necessary ideological legitimation for initial capitalist 
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accumulation and expansion (Polanyi 2001; Thompson 1968), so to does the expansion 
of capitalism to a global economic system require the ideological structures to generate 
conditions for social reproduction.  
This contemporary realization is interesting in light of the fact that 
democratization was initially threatening to the growth and expansion of capitalism. The 
“danger” of liberalism and democracy run amok was clear to elite observers of the 
French Revolution (Burke, Maury), yet the necessity of liberalism to classical economic 
theory was undeniable. How then to promote the ubiquitous ideology of liberalism while 
still maintaining the authority necessary for labor market stability? The solution was the 
synthesis of economic, political, and cultural processes forming the socio-political 
realities of the modern Western world in the post-Enlightenment era. Wood offers an 
excellent description of this historical process and illustrates the modern synthesis of 
democracy and capitalism through the process of artificial public division: 
The achievement of formal democracy and universal suffrage certainly 
represented tremendous historic advances, but it turned out that capitalism 
offered a new solution to the age-old problem of rulers and producers. It 
was no longer necessary to embody the division between privilege and 
labour in a political division between appropriating rulers and labouring 
subjects, now that democracy could be confined to a formally separate 
‘political’ sphere while the ‘economy’ followed rules of its own. If the 
extent of the citizen body could no longer be restricted, the scope of 
citizenship could now be narrowly contained, even without constitutional 
limits (Wood 1995, 203). 
 
Robinson’s (1996) concept of polyarchy complements Wood’s analysis and represents 
the synthetic interrelationship between the political and economic. In fact, the concept of 
polyarchy is an active description of the process of political globalization through an 
imperialist process greatly inspired by Lenin’s original critique. Specifically, Robinson 
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identifies the inherent difficulties of reconciling liberal economic organization with 
autocratic political organization. Polyarchy emerged as a political alternative in the 
promotion of global market integration while at the same time promoting political and 
economic liberalism as ubiquitous ideologies.  
We can end this brief discussion of political globalization (i.e., democratization or 
the promotion of liberal ideology) with the understanding that an exemplary description 
of this process would be more instructive than an extended literature review. Following a 
similarly brief discussion of cultural globalization, I will illustrate the interrelated process 
of political and cultural processes through a discussion of the debate among political 
philosophers on the conflict between liberalism/liberal ideology and multiculturalism. 
This exemplar serves the dual purpose of illustrating the necessity for similarly 
synthetic/holistic analysis as well as providing valuable theoretical background on the 
subject of multiculturalism and debates over its practical application through state policy. 
3c. Cultural Globalization 
 Theories of cultural globalization are dominated by either macro- or micro-level 
approaches. Contributions to larger discussions of (1) large-scale processes of cultural 
homogenization (Barber 1995; Hamelink 1994; Ritzer 1993) or (2) subjectivist studies of 
how these large-scale processes have impacted individual and small group populations 
(Tomlinson 2003; Wassman 1998) define this theoretical subfield. Both perspectives are 
necessary yet the lack of meso-level analyses is telling in the sense that focus has been on 
the globalization of culture and not necessarily on the management of said processes. 
 It should be noted that many subjectivist studies of globalization’s impact on 
identity construction show that this process is often channeled through national identity 
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formation. This project mirrors this contention in a certain respect. These studies of 
identity construction5 view these nationalist processes as being inherently social in nature 
and representative of an organic reactionary process in response to globalization. I argue 
that while this may be the case, the actions of the state in promoting a specific national 
identity must not be ignored. In this sense, I agree with the subjectivist conclusions, but 
argue that a more structural process (the state) assists in the promotion of national 
identity construction.  
3c1. Cultural Homogenization 
 The increasingly familiar surroundings in seemingly disparate global locations 
have led many to believe that one accompanying feature of economic globalization is the 
cultural homogenization, or Americanization (to use a more active term), of the world 
(Schiller 1992; 1976; Hamelink 1994). This process of homogenization is intended to 
promote a universal culture of consumption designed to match increases in global 
production.  
 Cultural homogenization is the product of the global capitalist system (Ritzer 
1999; 1993; Robinson 2004). Logically the expansion of global production and the fact 
that most countries are largely moving toward an export-orientation requires a 
simultaneous expansion of consumers. The focus of traditional societies, particularly in 
the developing world, has not been overly concerned with materialism and more general 
issues of consumption. In fact, the very persistent poverty of the developing world serves 
as a significant structural reality making materialism irrelevant in the face of more 
pressing subsistence needs. As anthropological studies of cultural development have 
                                                 
5 This perspective is best illustrated by the excellent work of Ailon-Souday and Kunda 2003. 
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shown, cultural norms and belief systems are largely dependent on material conditions 
and practical needs6.  It is logically concluded then that institutions of authority (such as 
religion) and resource control (for example political and military institutions) are 
constructed in conjunction with local cultural norms and beliefs. Therefore, if a local 
population has no history of materialism or need for non-subsistence consumptive desire 
the chances for capitalist development in these regions is limited. 
The process of cultural homogenization, however, is able to reduce the influence 
and importance of these traditional cultural objections to materialist consumption. 
Through the promotion of political liberalism (democratization) and global market 
integration, local culture is confronted with the images and realities of material wealth 
and active promotion of material acquisition (consumption) through popular culture and 
media. Media influence is exponentially increased as the Internet and accompanying 
telecommunications technologies are integrated into formerly traditional societies. The 
networking potential and exposure to dominant (i.e., American) popular culture furthers 
the project of cultural homogenization (Ess 2002; Lovink 2002) and thus facilitates the 
expansion of global capitalism.     
 The criticism of this approach, of course, is due to the lack of local agency or 
resistive capacity granted to respective national populations. In other words, we find 
again the inability of a theory of globalization to explain local level anomalies or change 
                                                 
6 Early anthropological perspectives on cultural development were divided between diffusionist approaches 
that stressed the similarities of cultural development (Steward 1955; Lévi-Strauss 1963) and those who 
stressed a more independent and locally-dependant development of culture (Malinowski 1960; Boas 1940). 
In short, cultural anthropology has largely agreed on the fact that both processes can and have occurred – 
perhaps best understood as the similarities of human subsistence needs (food, shelter, clothing, etc…) being 
driven by the available resources to any respective group. Thus, cultural development can be quite similar 
while at the same time producing different material cultures due to environmental, geographic, or other 
material conditions. 
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outside of change motivated by the global system itself. This criticism has resulted in a 
large number of alternatives to the homogenization thesis. These alternatives are more 
sensitive to local realities and experiences, but maintain the conventional argument that 
cultural homogenization, or at least the motivation for homogeneity, is occurring at some 
level. The commonality between homogenization and locally sensitive approaches is the 
underlying globalist belief that both processes describe individuals and groups coming to 
terms with their own identities in an increasingly integrated world (Robertson 1992, 29).  
3c2. Glocalization and Identity Construction 
 The cultural homogenization thesis was viewed by some as being both 
structurally dependent and empirically incorrect. Local resistance to homogenization 
processes or even simple local cultural differences in interpretation of dominant cultural 
norms showed many researchers that the universal wave of “Americanization” of the 
globe was at best uneven (Hannerz 1997). The popular concept of glocalization is one of 
many attempts to explain the ability of local populations to either resist or reinterpret 
encroaching cultural norms that commonly differ from traditional norms (Robertson 
1995; 1992; Meyer 2000). 
 Briefly, the process of glocalization describes the creolization of a dominant 
culture as local groups integrate new cultural norms and symbols with existing traditional 
beliefs and symbols. The result is a sort of hybrid local culture that contains elements of 
the dominant “colonizing” culture but made palatable to local populations through a 
traditional cultural “filter.” Thus, the process of global cultural homogenization is not 
nearly as ubiquitous and complete as many have posited.  
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 The clear debate within “world-culture theory” is centered on the question of local 
communities, or national populations. Homogenization proponents argue that the spread 
of capitalism and its accompanying rationalization processes quickly usurp traditional 
cultural controls and replace them with a set of norms based on materialism and 
consumption. This perspective provides a clear and direct link with the expansion of the 
global capitalist system by creating new foreign markets for exporting states.  
On the other hand, locally sensitive proponents of glocalization (and many other 
variants of limited global heterogeneity) theories view the process of cultural colonization 
as being an interpretive process that relies on local populations for its dissemination. The 
apparent dependence on local populations is limited in that the creolization process is 
uneven with respect to the level of promotion of materialism and consumption. In other 
words, hybrid culture in one region may embrace materialism and consumption at a 
higher level than another hybrid culture in another region.  
The distinction between the two is obviously the level of power attributed to 
local, or national, populations. I would argue that both do an excellent job of showing 
how globalization processes change local realities, but neither adequately address the 
ability of the state to shape the form of globalized change and play an active role in 
determining the pace of globalization. I would argue that both homogenization and 
glocalization theories inherently embrace the “state is dead” ethos by presenting a view 
of globalization that is exclusive of state mediation. The problem, it would seem, lies in 
the level of analysis. We seem to be back to the desire to construct dichotomies in order 
to prove our respective points. In this case “the local versus the global” defines an 
analytical debate that ultimately proves limiting in its application.  
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Examining the global system, or globalization processes as “autonomous 
processes” requires a “specifically global point of view” (Appadurai 1990; Featherstone 
1990; Robertson 1992). These statements are accurate, yet however powerful this 
approach has proven in illuminating the realities of globalization processes it has been 
equally derelict in its ability to explain how national populations and state institutions 
have interacted in response to these same processes.  
The similarities between political and cultural globalization processes are striking. 
Many observers have noted that these processes seem to work in a complementary 
fashion with economic globalization by promoting and creating conditions favorable to 
global capitalist expansion. The outcome of this process has been viewed as problematic 
and inherently contradictory by motivating national populations to seek non-liberal 
protections from the liberal market system. These contradictions are reflected in political 
debates centered on how to ensure national cooperation for global integration, 
particularly in reconciling liberal market ideology with non-liberal social protections. The 
following case examines, in limited detail, the debate between political philosophers 
concerning the difficulty in reconciling the necessary ideology of liberalism with the 
necessity to protect national populations through cultural policy7. This case offers an 
excellent view of the conflict inherent in the “double movement” as national populations 
seek protection and stability in the face of changes motivated by globalization processes 
and states attempt to facilitate the liberal ideology of laissez-faire/free-market economics. 
                                                 
7 The term “policy” is used here in a very loose sense. The official multiculturalism of Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand (to name a few) can be viewed as “official multiculturalism” and thus conforms to a 
more traditional definition of policy. Kurien (2004) comments on the “unofficial multiculturalism” of the 
United States as promoting an ideological multiculturalism without the explicit support of the state. Both 
however function in similar manners by promoting ethno-cultural diversity as a positive aspect of modern 
society.  
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4. “The Liberal Myth” and Multiculturalism: The Bumpy Process of Ideological 
Conditioning 
Polanyi contended that the integration of liberalism with capitalism resulted in a 
market system that adversely affects national populations. Essential to this process was 
the ideological support of liberalism by intellectuals and state institutions. Thus the 
project of liberal market capitalism could not succeed without the active support of 
“knowledgeable” actors. This point is revived in Richard Falk’s Predatory Globalization 
(1999) in which he views the process of global market capitalism as “globalization from 
above.” In other words, the active management and promotion of a liberal capitalist goal 
is a necessary component for systemic success. Liberalism, however, is not specifically 
economic in nature. Its purest definition rests on the ideals of individual liberty and 
freedoms – natural rights in their more pristine Lockean understanding. Many would 
argue that there is very little that can be termed “natural” or organic in liberal ideology, 
particularly in its marriage to capitalism. This section illustrates the double movement of 
liberal market promotion with demands for national protection through the analytical 
example of multiculturalism.  
 Polanyi’s critique of liberalism rests solidly on the belief that laissez-faire market 
self-regulation is not, and has never been, a reality. Instead, the idea (a self-regulating 
capitalist market) is a “liberal myth” perpetuated to privilege an ideological justification 
for market capitalism on a global scale. In fact, one could interpret Polanyi’s historical 
analysis of the development of this liberal mythology as constructing the ideological 
foundations for contemporary neo-liberal hegemonic structures and processes typically 
referred to as globalization. 
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There was nothing natural about laissez-faire, free markets could never 
have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course. Just 
as cotton manufactures – the leading free trade industry – were created by 
the help of protective tariffs, export bounties, and indirect wage subsidies, 
laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state (Polanyi 2001, 144). 
 
Polanyi’s observation can easily be updated to reflect the globalization-state debates 
through the substitution of international, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for the 
state, however some would argue that the state also remains a facilitating agent for 
transnational capital and thus retains some power in the face of the global neo-liberal 
economic system (Jessop 2002; Poulantzas 1978). Our focus here, however, is the 
supposed conflict between liberalism and multiculturalism and the fact that regardless of 
its intentional origins, liberal ideology defines modern capitalist societies. 
Liberalism, as is the case with all ideological manifestations, can be defined and 
understood in several different ways. In this case we can assume that liberalism, as a tool 
of social organization, can be understood as a social ideology that embraces the Lockean 
ideal of natural rights, particularly (as noted by Giddens 1990) the right to private 
property. This social ideology is then transferred to political and economic spheres in the 
form of democratization, which leads invariably to the laissez-faire tenets of market 
capitalism embodied in classical economic theory. This is an old story, but the most 
recent expansion and exportation of liberalism after the Second World War resulted in 
the rapid ethnic diversification of core states, or the Western World8. This diversification 
of national populations in countries such as Canada and the United States resulted in 
various attempts to manage the diversification process and maintain national stability. 
                                                 
8 This process of ethnic diversification as a function of globalization processes will be explained in detail in 
Chapter Six.  
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One strategy embraced by states such as Canada, Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands 
was the recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity through state policies of 
multiculturalism. This was an alternative to the assimilationist models promoted by 
(among others) the “melting pot” model of American diversity management. 
Multiculturalism not only recognized difference, but also promoted the belief that cultural 
enclaves were essential to the survival of traditional cultures. Thus, the active promotion 
and celebration of ethno-cultural differences became a trademark of multiculturalism. 
The ideology of multiculturalism has been under attack from its inception. 
Criticisms from the political right are obvious and range from racist to assimilationist. Of 
concern here is the critique of liberals from the political center and left that view 
multiculturalism as an unnecessary intrusion of the state into the realm of cultural 
management and control. Thus the ideological conflict concerns states that are oriented 
and, in fact, organized by liberal political ideology yet incorporate pressures to recognize 
disadvantaged minority groups within increasingly diverse nation-states. These states 
must reconcile their liberal political economic structures with the desire to manage and 
facilitate ethnic diversification in arguably non-liberal fashions. Of primary concern in 
this debate is the idea that classical liberalism advantages the individual and values 
individual rights over all else. Of course, multiculturalism is the special recognition of 
ethnic and cultural groups for the sake of ensuring their protection. The contradictions are 
obvious.  
 The debate over multiculturalism within liberal democratic societies has forced 
some to reconcile the ideological predominance of liberalism with the desire to ensure 
cultural survival of certain groups. Charles Taylor’s (1994; 1992; 1989a) contributions 
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focus on the desire to protect cultural authenticity as opposed to the individual autonomy 
inherent in what he calls “procedural liberalism” (1994, 56). This “procedural liberalism” 
can be used to define the socio-political ideology that defines Western democracies. 
Taylor views this political ideology as being individualistic to the point of destroying 
cultural and traditional distinctions (particularly among immigrant groups) in societies 
defined by this type of liberalism. His alternative is a “politics of difference” that seeks to 
recognize the differences between ethno-cultural groups in order to ensure that individual 
identity construction can continue without interference from the social or cultural norms 
of the dominant nation.  
 Taylor’s conceptualization has been called liberal and communitarian by 
supporters and critics of the “politics of difference.” Taylor attempted to critique the 
limitations of liberalism and prompted many to classify his work as communitarian 
(1989b). This designation has colored many criticisms of Taylor’s work as well as his 
later promotion of the politics of difference through official multicultural policies. He 
does not dismiss liberalism out of hand, rather Taylor promotes a liberal viewpoint, albeit 
a “fighting creed” that seems to promote an active version of liberal democracy that may 
or may not “involve substituting some individual freedoms for the collective goal of 
maintaining authentic cultural identities” (Seglow 1998, 974). The conflict for Taylor, 
and other scholars concerned with social protections, is concerned with reconciling social 
protections that may be non-liberal with the liberal democratic and capitalist environment 
in which these conditions of cultural degradation exist. While Taylor is specifically 
concerned with the effects of ideological liberalism on the ability of minority ethno-
cultural groups to survive, his difficulty in articulating a viable adaptation of “procedural 
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liberalism” is indicative of the challenge facing those tasked with managing the double 
movement-how to ensure social continuity in a liberal society while protecting those 
victimized by the same liberal structures. His promotion of an active liberalism with clear 
protections is quite different from the laissez-faire tradition and is a clear attempt to inject 
social protections for those, in Taylor’s view, most vulnerable to liberalisms effects.  
 Other scholars have attempted to revise contemporary conceptualizations of 
liberalism to further their multicultural aims. Most notably, Will Kymlicka’s (1995; 
1989) research attempts to establish a “hierarchy of differential minority rights.” In this 
hierarchy, certain ethnic and cultural groups are granted a level of autonomy and legal 
rights. Certain groups, such as indigenous peoples are at the top of the hierarchy due to 
the common historical experience of colonial domination, while immigrants are afforded 
no rights due to their conscious and voluntary decision to immigrate (Kymlicka 1989, 
170). All groups, however, are required to adhere to the principles of liberalism and those 
that seek to subvert those fundamental tenets are likely to be made to conform. 
Kymlicka’s understanding of the inherent contradictions between liberalism and 
multiculturalism can be overcome (in his analysis) through a process of liberal 
hegemonic dominance thus subverting any inherent social contradictions (Kymlicka 
1989, 167). 
 In this conceptualization we see a “front-loaded” liberalism in which the 
hierarchy of rights is established prior to any institutional liberal framework is enforced. 
In fact it is this enforcement of liberalism that defines Kymlicka’s attempt at 
reconciliation. This environment requires a strong liberal framework of nation-state 
cohesion, but within this framework exists a pre-established hierarchy of rights that are 
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based on cultural group membership, but largely subservient to national membership. 
Again, the difficulty lies in reconciling the liberal nation-state system with the ability to 
protect minority groups from the homogenizing effects of liberalism. 
 Neither Taylor nor Kymlicka satisfactorily reconciles the contradictions between 
an unrestrained liberalism and multicultural protections in this debate. Both seek to 
redefine (or at least, revise) liberalism to suit their end goals, yet neither is able to ensure 
that their rearticulation will be undertaken nor even supported. The work of Chandran 
Kukathas returns to traditional liberalism by arguing that the promotion of individual 
rights inherent in liberalism is enough to ensure cultural survival of minority groups: 
The reason why liberalism does not have a problem with multiculturalism 
is that liberalism is itself, fundamentally, a theory of multiculturalism. This 
is because liberalism is essentially a theory about pluralism; and 
multiculturalism is, in the end, a species of pluralism (Kukathas 1998, 
690).  
 
His basic statements in support of liberalism refer to the fact that true liberalism does not 
promote any group over the rights of an individual. Thus, individuals are free to associate 
and congregate with groups of their choice as long as those groups do not disrupt the 
stability of the society. This view, although quite utopian, counters the assertions of 
Taylor and Kymlicka that liberalism, understood in its traditional form, is incompatible 
with multicultural goals. The problem with this view, however, is that it continues with 
the assumption that liberalism is something of an “end goal” of sociopolitical 
development. Parekh’s critique of Kymlicka makes a similar comment: 
He [Kymlicka] expects Amer-Indians, Inuits, and other non-liberal 
communities to take a liberal view of themselves, that is, to view and 
relate to their cultures in a way that the liberal does to his, and he defends 




Parekh goes further to comment of the dangers to a universal assumption of liberalism 
that seems to typify the liberal/multicultural debate partly illustrated here: 
While rightly stressing its [liberalism’s] great values, he nowhere 
acknowledges that they do not represent the last word in human wisdom 
and that they might greatly benefit from a dialog with nonliberal ways of 
life (Parekh 1997, 62). 
 
The conceptual preoccupation with the nature of liberalism and its (apparently) 
inexorable connection to democratic governance ignores the history of liberalism and its 
artificiality. The emphasis on the tension and conflict between multiculturalism and 
liberalism lose much of their relevance when a Polanyian approach is incorporated. The 
contradiction being resolved in this debate is directly related to the Polanyian double 
movement of liberal market predation and the demands of a national population for 
protection. This cursory illustration of the difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of 
liberalism and social protections is an excellent example of how political economic 
conditions can be translated into issues of identity construction and culture.  
 This debate on integrating liberalism and multiculturalism provides a useful 
conceptual exemplar for this project. We know that there has been a change that now 
requires states to actively reconcile the liberal foundation of contemporary Western 
democracies with the need to protect national populations, including vulnerable groups 
within respective national populations. The previous example focused on 
multiculturalism as a protectionist strategy-a position that the remainder of this 
dissertation will emulate.  
 The fact that liberalism and multiculturalism require reconciliation points to the 
existence of an ideological “double movement” at work. The dominant ideology of 
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political economic liberalism, particularly in core nation-states is not questioned in the 
above debate. The issue at hand is how to reconcile a (arguably) non-liberal ideology that 
has been politically implemented as a result of national ethno-cultural diversity. The 
questions not asked in the previous excursus are the mechanical processes analyzed in 
this dissertation. Specifically, if the dominant political economic ideology is being 
challenged by non-liberal ideologies and policies, how did this conflict come into being? 
What is required of nation-states as they enter into this global liberal market economy? 
How are states and national populations changed by this process? How do states respond 
to these changes and challenges that are the direct result of globalization processes? 
 This project examines the post-World War II political economic and demographic 
histories of Canada and Québec to understand what state capacities exist in an era of 
globalization. Economic globalization has limited the policy capacities of contemporary 
nation-states with respect to national economic protection, but the importance of the 
nation-state has not experienced commensurate political demise. The remainder of the 
project is designed to understand what capacities are available to the nation-state and how 
this process of economic globalization has played a role in qualitatively changing how we 
understand the nation-state. Part II provides necessary historical background information 
for both Canada and Québec to further justify the methodological comparison of two 
distinct nation-states. Part III will provide empirical evidence in support of the project as 



















































Part II Introduction 
 
 
 Part II, consisting of Chapters Three and Four, contains historical background 
information for Canada and Québec, respectively. Contemporary divisions in Canada 
between English-Canadian, French-Canadians, and First Nations populations are deeply 
rooted in the colonial histories of each respective group and the shared history of 
Canadian national development. These two chapters are essential to the overall 
dissertation in that they allow the reader to better understand the associated yet 
autonomous nature of national history in Canada. History is, in its most political form, a 
nationalist project. The nationalist project of Canada is distinct from the nationalist 
project in Québec. National histories must reflect this important social, cultural, and 
political distinction. These chapters literally conform to this political reality and attempt 
to tell two sides of the same story. 
Part II is, by necessity, repetitive to a certain degree. Québec history is the history 
of Canada with the converse being equally true. Similar organization and chronological 
patterns allow for significant overlap. On the other hand, each national history contains 
perspectives and events that vary in their significance in relation to a respective 
nationalist project. In the effort to maintain and illustrate the autonomous nature of each 
nationalist project each national history is told with attention to each nationalist project.  
Chapter Three is the national history of Canada that intentionally minimizes the 
divisions and problems of nation-building with the persistence of two European colonial 
legacies. Chapter Four is the national history of Québec with particular attention to the 
conflict between Anglo- and Franco-Canadian cultures and political economic realities. 
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Both histories are defined by their interdependence yet both support an insular nationalist 
project. Part II is designed to illustrate the functional interdependence and insular 





















Chapter Three  
Canada: History and Nationalist Project 
 
 
 The history of Canada tells both a unique and common story. It is unique in that 
its history of conquest, expansion, and legislative management are centered on the reality 
of bilingualism and the presence of at least three (broadly defined) founding peoples: 
those of English, French, and Aboriginal ancestry. Canadian history is common with 
respect to its story as a British colonial possession. One can find common experiences, 
patterns of action, and strains of governance in British post-colonial societies such as 
Australia and New Zealand to name a few. 
 This chapter chronicles the general history of Canada with specific attention to the 
project of creating a singular Canadian nation-state. With at least three ethno-cultural 
groups claiming status as “founding peoples” defining a distinct nationalism is essential 
in the fight for political capital (not to mention the social and economic benefits of 
cultural dominance). The history of Canada, from a Canadian nationalist perspective, is 
distinct from indigenous, Québec, or any other ethno-cultural national history. The 
purpose of this chapter is to tell this national story, but also to illustrate the struggles to 
promote a singular Canadian nationalism, particularly from a singularly English-
Canadian perspective.  
1. Prehistory, First Contact, and the Colonization of New France9
 The archeological evidence of Canadian pre-history has identified two migrations 
of native peoples. The first migration is believed to have occurred in successive waves 
                                                 
9 This section was compiled from several narrative historical sources including Dickason (1997), Eccles 
(1972; 1969), Parkman (1983; 1962), and See (2001). 
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from anywhere between 20,000 and 10,000 BCE. Archeological evidence supports the 
“land bridge theory” of Asiatic migration of Native American peoples. This theory and 
evidence is, in turn, supported by recent genetic evidence that links Native Americans 
with Asian (particularly Siberian) ancestry (Lell et al. 2002; Santos et al. 1999; Bonatto 
and Salzano 1997). A second migration is thought to have taken place between 8,000 and 
3,000 BCE and explains the linguistic differences apparent between Inuit and Aleut arctic 
cultures and southern native peoples (Brace et al. 2001; McGhee 1978, 1996; See 
2001)10.  
These Native Canadians comprised a population that arguably reached 500,000 or 
more prior to European contact. Geography and linguistics traditionally separated these 
peoples into several distinct groups from the Chinook and Salish of the Pacific Northwest 
to the Blackfoot and Chipewyan of the Plains to the James Bay Cree and Huron of the 
Eastern Woodlands to the Beothuk and Penobscot of the Atlantic Maritimes to the Inuit 
and Dene of the Arctic. Prehistoric Canada was clearly a land of great demographic 
diversity. The European “Age of Discovery,” as was the case in the entirety of the 
hemisphere, brought about the end of indigenous predominance in North America. The 
continued (to this day) centrality of native peoples to the history and culture of Canada 
cannot be discounted. Politically, however, the establishment of New France would 
sound the beginning of European dominance over the region.    
Norse sagas make mention of contact with Native Canadians at or before 1000 
CE, but sustained contact between Native Canadians and Europeans was not to occur 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that traditional Native Canadian beliefs reject these scientific theories of migration on 
the basis that they contradict First Nations religious beliefs that respective tribes have lived on what is now 
Canadian soil from the beginning of time. These scientific theories are viewed as being political tools to 
discount First Nations claims of sovereignty and autonomy. 
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until the 16th century. Explorations by John Cabot (1497) and Giovanni de Verrazano 
(1524-1528) were two of the many who began to explore the Atlantic coast of what 
would become Canada. Verrazano was of particular importance as he sailed under the 
French flag (commission by King François I) and proclaimed the land Nova Francia. The 
common story of exploration was told again in “New France” as commercial opportunity 
drove the first settlements. Fishermen eager to take advantage of fishing stocks off the 
shallows near Nova Scotia and Newfoundland established the first temporary settlements, 
while Basque fishermen and whalers did the same. 
 Jacques Cartier’s three voyages in the early 16th century did little to encourage 
French settlement but did develop an improved cartographic knowledge of the St. 
Lawrence River including visits to what would be Québec and Montréal. For years, 
informal fishing settlements constituted the European population of New France. These 
settlements established trading relationships between European groups (French, English, 
Portuguese, and Basque) and Native Canadian groups.  
French interest in Canada rose in conjunction with demand for beaver furs in 
Europe. Samuel de Champlain succeeded in establishing the colony of Québec in 1608 
after a failed attempt in Nova Scotia four years earlier. Champlain’s retention of the 
Algonquin name Québec reflects a relationship with the local Algonquin peoples that 
would enable the settlement to survive. This was a relatively reciprocal relationship as the 
French engaged in Algonquin-Iroquois conflicts on behalf of their allies for years. Of 
course, disease and sporadic French-Algonquin conflict would ultimately decimate the 
once populous group. 
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As the settlement of Québec began to show that a permanent French settlement 
was possible and as the trade in beaver fur remained lucrative, more settlers began to 
arrive to settle the St. Lawrence region. However, tenuous support from the French 
government and the failure to discover alternative sources of income (other than furs) 
ensured that the colony would remain small in comparison with English, Dutch, and 
Spanish possessions to the south.  
New France did succeed in cultivating enough land in the St. Lawrence region to 
stabilize their population. The French settlers had another series of advantages over larger 
colonies; the geography of the region was especially conducive to the fur trade as well as 
providing transportation infrastructure for future commercial endeavors. The St. 
Lawrence River System provided a series of inland ports and protected harbors that 
served the French well. The fur trade provided ample financial incentive to invest and 
travel to New France, if only as a temporary resident. The consequence of this expansion 
of the fur trade and settlement in the Mississippi River Valley as well as in the Great 
Lakes region was that conflict with the also expanding British colonies would be 
inevitable. 
King William’s War (1690-1697) represented the first of many violent conflicts 
between the French-Algonquin alliance and the British colonials. These conflicts ebbed 
and flowed with the currents of war blowing from Europe, but the conflicts in New 
France and the American colonies took on a regular pattern of coordinated raids on towns 
and ports from the late 1600s through 1763. A series of European treaties (Utrecht in 
1713 and Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748) ensured that the political map of North America was 
in constant flux. Both the British and French used colonial possessions as bargaining 
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chips throughout the treaty process. Settlers seemed to be constantly in a state of raid-
preparedness and uncertainty over claims to forts, lands, and strategic geography. This 
state of constant contact and conflict culminated in the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) 
and effectively ended French political and economic participation in the settlement of 
North America. 
1a. The Seven Years’ War and the Conquest of French Canada 
The Seven Years’ War began as prior colonial conflicts had – as both extensions 
of European continental conflict and local conflict between groups seeking the same 
material resources. In 1754 colonial British and French forces met near Fort Duquesne at 
what would become the city of Pittsburgh. This relatively minor conflict illustrated the 
fact that French dominance of the Mississippi River Valley was increasingly challenged 
by British-American colonists crossing west over the Appalachian Mountains. As 
colonial settlers battled for territory and resources, their European masters continued the 
long history of French and British warfare. The colonial conflict soon escalated from 
frontier skirmishes to a full-scale war culminating with British victories at Québec and 
Montréal. The particulars of the protracted War have been chronicled to the point of 
mythology, especially the battle at the Plains of Abraham in which both Generals 
Montcalm and Wolfe died11. The eventual defeat of French forces in North America 
effectively ensured British and American control of the northeastern portion of the 
continent.  
                                                 
11 Full and detailed accounts of both the Seven Years’ War as well as the legendary status of the battle for 
Québec on the Plains of Abraham have been eloquently written by Fred Anderson (2001), Francis Parkman 
(1962), and Francis Jennings (1988). 
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With the fall of Québec in 1759 and Montréal in 1760, New France was officially 
captured territory in the hands of the British. The 1763 Treaty of Paris officially granted 
the lands of New France to the British ensuring that, for the time being, territory 
stretching from the Atlantic seaboard to the Mississippi River Valley and from Georgia to 
the Arctic Circle was British. In the same year a Royal Proclamation created the colony 
of Québec and set the conditions for French assimilation. The Catholic Church was 
ignored by the new colonial administration, as was the feudal land-grant system of 
seigneurial control. English criminal and civil law replaced the dominant authority of 
both the French colonial administration and the Catholic Church. Clearly, the goal of the 
1763 Proclamation was to assimilate the French population as quickly as possible. The 
British colonial authorities underestimated the desire of French-Canadians to retain their 
language and culture. In addition, the dominance of the Catholic Church in the life of the 
average Canadien12 was unquestionable. English efforts to eliminate Catholicism from 
Québec were met with staunch resistance. The population and culture of French Canada 
was too entrenched for any comprehensive assimilationist policy to be effective.  
Anglophone immigration was limited to “mostly administrators, merchants, and 
military leaders” (Conrad, Finkel, and Jaenen 1993, 249) and could not counter the 
population and solidarity of the Francophone Canadiens. The British responded to the 
failed policy (1763 Royal Proclamation) with the Québec Act in 1774. This act restored 
French civil law, including recognition of the Catholic Church, while maintaining British 
                                                 
12 The term Canadien refers to Francophone citizens of Canada. This is a cultural distinction made by 
French-Canadians that implies a distinct history and lineage of a colonial founding people. The term can be 
compared to habitant, which is an original French-Canadian farmer that worked under the seigneiurial 
system of land tenure in early Québec history. The habitants are a specific rural group with strong ties to 
the rural, agricultural history of Québec, while Canadien is a term that can be applied to Francophone 
citizens of the larger Canadian nation-state.  
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criminal law and political authority. This Act served the dual purpose of pacifying 
Canadien dissent and bolstering British colonial authority on the eve of the American 
Revolution. Unlike the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Québec Act was successful in 
quelling any potential Francophone revolt and keeping Québec out of the American 
Revolution.  
The issue of the American Revolution is significant in its impact on Canadian 
history. British loyalists (Tories) migrated en masse during the War as a result of 
American discriminatory measures and their desire to maintain ties to the British Empire. 
A first migration of Tories moved to Nova Scotia and petitioned the British to create a 
new colony that would become New Brunswick. There was also a later movement to the 
border region between the St. Lawrence River and Detroit (Lanctôt 1967). This second 
migration of English-speaking British loyalists would also petition the British 
government for political autonomy due to the conditions of the Québec Act, which denied 
them the right to British civil law. The British responded to this request with the 1791 
Constitutional Act that divided Québec into two: Upper (English) and Lower (French) 
Canada. The Act allowed respective legal, religious, and civil systems to exist in each 
region while maintaining British political control.  
The division of Canada allowed local cultural and civic institutions to function. 
To say that this was a concession to the Francophone Canadiens would be an 
overstatement. The British instituted a mercantile trade relationship with Canada thus 
facilitating Anglophone control of trade. Trade and merchant relationships with Britain 
were of supreme importance and thus much of the fur trade commercial management fell 
into the hands of the English, particularly in Montréal. This shift in control of commercial 
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centers would create an historical condition of economic stratification that will be 
discussed in the next chapter. By the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, the political 
and economic face of Canada was increasingly English.  
2. Post-conquest and Confederation, 1800-187013
Canada in the first half of the Nineteenth Century would be defined by 
intermittent rebellious sentiment, an evolving relationship with the United States to the 
south, and the persistent problem of the “French Fact.” Each of these conditions 
contributed to the environment that spawned the first of Canada’s multi-act constitutional 
documents: the Constitution Act of 1867. 
A series of rebellions against British colonial authorities began in 1837 due to the 
effects of an economic downturn earlier in the decade caused by poor harvest and 
political reform in Britain that did not extend to the Canadian colonies. These conditions 
created a certain level of anti-authoritarian sentiment on the part of both French and 
English Canadians and were directed squarely at the British colonial authorities, 
including their local representatives in both Upper and Lower Canada. The ideological 
influence of the United States on Canada during this period cannot be ignored. The 
combination of lethargic British colonial administrative reforms and the example of 
liberal capitalist governance to the south created quite a strong desire among Canadians 
for change.  
These rebellions were poorly organized and relatively sporadic in both Upper and 
Lower Canada. The level of British colonial control and the languid pace of political and 
                                                 
13 The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Buckner (1985); Conrad, 
Finkel, and Jaenen (1997); Hallowell (2005); and See (2001). 
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economic reforms provided ample motivation for reform oriented leaders whose message 
of change was eagerly absorbed by impoverished farmers. In terms of generating large 
scale change or even wide-spread revolutionary action, these rebellions were failures. 
The outbreak of violent insurrection in Canada so soon after the American Revolution 
greatly alarmed both conservative (Tory) Canadians and the British government.  
The motivations for these rebellions in Lower Canada and Upper Canada were 
reflective of the larger transitions from a mercantilist to liberal economic relationship 
with the United Kingdom. The British government was resistant to reforms, particularly 
in its established colonies that provided the bulk of England’s raw material resources. 
While the rebellions could easily be classified as a “middle-class” reaction to the British 
refusal to reform economic structures, the rebellions in Lower Canada also contained a 
level of ethnic mobilization and included many lower-class farmers. This difference is 
entirely consistent with the economic inequalities present between Upper and Lower 
Canada at this time. The free-holding agricultural system of Upper Canada was more 
amenable to capital accumulation and thus a greater middle-class agricultural population. 
In Lower Canada, the seigneurial system was based on a quasi-feudal relationship 
between a landed seigneur and a tenant farmer. The lack of property ownership and the 
rent requirements of this relationship ensured that the habitants remained landless and 
poor. 
While these resistive activities did little to affect immediate administrative 
change, they did pressure the British to establish an inquiry led by Lord Durham in 1838. 
The subsequent Durham Report suggested establishing a unique level of Canadian 
governmental autonomy while remaining within the British Commonwealth. The intent 
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was to effectively address the causes of the rebellions but also maintain supreme 
authority in matters of political and economic relations between Canada and Great 
Britain. 
The Durham Report is significant for two historical reasons. The first was the 
promotion of a confederation model of governance that would shape the future of 
Canadian federal-provincial relationships for years to come. The second issue of 
significance was the resurgence of anti-French sentiment through the Report’s insistence 
on French assimilation in Canada. The legislative importance of the Durham Report is of 
primary importance in this chapter. The cultural legacy of the Durham Report will be 
revisited in the following chapter. 
The emergence of an autonomous government in Canada began with the 1841 Act 
of Union that united Upper and Lower Canada into the single colonial entity of Canada, 
while maintaining the legislative distinction of Canada West and Canada East, 
respectively. Both entities were allowed legislatures of equal numbers but firm executive 
power resided with the Governor who was the Crown’s official representative in Canada, 
thus maintaining British political authority. These political organizational changes were 
reflective of the larger economic shifts away from mercantilist empires to a more open 
liberal market economy. Domestically, the colonial divisions of Canada were view by 
colonial authorities as an impediment to civic improvements projects and economic 
development, particularly westward expansion. Liberal economic reforms were viewed as 
the solution to economic stagnation, particularly agrarian reforms that allowed both land 
ownership and the ability to accumulate reinvestable capital by Canadian farmers with 
the goal of expanding the agricultural production capacities of the colony.     
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These reform impulses motivated the Confederation Debates between all British-
Canadian colonial entities at the 1864 Québec Conference. The most contentious and 
historically persistent issue of federal and provincial relations was that of autonomy 
under the aegis of a confederated Canada. In short, the proposed federalist system of 
governance included a level of centralized control that was disconcerting for some 
colonies. These issues were enough to keep Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland 
from participating in the confederation project. The novel concept of an autonomous state 
within the British colonial system became a reality with the British North America Act 
(BNAA) in 1867. 
2a. The British North America Act  
 The BNAA reflected the conflicts and conditions that originally motivated the 
Durham Report. International relationships, with the United States and the United 
Kingdom played a significant role in the shaping of the BNAA with respect to federalism 
and national identity construction. In the case of federalism, the recent American Civil 
War motivated the Canadian framers to attribute more power to the federal government 
of Canada than to individual provinces. The mechanics of the document promoted the 
three ideals of “peace, order, and good government” in an obvious departure from the 
language of the American Declaration of Independence. This attempt to differentiate 
Canadian and American histories, societies, cultures, and identities is the first legislative 
effort to create a unique Canadian national identity. This would be a difficult and 
prolonged effort that continues to this day and serves as one of the single most important 
challenges to Canadian government as will be shown in subsequent chapters. 
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 The Act established a House of Commons and a Senate with legislative powers. 
The British monarchy retained executive powers with the appointed Governor-General 
serving as the Crown’s proxy. The BNAA did allow room for legislative interpretation 
with respect to authority granted to the central Canadian government and that of 
provincial authorities. This ambiguity concerning federal and provincial authority was 
largely responsible for nonparticipation by Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland in 
1867 and continued to color Canadian history with respect to the numerous debates 
concerning federal and provincial authority. The federal government was granted powers 
of taxation and veto with respect to provincial legislation, while the provinces were 
granted autonomy over educational policies and issues of civil rights.  
The BNAA also granted the legal status of two official languages in the country: 
French and English. This provision again shows the persistence of the “French Fact” in 
the face of considerable English pressure for the assimilation of the Canadiens. The 
legislative recognition of linguistic equality in conjunction with the federal-provincial 
balance of powers that was established by the BNAA would create significant platforms 
for issues of political autonomy and control. The issue of federal-provincial relations 
undergirds the previously mentioned issues of culture and national identity in Canada. 
These relationships will be discussed at length but bear mention here for the fact that 
their origins lie with the British North America Act. It should be noted that the BNAA, 
while providing the necessary political autonomy for a national-state foundation, was 
motivated in large part by the British government. The BNAA was instrumental in 
providing a framework on which a Canadian national project could be built, but should 
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not be understood as a distinctly Canadian product. Rather the BNAA reflects the 
growing political economic potential of a British colony in a time of declining empire.  
2b. Westward Expansion and the Beginning of the Canadian Nation-State 
 With the (partial) unification of Canada completed, the newly elected federal 
government under the leadership of Canada’s first Prime Minister, Sir John A. 
Macdonald, undertook the massive project of westward expansion. This was seen as an 
economic imperative as the vast plains of Manitoba and Saskatchewan presented vast 
agricultural potential and the newly established province of British Columbia (1871) 
offered a Pacific port for future trade with Asia. The project of expansion carried with it 
the same issues and conflicts as in the American experience. Specifically, Native 
Canadian assimilation and land appropriation resulted in resistance, rebellion, and 
conflict in the Red and Saskatchewan River regions in the interior of the new country. 
The combination of the encroaching Canadian Pacific Railway and a massive 
government effort to settle and exploit the interior plains pressured the indigenous 
peoples and Métis14 to respond. The Red River conflict of 1869 saw a period of sporadic 
violence between settlers and the Métis provisional government. This provisional 
government was designed to protect the culture and land of indigenous and Métis 
inhabitants of the region in response to Canadian encroachment. The conflict and outcry 
over the actions of these Catholic, Francophone, and mixed-race Métis pressured the 
                                                 
14 The Métis are the children of French and English fur traders and members of the Cree, Ojibway, and 
Saulteaux tribes. The Métis played a significant leadership role in the history and governance of Manitoba. 
In fact, the entrance of Manitoba into the Canadian confederation in 1870 illustrates the influence of the 
Métis. The Manitoba Act (1870) ensured separate educational institutions based on linguistic preference as 
well as recognizing English and French as official provincial languages. The 1873 “Half Breed Land Grant 
Protection Act” was only partly successful in protecting the land claims of the Métis settlers of the 
province, but it does serve an historical purpose in exposing the power of the Métis people to motivate 
provincial protectionist legislation on their behalf.  
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Macdonald government to diffuse the situation. The federal response was to establish the 
province of Manitoba in 1870 while maintaining many of the local protectionist policies 
of the provisional government.  
This compromise was not to last as rapid settlement and frequent treaty violations, 
commonly in the form of land acquisition pushed many Métis west to the Saskatchewan 
River region. Conditions continued to deteriorate as several treaties claimed former 
Native Canadian land for federal government use. The 1876 Indian Act, designed to 
encourage assimilation of Native Canadians, also inflamed already tenuous relations 
between the Métis and settlers. The resulting North-West Rebellion resulted in the 
execution of several indigenous combatants including the leader of both the Red River 
and Northwest rebellious actions, Louis Riel.  This was the last organized resistance to 
Canadian westward expansion.  
 The repression of indigenous resistance in the West allowed the nationalist 
expansion project to continue. Under the Macdonald “National Policy” the shape of 
Canada drastically changed. British Columbia became a province in 1871, the Canadian 
Pacific Railway was completed in 1881, and the late Nineteenth Century saw Canada’s 
first massive recruitment effort to populate and exploit the vast natural resources of the 
country. It was clear very early in the colonial Canadian project that the resources and 
land-spaces of Canada were far too vast for the small population of French and English 
settlers to productively exploit. New sources of labor were needed if westward expansion 
was to be successful. The federal government actively promoted the Canadian as a place 
of amazing agricultural potential. 
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3. Immigration and the Peopling of Canada15
 The organizational and deliberate promotion of selective immigration in order to 
encourage agricultural growth in Canada was led by the Minister of the Department of 
the Interior, Clifford Sifton16. The Department’s Immigration Branch began to distribute 
promotional materials in strategic locations such as the United States and Great Britain. 
The emphasis on recruitment in the United States was quite successful with an estimated 
750,000 Americans emigrating between 1901 and 1914 (Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada 2000). The provincial creation of Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1905 further 
emphasized the managed growth and dominion claims of the Canadian government. 
Encouraged by the success of the American and British recruitment efforts, Sifton 
continued to expand his efforts into Central and Eastern Europe. His goals for peopling 
the interior of the country were colored by desires for a specific type of immigrant, the 
“stalwart peasants” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000). The most numerous of 
these people agreeing to Canada’s offer of settlement were from the Ukraine. The 
Ukrainian example is an historically important one as this was an ethnic group that 
actively strove to maintain its cultural and linguistic heritage in an adopted land. In 1905 
the province of Manitoba financed a teacher education program in the Ukrainian 
language, enacting arguably Canada’s first multicultural policy outside of the traditional 
triad of Indigenous, French and English peoples. The years preceding the First World 
                                                 
15 The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Brown and Cook (1974), 
Cameron (2004), Halli and Driedger (1999), Owram (1992), See (2001), and Waite (1971).  
16 Sifton served as Minister for the Department of the Interior from 1896 to 1905 under the Liberal 
government of Wilfrid Laurier. Information pertaining to his ministerial career and policies was obtained 




War were characterized by massive recruitment and immigration to Canada. Ukrainian 
settlers were followed by Germans and Italians who settled both in urban and rural areas. 
An example of this massive growth is Saskatchewan, which saw its population explode 
from approximately 91,000 in 1901 to 500,000 in 1911 (Bitner and Newman 2005).  
 The active recruitment of immigrants led to a populist political backlash. Public 
sentiment against non-Northern and Western European immigration was palpable, 
particularly against the expansion of Chinese immigration in British Columbia. As early 
as 1885 (and again in 1900 and 1903), financial disincentives were established to reduce 
Chinese immigration into the country. When Sifton resigned his post in 1905 he was 
replaced by Frank Oliver, whose approach to immigration was focused much more on 
public sentiment and political opinion. One year later the federal government passed the 
first of several laws regulating immigration into Canada. The Immigration Act of 1906 
established definitions for “immigrant” and established restrictions on acceptable 
individuals (denying the mentally disabled and incompetent, criminals, those “afflicted 
with a loathsome disease” and the very poor) and occupations (criminals and prostitutes). 
The real impact of this Act, however, was in the federal codification of immigration 
regulations with standardized procedures and penalties for non-compliance17.   
 The 1906 Act provided the legislative precedent for further restrictions in 1910. 
The Immigration Act of 1910 was much more explicit in its prohibitions (adding the 
blind, deaf, and dumb to its existing list of physical and mental maladies) and allowing 
                                                 
17 The Immigration Act of 1906 is a watershed legislative moment in Canadian history. In just one year the 
official stance of the federal government went from promoting Canada as an opportunity to restricting 
landings and legislating discriminatory policies. The text of the Act can be found at the Canadian National 
Library at http://www.canadiana.org/ECO/ItemRecord/9_07188. Of particular note are the stated restricted 
peoples listed and defined in sections 26-29.   
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more subjective leeway for immigration officers, particularly with respect to race and 
ethnicity. For example, Section 38 of the Act states that immigrants of “any race deemed 
unsuited to the climate and requirements of Canada, or of immigrants of any specified 
class, occupation, or character18”. Clearly, the welcome for non-Western European 
immigration had been rescinded in Canada. These measures would serve to pacify public 
outcry against increasing ethnic diversification due to liberal immigration policies – a 
common theme in North America at the turn of the century.  
4. World Wars and Political Autonomy19
 By the time of the First World War, Canada had expanded its industrial 
capacities, thanks in part to protective tariffs and a concerted effort to expand the pool of 
available labor through immigration. The coming of the First World War brought the 
realization that Canadian isolation, or at least its status as a subordinate British colonial 
possession, had come to an end. Prior to 1914 many Canadian economists and business 
leaders began calling for the commencement of reciprocal trade with the United States 
and the removal of nationalist trade protections. Their reasoning was reflective of the 
growing sense of Canadian autonomy and a desire to realign economically from a fading 
global power to a more geographically convenient emergent power. The defeat of the 
Liberal party platform of trade reciprocity with the U.S. in 1911 quelled this argument for 
a time, but Canadian involvement in World War I would usher in an era of greater 
                                                 
18 The Immigration Act of 1910 is viewed as the logical outcome of its 1906 predecessor. While racially-
specific immigration policies regulating Asian migration had been in effect since the 1860s, this was the 
first federal regulatory measure applied to immigrants with general racist criteria. The text of the Act can 
be found at the Canadian National Library at http://www.canadiana.org/ECO/ItemRecord/9_07184.     
19 The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Bothwell, Drummond, and 
English (1989; 1987); Brown and Cook (1974); Granatstein (1975); See (2001); and Thompson and Seager 
(1985). 
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political economic autonomy for Canada and shift the dominant international economic 
relationship from the United Kingdom to the United States. 
  In a sense, Canada was drawn into World War I at the behest of the British. 
General public support for England and France in Canada was not in serious question; 
however it was Canada’s position within the British Empire that created a de facto 
position of military support. Ironically, this support and Canadian political actions after 
1918 would further distance the country from its colonial past and work to create a 
modern nation apart from the constraints of the British Empire. 
 Canadian contributions to the war effort included increased industrial production, 
support services (including medical and transportation services), and a significant 
military contribution. These military contributions, specifically conscription which was 
instituted by the Military Service Act of 1917, served as the most contentious issue on the 
Canadian home-front. Resistance to conscription was widespread throughout the country 
but remained a minority position outside of Québec. This popular position (in Québec) 
was indicative of the French-Canadian argument against European imperialism. Why, it 
was argued, should French-Canadians support a war on the grounds of saving the British 
Empire when Québec was a victim of British imperialism? The fact that France was 
under attack was of little consequence as many French-Canadians viewed France as 
having abandoned their kin to the British. Both the military effort in general and the 
Military Service Act went unsupported in Québec and resulted in anti-conscription riots 
throughout the province. These events further illustrated the divergent attitudes and 
opinions that belied a Canadian national identity. For the federal government however, 
these domestic conflicts and disagreements were secondary to the process of building a 
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sovereign nation-state. Independent participation in the war effort was an important step 
in this nation-building process. 
 The level of Canadian participation in World War I accelerated its emancipation 
from Britain. The inter-war period illustrates the level of this emancipation on both 
positive and negative tracks. Immediately following the war, Canada participated in the 
short-lived League of Nations as an independent member. This political autonomy was 
further exemplified with the negotiation of the 1923 Halibut Treaty that codified Pacific 
Northwest fisheries. This treaty was negotiated and enacted between the United States 
and Canada without participation of the British government. In 1926 Lord Balfour 
advocated a level of political sovereignty of countries within the British Commonwealth. 
This support from Balfour was essential in promoting the 1931 Westminster Statute that 
officially created the British Commonwealth including the recognition of independence 
with respect to domestic and foreign policy but retaining British legislative authority. 
4a. Economic Interdependence 
In terms of trade and economic issues, the decade of the 1920s saw the emergence 
of the United States as Canada’s single greatest trading partner. This economic 
relationship would motivate a decrease in national protective tariffs, particularly on the 
part of Canada and drastically increase the level of economic interdependence between 
the two North American countries. No experience is more telling of this relationship than 
the nearly identical experiences of Canadians and Americans during the Great 
Depression.  
The expansion of liberal market economics in the latter half of the 1800s pushed 
individual nations toward increasing their export capabilities. This reorientation would 
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prove disastrous for most Western countries during the Depression Era. The immediate 
and persisting effects of economic depression ensured that foreign orders would decrease 
– in most cases drastically. In turn, decreased domestic income due to the collapse of 
export income would allow no viable avenues for short-term recovery. These conditions 
were exacerbated in a situation of massive economic interdependence like that of Canada 
and the United States. The resulting “Dirty Thirties” saw matching industrial and urban 
poverty levels rise dramatically. Agricultural regions and sectors were heavily impacted 
as drought and a decline in market demand combined to create conditions of abject 
destitution. The “Dust Bowl” conditions so passionately captured in photographs ran 
from Mexico to the northern reaches of agricultural production in Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba.  
Political responses to the Depression era were also quite similar. The 
Conservative government of Richard Bennett attempted to replicate the relative successes 
of Roosevelt’s “New Deal” by providing programs such as unemployment insurance, 
industrial oversight, and permanent economic planning. These efforts were unsuccessful 
and resulted in the defeat of the Conservative government in 1935. The result of these 
collective experiences was a nearly universal belief that the federal Canadian government 
was not doing nearly enough for its citizens, particularly in times of crisis. The post-
Depression period would see a desire to establish clear social responsibilities of the 
federal government. This desire to strengthen the state was reflected in the 1940 Rowell-
Sirois commission report. The Rowell-Sirois Commission pointed to the increase in 
provincial power due to judicial decisions as a serious problem for welfare provision. The 
report advocated a resumption of the federal authority established by the 1867 British 
 102
North America Act. Much of the Rowell-Sirois report was supported by the inability of 
provincial governments to address the massive social and economic welfare crisis of the 
Great Depression. This era would see the legitimation and practical expansion of the 
Canadian state that would play an essential role in the post-World War II history of the 
nation. 
4b. The Expansion of the Canadian Welfare State 
The Second World War again saw Canada enter a major international conflict and 
provide significant human and material resources on behalf of the Allied powers. The 
typical Canadian story during World War II told of support for the Allied effort, 
particularly on behalf of a besieged Britain. There were exceptions particularly in Québec 
where the resurgent criticism of British support ensured that the Canadian effort would 
not be universally supported. Conscription again emerged as a contentious issue with 
Québec in opposition to a reestablished draft. The majority of Canada, however, 
supported conscription and welcomed the massive increase in industrial production that 
accompanied the war years.  
The post-war devastation of Europe created a significant opportunity for Canada. 
The industrial and economic infrastructures that supported the war effort remained intact 
and Canada’s position as a growing power to the north of the Western Superpower of the 
United States ensured increased international visibility. The country was a major 
participant in the founding of the United Nations in 1945 and an early leader in 
humanitarian efforts within the organization.  
Domestically the post-war period continued massive increases in industrial 
production and economic growth. This period of economic growth was extended by 
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Canada’s participation in the Korean War, but would come to an end in 1957, as the 
global trends of economic growth would slide into recession. The classic Canadian 
problem of manpower again served as a significant post-war problem. Increases in 
immigration provided essential labor to fuel Canada’s economic boom. This situation of 
economic growth hampered by persistent labor demand would play a significant role in 
the development of contemporary Canada and will be addressed in subsequent chapters. 
In brief, the period from 1945 through 1960 saw increases in state responsibility for 
social welfare, a massive rise in immigration through the late 1950s, and a growth in 
Canada’s international status as a central political and economic power. The major 
outcome of this period would be centered on an old but intensifying Canadian problem: 
national unity. 
The Diefenbaker government of 1957-1963 offers several illustrations of these 
dynamic yet ominous times. First, Diefenbaker clearly understood the dangers and threats 
to national unity posed by rapid economic growth and accompanying increases 
immigration. His government promoted two efforts to stem the liberal notion of 
individual ethnic identity and encourage an assimilationist Canadian nationalism. The 
first was a general emphasis on national unity called “One Canada.” This policy was 
designed to deemphasize racial, ethnic, and cultural identification and promote a singular 
nationalistic ideal of personal identity. The second effort was the 1960 Bill of Rights that 
provided legislative justification for the ideological positions of the “One Canada” policy. 
This was the first of many legislative efforts to promote and define Canadian nationalism 
as a singularity. Diefenbaker should be credited as one of the first to legislate a definition 
of “Canadian.” 
 104
Both the ideological and legislative nationalism of the Diefenbaker government 
seemed the final straw for Québec. In 1960, the long-standing conservative provincial 
government of Maurice Duplessis (1936-1939 and 1944-1959) was defeated by Jean 
Lesage’s Liberals who immediately began a project of Keynesian economic and 
governmental reforms intended to modernize the province. These reforms would evolve 
into a political and cultural period of empowering change known as La Révolution 
tranquille (Quiet Revolution). The consequence of this period in Québec would be the 
motivation of a more inclusive nationalism and the strengthening of the Canadian nation-
state. 
5. The Quiet Revolution and Ethnic Challenges to Pan-Canadian Nationalism20
In brief, the Quiet Revolution was a period of political and economic 
modernization in conjunction with an urban cultural nationalism centered on the 
uniqueness of Québec. The “revolutionary” aspects of this period describe the incredible 
speed with which the province shifted from an agrarian rural society that was largely 
defined by its Catholic faith and social institutions. Following the Quiet Revolution, we 
find a Québec that is urban, industrial, and increasingly secular in its worldview. For 
English Canada, the Quiet Revolution represented a significant acceleration of the 
demands and volume of French-Canadian nationalism. The emergence of an articulated 
Québécois identity in conjunction with the persistent call for Québec sovereignty led 
many in English Canada to begin to question whether Canada could, in fact, survive this 
challenge to its national-state framework. 
                                                 
20 The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Bashevkin (1991); 
Bothwell, Drummond, and English (1989); Fitzmaurice (1985); See (2001); and Thomson (1985). 
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Briefly, the Quiet Revolution was a period of political change that instituted 
liberal economic reforms (within a socially democratic context) and ethno-nationalist 
social and cultural reforms. The “Revolution” formally ended traditional structures of 
socio-political control in the form of the Catholic Church and Anglophone economic 
dominance in Québec commercial centers. The provincial state quickly replaced the 
Church in providing social services to the Québec population through the expansion of 
state control over education, health care, and other social services. The state also 
increased its role in economic sectors with the nationalization of power and water utilities 
(Hydro-Québec) and gaining control over a provincial pension plan that also had the 
ability to protect specifically Francophone businesses. The goals, and in fact the actual 
outcomes, of the Quiet Revolution were to reassert the Francophone, Québécois nature of 
Québec society while at the same time expanding economic sectors and productive 
capacities to harness the growth potential of liberal (economic) market integration. 
The full impact of the Quiet Revolution will be discussed in the following 
chapter. Its importance to the development of a French-Canadian identity and culture that 
was neither Canadian nor French but Québécois cannot be understated; however its role 
in the history of Canada is of primary importance here.  The “revolutionary” aspects of 
this period are debatable and will be further discussed. The extended nature of this 
process of change does connote some level of significant change; however the sentiment 
of French-Canadian or Québécois nationalism was neither new nor revolutionary. The 
significance of this change was the provision of a secular state support structure that 
allowed Québécois nationalism the opportunity to thrive as a progressive alternative to 
stagnant isolationism. The Quiet Revolution period was complex with divergent attitudes 
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and directions yet served as a focal point for a people who generally felt repressed by the 
power of Anglophone Canada.  
During the same period, Canada was faced with yet another problem – that of a 
resurgent economy (following the recession years of 1957-1961) and a dwindling source 
of labor migrants. As Europe began to recover and promote intra-continental labor 
migration, Canada saw a precipitous decline in its traditional sources of immigration. 
Labor from alternative source countries was needed if Canada was to continue its long-
term project of economic growth. As a result Canada passed a series of legislative acts 
designed to reduce racial and ethnic restrictions on possible immigrants. In 1962 the 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration announced the de-racialization of Canadian 
immigration by emphasizing educational attainment and vocational skills as entry 
criteria. In 1966 the Assisted Passage Loan Scheme (a program of loans to desired 
immigrants) ended its European-only policy and was amended to include migrants from 
the Caribbean. Finally, in 1967 Canadian immigration policy completely eliminated race 
and country of origin from its selection criteria with the implementation of the Points 
System, which evaluated vocational and language skills, education, and other aspects of 
potential immigrants.  
The result of this economically driven shift in immigration policy was the rapid 
diversification of Canadian immigration and the increasing diversification of Canadian 
urban areas. For example, prior to 1962 the top three origins of Canadian immigrants 
were the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany. By the year 2000, the top three origins 
were China, India, and Pakistan (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000). Changes in 
 107
Canadian immigration policy in the 1960s would forever change the face of metropolitan 
Canada and pose additional challenges to the idea of a pan-Canadian nationalism.  
5a. Managing Ethnic Diversity 
The pressures of the Quiet Revolution on Canadian federalism prompted the 
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963. Their work was intended 
to solidify Canadian nationalism through the recognition and inclusion of Francophones 
as “founding peoples.” The ethno-cultural dichotomy assumed by the Commission led to 
discontent and protest from Canadians of neither English nor French ancestry. This so-
called “Third Force” rejected any bicultural definition of the country and motivated the 
addition of Book IV to the Commission’s final report chronicling the “The Cultural 
Contributions of Other Ethnic Groups” in 1970. The Commission on Bilingualism and 
Biculturalism Report (B&B Report) would serve as an important tool for one of the most 
controversial Prime Ministers in Canadian history, Pierre Eliot Trudeau. 
Trudeau came to power in 1968 and immediately resumed Diefenbaker’s project 
of creating pan-Canadian nationalism. It is unclear whether Trudeau originally agreed 
with Diefenbaker’s singular or mono-cultural view of Canada, but a resurgent Québec 
and a labor migrant population that was increasingly ethnically diverse motivated a shift 
in the federal position in defending and defining Canadian nationalism. The B&B Report 
allowed Trudeau to sponsor a series of cultural policies designed to define Canadian 
nationalism and acknowledge the changing face of the Canadian nation. The 1969 
Official Languages Act recognized both English and French as national languages and in 
1971 Trudeau laid the groundwork for a federal multicultural policy. These actions 
countered the ethnic nationalist message of the Quiet Revolution in Québec through their 
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message of inclusion and the recognition of diversity throughout the country. In other 
words, through the official embrace of ethno-cultural diversity, the multiculturalism of 
the Trudeau administration effectively recognized the distinctive Québécois culture while 
recognizing this diversity as being of equal status to that of other non-Anglo groups in 
Canada. Québec was, in the eyes of the federal government, distinct but equal, and above 
all a Canadian province like all the others. 
The Multicultural Policy of 1971 had yet another nationalistic purpose in its 
ability to distinguish Canadian diversity policy from that of the United States, thus further 
distinguishing a distinctly Canadian national culture. By promoting the “cultural mosaic” 
model over the American “melting pot” strategy, Canada could distinguish itself 
internationally as an increasingly distinct and independent society. This was further 
exemplified by the federal government’s continuing concern over foreign economic 
investment and ownership of Canadian production facilities. Trudeau’s lack of support 
for increased “free-trade” between the United States and Canada, as well as his 
unwillingness to fully support US actions in Vietnam and the Cuba trade embargo, 
further distanced the two countries politically while maintaining the status of mutual 
primary trading partners.   
The question of national unity, which was a continuing priority for the Trudeau 
government, suffered a significant blow in 1976 with the election of René Lévesque and 
the Parti Québécois (PQ) in the province of Québec. The PQ wrested provincial power 
from the traditional liberal party (Parti libéral du Québec) on the platform of sovereignty 
through a renegotiated relationship with the Canadian federal government. The PQ was 
successful in bringing about cultural policies intended to codify the cultural goals of the 
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Quiet Revolution. Among the most significant legislative achievements of the Levesque 
administration was the passage of Bill 101 (Charter of the French Language) that 
officially enforced French as the language of major business and government as well as 
requiring that new immigrants to Québec send their children to French-language schools. 
In 1980, the PQ brought about a public referendum on that they termed “sovereignty-
association.” If successful the referendum would grant authority to the provincial 
government to negotiate the extent and level of provincial autonomy leading toward 
increased sovereignty. The referendum failed as sixty percent of provincial voters 
rejected the proposal. The failure of the 1980 Québec referendum was a significant 
victory for the Trudeau administration that had dedicated tremendous resources to the 
defeat of the referendum. This failure for the Parti Québécois led Levesque to approach 
an emboldened Trudeau and work with him on a standing promise to revise the 
relationship between federal and provincial authorities. 
6. Constitutional Repatriation and an Autonomous Canada21
These promised revisions to the British North America Act prompted Trudeau to 
bring provincial leaders together in the hopes that a new constitutional agreement could 
be reached that would replace the British North America Act. This process would grant 
Canada a domestic tradition of self-governance and officially remove the British 
legislative legacy from a political system that was practically free of British influence by 
this time. In November 1981 all but one of the provincial ministers signed the revised 
constitution (Constitution Act), which was passed as the Canada Act by the British 
                                                 
21 The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Bothwell, Drummond, and 
English (1989); Clarkson and McCall (1994; 1990); Hart, Dymond, and Robertson (1994); and See (2001). 
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Parliament in 1982. Québec abstained from signing the document and joined with several 
Native Canadian nations in rejecting the language and process of constitutional 
repatriation.  
The Constitution Act is a significant document that articulates Canada’s final 
entry into sovereign statehood, however also reflects the tradition of compromise in 
Canadian politics. The most significant point of ambiguity was the “notwithstanding 
clause” that allows provinces to ignore certain aspects of the Constitution that infringe on 
local authority. The potential invocation of this clause is particularly problematic when 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is taken into account. The Charter is an inclusive 
legal statement defining and protecting liberal equality making the Charter “one of the 
most progressive constitutional documents in the world…” (See 2001, 178). Section 15 
clearly exemplifies the inclusive nature of the document: 
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, 
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability22.   
 
The Constitution Act finally defined Canada as a fully autonomous country with a 
functioning constitutional foundation. Many have pointed to this document as an ultimate 
success for Trudeau and his projects of nation-building and pan-Canadian nationalism. 
However the persisting domestic thorn in Trudeau’s side was Québec. Despite his tireless 
efforts to include the province within a unique nation-state, the province continued to be 
                                                 
22 This statement is a general definition of equality rights. The entirety of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms continues to include groups as protected Canadians on the basis of race, ethnicity, language, 
culture, sex, religion, and disabilities with significant legal protections for all Canadians. The document 
also shows the imprint of provincial negotiations in its specific language. For example, in Section 16 on 
Official Languages, subsection two clearly identifies New Brunswick as the only officially bilingual 
province in a bilingual Canada. The entire Charter of Rights and Freedoms is included in the 1982 
Constitution Act, which can be found at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/annex_e.html#I. 
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dissatisfied with the lack of recognition and authority granted by the federal government 
on a number of issues.  
 The Constitution Act is a significant illustration of this disparity due to the 
continuing absence of a Québec signature. To date, the province of Québec has not 
signed the Constitution Act yet functions within the federal Canadian system as if it had. 
Again, the legislative ambiguity of federal-provincial relationships serves as a double-
edged sword in the quest for a united Canadian nation-state. Although the challenges 
posed by the Quiet Revolution and the 1980 Québec Referendum resulted in a stronger 
federal Canadian state, the nation continued to be increasingly fragmented. 
6a. The Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords 
The problems of national fragmentation and unequal state participation 
were addressed by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Québec Premier Robert 
Bourassa in the 1987 Meech Lake Accords. Provincial ministers agreed to modify 
the existing Constitution Act to recognize Québec as a uniquely distinctive 
society within Canada, reinforce the federal commitment to bilingualism, allow 
provinces additional authority in matters of immigration, and give greater 
authority to provincial constitutional veto powers. Clearly, the federal government 
was willing to give Québec and other provinces increased authority in exchange 
for national unity. The Manitoba Legislative Assembly, however, did not agree 
and refused to sign the Accord. Newfoundland then followed the Manitoban 
example and rejected the Accord as well. Objections were raised over the 
significance of Québec society and federal recognition of uniqueness over all 
other Canadian provinces, cultures, and concerns. The First Nations also objected 
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that their concerns were not addressed and that their level of participation was not 
acceptable. With passage in only eight of the required ten provinces, the Meech 
Lake Accord failed to resolve the lingering constitutional non-participation of 
Québec. 
The 1992 Charlottetown Accord again attempted to reconcile Québec’s 
concerns with the 1982 Constitution Act. A group of provincial, federal, First 
Nations, and Métis representatives reached an agreement designed to encourage 
national unity and promote a singular Canadian nation-state. The Accord limited 
federal powers over provincial statues; guaranteed federal funding of social 
services such as health care and education while limiting provisional requirements 
for funding; included a “Canada Clause” that recognized certain values as being 
officially “Canadian” such as equality, diversity, and again recognizing the 
distinct nature of the Québec province, culture, and society; and interestingly 
included a statement on liberalizing trade through the abolition of protective 
tariffs between provinces. The Charlottetown Accord, unlike the failed Meech 
Lake Accord, was to be put to a national vote through the referendum process, 
although unanimous approval was again required for ratification. Only five of the 
twelve Canadian provinces approved the Accord with Québec rejecting the 
proposal 57 to 43 percent.  
The failure of the Charlottetown Accord to resolve Québec constitutional 
non-participation led to the defeat of Bourassa’s Liberal government in Québec. 
The Parti Québécois again gained power in 1994 led by Jacques Parizeau and held 
another referendum the following year. The 1995 referendum was supported by 
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the PQ, a new federal separatist party, the Bloc Québécois, led by Lucien 
Bouchard, and popular dissatisfaction with federal efforts to resolve Québec’s 
objections to the Constitution Act. The 1995 referendum was only narrowly 
defeated (50.6 percent to 49.4 percent) and continued the legacy of ambiguous 
cooperation in a Canada that continues to struggle with issues of domestic unity.   
7. Economic Growth and the Shift to “Free-Trade” 
The 1970s saw a continual rise in Canadian economic growth as well as 
international political status. The federal government further clarified immigration 
definitions through the 1978 Immigration Act that created categories for refugees and 
other humanitarian immigration cases as well as further reducing discriminatory 
measures targeting medical problems and sexual orientation. The process of urbanization 
and ethnic diversification continued throughout Canada creating a country that could be 
defined as primarily urban with 76 percent of all Canadians living in urban areas in 1980 
(Statistics Canada 1996). Canadian economic growth and geographic proximity to the 
United States led to inclusion in the 1976 G7 economic summit and subsequent 
participation in the group’s meetings and operational agreements. Some have pointed to 
this inclusion as being somewhat artificial as mid-1970s Canadian economic performance 
was not necessarily on par with that of other G7 countries and perhaps promoted Canada 
to international prominence before the state was prepared to assume such a role (Hawkins 
1988, 12). This premature promotion to the global political economic elite continued 
Canadian global market integration, particularly with respect to liberal “free trade.” 
The election of the Conservative Mulroney government in 1984 ushered in the 
end of large-scale trade protectionism, even though the official Conservative party 
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platform was against expanding Canadian “free trade” agreements. In fact, the issue of 
“free-trade” was, by this time, already in practice between Canada and the United States 
with the most notable liberal trade policy being the Canada-United State Automotive 
Agreement of 1965. There were significant trade protections remaining that were 
effectively demolished by the Canada-United State Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 
1987. Political opposition to this liberal trade agreement and the fears that this would 
usher in the fall of Canadian economic and cultural independence made CUFTA the 
central issue of the 1988 federal elections. Mulroney’s Conservatives won, but the two 
parties (New Democratic Party and the Liberal Party) in opposition to CUFTA received 
the majority of total votes. Liberal opposition was short-lived as the 1993 election of Jean 
Chretien’s Liberal government saw the expansion of CUFTA to include Mexico with the 
enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. 
Liberal trade agreements remain an issue in Canadian politics, but opposition to 
liberal trade and globalization has been marginalized. The only remaining political party 
in opposition to “free-trade” agreements remains the New Democratic Party.  However 
public opposition to NAFTA has been resurgent in the past few years largely due to the 
United States’ failure to adhere to the trade agreements23.  
Present-day Canada is by most accounts a successful nation-state despite the 
failure to resolve several key national problems. Canadian economic growth has out 
performed its fellow G8 countries for the past several years and fiscal solvency projects 
have resulted in federal surplus revenues for the past six years. This economic growth has 
                                                 
23 The continuing dispute over softwood lumber sales to the United States has been a significant obstacle. 
The US position on applying tariffs to Canadian softwood timber was ruled illegal by the NAFTA 
adjudication body on several occasions. A recent World Trade Organization ruling was more amenable to 
the US position, but the situation has yet to be resolved. 
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not been without cost. The federally funded health care system (Health Canada) is facing 
increased financial difficulty after years of reduced funding. Education and cultural 
programs, including the vaunted Multicultural Program have experienced years of 
reduced funding. In addition, increased regional dissatisfaction with federal 
appropriations and intrusion on perceived provincial matters has continued to mar federal 
and provincial relationships. The ever-increasingly close economic relationship with the 
United States continues to serve as a thorn in the side of Canadian nationalists as they 
often lament the loss of distinctive Canadian culture to American symbols and affinities. 
The combined threat of external influence and internal dissatisfaction poses a major 
problem for future Canadian leaders, particularly with respect to promoting an acceptable 
national identity. The recent “Adscam24” scandal illustrates the immediacy and 
problematic nature of promoting a pan-Canadian national identity. For the Canadian 
government, this is a necessary project if Canada is to survive. 
Despite these simultaneous successes and failures, the issue of most significance 
is the persistence of the “French Fact.” The solidification of Québec as an autonomous 
and culturally distinct province within Canada continues to be problematic for the federal 
government and its project of pan-Canadian nationalism. The following chapter adds 
more detail to the history of this “French Fact” and juxtaposes Québec history and 
nationalism with that of Canada.  
                                                 
24 “Adscam” is the informal moniker given to the scandal that has brought about the recent fall of the 
Martin Liberal government. Briefly, the Chretien Administration authorized the payment of millions of 
dollars to several Québec marketing firms for the purpose of promoting Canadian nationalism in the 
province. The intent was the encourage Québécois voters to support Canada as opposed to the PQ and its 
project of sovereignty. In reality, this support of Canadian nationalism took the form of illegal financial 
contributions to the Québec provincial wing of the Liberal party (the PLQ). The money meant for 
marketing purposes was, in effect, laundered through these marketing firms and used for political purposes 
in support of the PLQ and defeat of the PQ.  
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The goal of Chapter Three, however, is to establish a clear, yet problematic, 
nationalist project in Canada. Economic under-population, dual European colonial 
heritage, indigenous autonomy and sovereignty claims, and increasing ethno-cultural 
diversification are just a sample of the challenges to articulating a singular Canadian 
nationalism. This has not stopped the federal government and other supporting groups 
from attempting to define what in fact a Canadian actually is. This challenge is 
increasingly important as the national population of Canada becomes more diverse as a 
result of shifting immigration sources. This project argues that culture is becoming 
increasingly important in maintaining nation-state stability. The history of Canada 
implies that culture is a continually problematic notion, but also that the state has 
continually worked to define Canadian nationalism in various attempts to maintain a 
singular national cultural ideal. The remainder of the dissertation examines the changes 
that have occurred in the post-World War II era and argues that the challenges facing the 
Canadian state with respect to defining a national culture and maintaining national 
stability are increasingly complex and problematic. The dissertation also argues that 
control over cultural definitions and symbols is increasingly important and necessary for 
core states such as Canada. Chapter Four will examine the same process of Québec 








Québec: History and Nationalist Project 
 
This chapter illustrates the interdependent history of Québec as a Canadian 
province. It also tells the story of Québec national cultural development as a process and 
project independent of Canadian nationalism. In this way the history of Québec is the 
history of Canada; however, the nationalist history of Québec retains significant 
autonomy from that of Canadian nationalist history. The persistence of this duality, a 
shared yet distinct history, is problematic for both Canadian and Québec nationalist 
projects. Chapter Four examines this shared history with particular attention to distinctive 
events, conditions, and occurrences that have defined Québécois nationalism and enabled 
a distinct Québec national history to develop alongside Canadian national history. The 
existence of dual nationalist histories is important in support of methodological 
comparative efforts as well as understanding divergent approaches to global market 
integration that will be shown in Part III.    
The persistence of this duality is has historically provided the most significant 
obstacle for a singular Canadian nationalism. The “French Fact25” of a Francophone 
founding people is a reality that Canada is continually forced to reconcile. Any discussion 
of one must include a substantial discussion of the other. However, the unique and 
                                                 
25 The “French Fact” is a term describing the reality of bilingualism in Canada. This is a phrase that is used 
mainly in an Anglophone and federalist context. The 1774 Québec Act was the first official recognition of 
the “French Fact” in an otherwise Anglo colony.  This attitude of resignation has given way to the official 
incorporation of the “French Fact” into state policies of bilingualism. As stated by the Canadian Heritage 
Department, “Recognizing the importance of the French fact at home, as well as its international 
dimension, the Canadian government joined La Francophonie [this refers to the international cooperative 
entity consisting of Francophone countries] very early on and was involved in establishing and developing 
its many institutions.”  
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relatively insular creation of culture in both Québec and in Anglophone Canada raises 
serious questions concerning the development of a homogenous historical narrative26. 
The question of autonomy is very real when discussing both Canadian and Québec 
histories. The reality of history necessitates a dual telling of the Canadian story. The 
historical reality of the “French Fact” in Canada is that Québec has created a culture and 
society that is national in its actions and composition. This chapter will also show that the 
relative successes of Québécois nationalism present equally challenging conditions as 
Québec integrates into the global market economy.  
As previously stated, this chapter takes the position that it is not only possible, but 
also historically necessary to understand Québec as a semi-autonomous nation-state in a 
political, economic, and cultural sense. In support of this methodological definition, a 
brief telling of the Québec provincial story is necessary.       
1. Settlement to Conquest27
 The French were the first European group to actively colonize what would 
become Canada. Of course this was a project of appropriation as many Native Canadians 
occupied the land desired by encroaching Europeans. The French experience in Canada 
was typical in the sense that disease and warfare worked to decimate a once populous 
general Native Canadian population. The experience was unique, however, in the sense 
                                                 
26 The issue of cultural diversity by region and settlement patterns has always been present in Canadian 
history. The unique history of the Acadian (New Brunswick) region differs from that of Québec, from that 
of Alberta, from that of Vancouver. To say that there is even a clear homogenous narrative in Francophone 
or Anglophone Canada would be incorrect. The growth of Canadians of neither French nor British origins 
further complicates the project of constructing a singular Canadian historical narrative. 
27 The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Dickason (1997), Eccles 
(1972; 1969), Mathieu (1991), Parkman (1983; 1962), and See (2001). 
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that there was a level of cooperation and cohabitation with indigenous groups that existed 
on a scale not often seen in the history of American colonization.  
 The first claim of French sovereignty over the lands of Eastern Canada was made 
by Giovanni da Verrazano whose voyages were funded by the French monarch François I 
between 1524 and 1528. The French began their colonial endeavor by joining Portuguese, 
Basque, British, and Irish fishing expeditions off the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia 
coasts. François also sponsored Jacques Cartier’s three exploratory voyages between 
1534 and 1542. Cartier’s mission was to find the mythical Northwest Passage to China 
but instead “discovered” the Native Canadian settlements of Stadacona and Hochelaga, 
which would be renamed Québec and Montréal respectively as the French settled and 
took control of the region. Successive voyages saw Cartier and a French nobleman by the 
name of Roberval attempt settlements at Stadacona (Québec) with no success. It seemed 
that no passage to the Orient would be found nor would the land produce the mineral 
wealth found by Spanish expeditionary forces in Central and South America. Cartier’s 
voyages yielded little in terms of material wealth but did produce considerable 
information concerning geography and natural resource potential. Contact with Native 
Canadians was simultaneously negative and cooperative. Cartier’s kidnapping of several 
Iroquois who died under his care set the stage for centuries of French-Iroquois conflict. 
Conversely, Cartier was able to gain information and negotiate limited trade with several 
Iroquois and Algonquin groups. Perhaps Cartier’s most lasting contribution was his use 
of the Iroquois place name Canada to identify the region. 
 More than half a century passed before sustained French efforts to settle Canada 
were resumed. Samuel de Champlain, with the financial backing of the Sieur de Monts, 
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first attempted a permanent settlement near the present-day border of New Brunswick 
and Maine on the St. Croix River. This was a short-lived experiment as the settlers, 
including Champlain, were forced to abandon the location in 1607 and return to France. 
Undaunted, Champlain led another settlement expedition in 1608, this time in the more 
protected St. Lawrence River region. Champlain’s desire to facilitate trade between the 
French and Native Canadians promoted a fairly successful cooperative effort to coexist. 
A benefit to such a cooperative agreement on the part of the Algonquin was the 
acquisition of a powerful ally in their persistent conflicts with the now southern tribes of 
the Iroquois Confederation. This agreement created local security as well as an ally for 
the new settlement of Québec on the former Iroquois site of Stadacona. It also would 
create a European-Indigenous alliance that would serve to allow French settlement and 
the nascent fur trade to succeed.  
 The settlement of Québec, and later Montréal, succeeded and became important 
trade centers for the single most important commodity being exported to Europe from 
Canada: furs and pelts. The relationship between Québec and France was strictly 
mercantilist. The colony had a monopolistic trade relationship with the French Company 
of Hundred Associates and barred Protestants from settling in what was then called New 
France. This dominance of Roman Catholicism would shape the history and destiny of 
New France and later Québec until the latter half of the Twentieth Century.   
 As the colony began to grow, agriculture became a more sustained project. 
Clearing of the St. Lawrence River Valley became a priority and was seen as essential to 
the sustained growth of New France. The model of land appropriation was modeled on 
the feudal French seigneurial system. The crown would grant land to seigneurs, direct 
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representatives of the French monarchy, who then divided the land grant among tenant 
farmers who became known as habitants (although officially termed censitaires by the 
French authorities). Most of these agricultural communities remained in the St. Lawrence 
Valley and served as the central grain-producing region of New France. Life in colonial 
New France was rural, religious, and feudal in its structure. But, as Scott See states, 
“ample evidence suggests that habitants enjoyed some freedoms, aggressively asserted an 
independent streak, and regularly ignored state regulations or church edicts. In short, the 
peasants of the Old World were swiftly becoming the Canadiens of the New World” 
(2001, 45). 
New France began to grow as a result of an agricultural base that supported the 
semi-urban settlements of Québec and Montréal, which in turn supported the flourishing 
fur trade that created the urban center of Montréal and solidified its place as the 
commercial capital of New France. This demographic and economic growth, in addition 
to the strategic transportation value of the St. Lawrence River system, ensured that the 
colony of New France would soon come into conflict with the burgeoning British 
American colonies to the south. A series of European continental conflicts (King 
William’s War, 1689-1697; the War of Spanish Succession, 1701-1714; and King 
George’s War, 1744-1748) instigated tensions between colonial rivals that resulted in 
nearly continual military and paramilitary conflict in North America from the mid-
Seventeenth to the late Eighteenth centuries. These conflicts culminated in the Seven 
Years’ War in which the British gained complete control over all former French colonial 
possessions in North America.  
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As stated in the previous chapter, the short period of British assimilationist efforts 
in the newly named colony of Québec failed miserably. The recognition that Québec 
would always be a French culture was recognized by then-Governor James Murray. The 
1763 Royal Proclamation that removed legislative support for the seigneurial system as 
well as support for the Catholic Church, made it illegal for Catholics to hold public 
office, and imposed both British criminal and civil law upon an unwilling populace 
created an impossible position from which to govern. Murray and his successor Guy 
Carleton supported ending this assimilationist project and partially succeed with the 
enactment of the Québec Act in 1774.  
2. Post-conquest and a Bicultural Existence28
The Québec Act was designed to reinstate French civil controls in the hopes that 
those reinstated elites would support the larger British colonial project. This was 
increasingly important to British colonial authorities due to growing rebellious sentiment 
in its American colonies. As Conrad, Finkel, and Jaenen (1993) state: 
Designed to strengthen the traditional elites in the colony, the act was 
based on the mistaken belief that those elites would ensure the loyalty of 
the masses in time of war (P. 254). 
 
The austere provisions of the 1763 Proclamation were reversed to allow Catholics to 
worship, hold office, and ensure that the traditional system of religious authority would 
continue. In addition, the seigneurial system of land ownership and administration was 
officially recognized by the British colonial authorities. British criminal law and, of 
course, colonial authority remained entrenched. The result was a colony extending from 
                                                 
28 This section was compiled from several narrative historical sources including Conrad, Finkel, and Jaenen 
(1993); Fitzmaurice (1985); Plourde (2000); Rioux (1974); and See (2001). 
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the Labrador coast to the Ohio River Valley that was uniquely French, Catholic, and 
governed by the anti-democratic cooperation of priest and seigneur that pleased few 
outside of the local power structures in British North America, including American 
colonists and many habitants. 
 As previously stated, the Québec Act was as much of a British protective measure 
as it was a policy designed to control the French-Canadian population. The hope that 
Québec colonials would support the British was initially dashed as invading American 
contingents under Richard Montgomery met little or no resistance in their march to 
Montréal. The city was taken without a struggle in September 1775 with Governor 
Carleton escaping to Québec. The mobilization of resistance to the American invasion 
was less a result of the Québec Act and more the actions of the occupying American 
forces. Antagonistic actions against the Catholic Church and the illegal acquisition of 
property and supplies by Montgomery’s men led to a rapid increase in local support for 
the British defensive forces. By the time Montgomery joined with Benedict Arnold (who 
had marched from what is now Maine) at Québec they met heavy resistance in defense of 
the city. On December 31 the combined American forces saw Montgomery killed and 
Arnold wounded in a last major attempt at taking Québec. The siege was ended in May of 
1776 when ten thousand British troops sailed down the St. Lawrence to reinforce the 
besieged colonial forces (numbering fewer than 600) at Québec.  
 The lack of local habitant support for the British war effort troubled British 
colonial authorities. Elite control over the local “peasant” populations envisioned in the 
Québec Act never materialized. The position of the British political hierarchy was soon to 
be reinforced through the immigration of large numbers of British migrants. After the 
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1783 Versailles Treaty that ended the American Revolution, thousands of British 
Loyalists (Tories) escaped to the colony of Québec. This massive population shift 
significantly altered the demographic composition of the colony and prompted British 
authorities to take action.  
The newly arrived Tories demanded an elimination of the French system of civil 
law and a return to the monopolistic British controls inherent in the 1763 Royal 
Proclamation. French-Canadian elites were not sympathetic to the demands of the Tories 
for obvious reasons. A compromise was found as the 1791 Canada Act officially divided 
Canada into Upper (English) and Lower (French) halves. Upper Canada, roughly present-
day Ontario, was home to approximately 20,000 Anglophone Canadians and Tories and 
maintained British criminal and civil systems of governance. Lower Canada, roughly 
present-day Québec, included the metropolitan areas of Montréal and Québec with a 
population of approximately 110,000 and maintained the French civil/British criminal 
system established by the Québec Act (Conrad, Finkel, and Jaenen 1993). In comparison, 
the Canadian population near the turn of the century is estimated at 250,000 (Klein, 
Goldewijk, and Battjes 1997).  The French-Canadian population constituted a significant 
portion of the total national population and was able to resist assimilationist efforts on the 
part of British colonial authorities. The British government grew increasingly aware of its 
inability to assimilate such a large population and sought a compromise solution. The 
Canada Act effectively created a bifurcated colonial nation-state by creating legislative 




2a. Growth and Rebellion under British Rule 
 Lower Canada in the beginning of the Nineteenth Century was a colony governed 
by an odd mix of Anglophone commercial and political elites supported by the 
Francophone seigneurs and clerical elites. This relationship, and the centrality of English 
control over the commercial activities in Montréal and Québec, would create a condition 
of stratification. The sustainable farming tradition of the habitants created a condition of 
poverty that was much more extreme when compared to English wage-earning farmers in 
Upper Canada. The lack of land ownership coupled with a relatively feudal system of 
social and commercial interaction for Lower Canadian, Francophone farmers allowed the 
consolidation of wealth in urban areas and primarily in the hands of the Anglophone 
commercial merchants and political elites. Of course a significant amount of wealth was 
distributed to Francophone seigneurs and to the Church, which resulted in limited elite 
motivation to alter the status quo. The situation of urban (particularly in Montréal) 
Anglophone control over wealth and commercial resources would couple with the strong 
social service (health care, education, moral guidance, etc…) structure of the Catholic 
Church to create an unfortunate disparity in wealth and resources that largely followed 
cultural lines.  
 Despite the socio-economic stagnation engendered by the British colonial power 
structure in Lower Canada, economic expansion was occurring. The decline of the fur 
trade that had largely created the commercial center of Montréal was replaced by timber 
extraction. Lower Canada became the primary supplier of timber to the British Navy 
further reinforcing the commercial power of the Montréal Anglophone elite. The desire to 
increase the English presence throughout the colony led to the granting of land to 
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Anglophone farmers (mainly expatriate American Tories) willing to move to Lower 
Canada. Approximately 20,000 agricultural migrants settled in what is now known as the 
Eastern Townships to the South and East of Montréal following the 1791 Constitutional 
Act. The Townships remain to this day one of the few examples of a rural Anglophone 
presence in Québec.   
The dominance of the English-Catholic alliance in Lower Canada was dealt a 
blow by the French Revolution, but a blow that would only be felt years later. With the 
conservative French-Canadian Catholic Church aghast at the liberalism and independence 
of French Revolutionary ideals new sources of educated priests (not immediately 
influenced by the liberalism of France) was required. The Church established 
Francophone colleges throughout Lower Canada to train future clerical leaders. Many of 
these graduates would choose a secular path and created a limited but important 
Francophone middle class. These were mainly civil servants and lawyers who were 
ultimately subject to the ethnocentric controls of the British that kept many in this 
increasingly populous professional class unemployed. This educated and skilled 
Francophone group began to advocate a Francophone nationalism that embraced political 
democracy while retaining the feudal economic and cultural controls embodied in the 
seigneurial system and the Catholic Church. This uniquely conservative nationalism 
would speak on behalf of Québec sovereigntists until 1960. This rise of a Francophone 
intellectual elite was coupled with a growing population that was impoverished by the 
proto-feudal seigneurial system29.  
                                                 
29 As population increased in the early Nineteenth Century, there were not enough seigneurs to supply land 
appropriations in order to meet demands. The seigneurial system was based solely on patronage and thus 
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 The persistence of poverty in Québec promoted anger and frustration particularly 
among the Francophone habitants who viewed the accumulation of wealth and power by 
the Anglophone minority in Montréal, as well as increased agricultural prosperity in 
Upper Canada, as signs of English oppression. In fact, it was the combination of arcane 
economic controls and the cultural promotion of high birth rates that contributed most 
greatly to the agricultural (read: economic) crisis of the early Nineteenth Century. This 
fact was not lost on the British colonial authorities who did little to assist Québec in 
alleviating nearly universal rural poverty among the Francophone population. In fact, the 
acquisition and distribution of land in the Eastern Townships added to the sense of 
abandonment on the part of the habitants as these acquisitions were based on the liberal 
capitalist notion of land-granting and thus outside the patronage of the seigneurs. Thus 
the only individuals and groups able to acquire these newly created agricultural plots 
were those with disposable capital, which excluded nearly the entirety of the habitant 
population.   
The newly emergent Francophone intellectual elite seized this opportunity and 
created the Parti canadien (PC), a nationalist political party designed to gain power 
through legislative means in the Québec House of Assembly. The conservative 
nationalism of the political party was welcomed by the traditional Francophone elites 
(seigneurs and Catholic clergy) due to the fact that it allowed the retention of their social 
station and power. In 1822, the Parti canadien, with the support of the Catholic Church, 
                                                                                                                                                 
did not allow the habitants an opportunity to accumulate capital in the same manner as their English peers. 
The Roman Catholic Church culturally promoted large families and the inevitable condition of a large 
population with little to no capital and an agricultural system that was ill designed to deal with the reality of 
capitalism led to massive poverty. Add this to poor crop yields in the post-1812 era and a picture of dire 
poverty is painted of the Québec rural landscape. 
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defeated a British proposal to unite Lower and Upper Canada. In 1827, the PC won 
nearly ninety percent of the available seats in the House elections due to habitant support 
for a policy of increased seigneurial holdings that meant greater agricultural opportunities 
for a desperate rural population. These demands persisted and created a significant level 
of tension between Anglophone merchants and their allies in both Upper and Lower 
Canada who viewed this “obstructionism” (through their promotion of an expanded 
seigneurial system) as being anti-commercial and thus a threat to economic growth in 
Canada (Conrad, Finkel, and Jaenen 1993, 414). As a result, steps were taken in 1837 to 
circumvent Assembly control and increase privately held land outside of the seigneurial 
system. Funds were appropriated by the British colonial government for the sale of 
millions of hectares of land to the British American Land Company; these holdings were 
then sold to the highest bidder – effectively excluding most Francophones. These actions 
allowed the PC and its leader Louis-Joseph Papineau to legitimate their claims that the 
British government cared little for improving the lives and democratic rights of its 
Francophone citizens.  
A series of economic and civic disobedience tactics ensued that were intended to 
subvert British political and economic controls. Sporadic violence broke out between 
Anglophones and Francophone patriotes in Montréal and the Governor of Lower Canada, 
Lord Gosford, called for the immediate use of British troops to quell any Francophone 
nationalist sentiment and violence. Papineau and other patriote leaders were ordered 
arrested and many, including Papineau, fled to the United States. Organized resistance in 
the form of organized habitant militias defeated a British colonial force at St-Denis in 
November 1837. The days following this initial victory saw a deflated (after Papineau’s 
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escape to the United States) rebellion crushed by British troops. A brief attempt at 
rekindling the rebellion occurred the following year when approximately four thousand 
patriots, led by leaders who had escaped to the US in 1837, attacked British positions in 
Lower Canada. They were quickly defeated and the British sought to quell any future 
rebellion through the execution, deportation, and exile of patriote leaders. 
These relatively minor armed rebellions were important examples of the 
development of Canadien nationalism; however their defeat illustrates a conflict of 
interest between political, economic, and cultural spheres of Québec society. Prior to 
1837, the Parti canadien transformed into the Parti patriote which succeeded in 
promoting a reduction in the socio-political power of the Church in Québec society. The 
obvious outcome was that the Church refused to support the rebellion and thus an 
opportunity for legitimation was lost. The continuing affirmation of the seigneurial 
system by the Parti patriote was also a source of consternation for many habitants. Why 
should they risk their lives to maintain a traditional system of land allocation that denied 
them ownership and profits? These points did little to engender universal support for the 
patriote rebellions and possibly contributed to their ultimate failure. 
As stated in the previous chapter, the political outcome of the Lower (and Upper) 
Canadian rebellions was the compilation of the Durham Report that advocated 
assimilation of all Francophone Canadiens through a process of colonial unification. The 
Durham Report prompted the 1841 Act of Union that promptly infuriated nationalist 
Candiens, but offered a unique opportunity for compromise between English and French 
parliamentarians. The Act of Union occurred simultaneously with a British move away 
from mercantilist trade and toward a liberal “free-trade” model. This created increased 
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trade opportunities between Canada and the United States, resulting in the 1854 Treaty of 
Reciprocity. The result was a situation that encouraged modernization of political 
economic systems of control in a traditional Lower Canadian society.  
3. Encroaching Liberalism and Confederation30
As Canadiens struggled for executive governmental inclusion (achieved through 
an Anglo-Franco Executive Committee in 1842, rescinded by the subsequent Governor 
General Metcalf, and reinstated in 1848) an alliance between economic and political 
liberals crossed ethnic lines. An unintended parliamentary majority emerged that 
advocated reforming the existing socio-economic structure of Canada in order to 
facilitate increased trade. The result was the dissolution of the seigneurial land-patronage 
system in 1854, increased spending on public (secular) education, and massive 
transportation projects (railways and canals) intended to encourage expanded trade with 
the United States. Thus, the Durham Report and the subsequent Act of Union succeeded 
in achieving a measure of assimilation through the destruction of the unique land-holding 
system and monopolistic control over education held by the Catholic Church that created 
the differences upheld as “distinct” by the conservative nationalists of the 1830s. 
Cooperative multiethnic governments showed that the common political economic goals 
of liberalism and “free-trade” could overcome linguistic and cultural differences. This 
serene picture of cooperative economic development hid the continued stratification of 
economic conditions between Upper and Lower Canada. 
The political alliance of Anglo and Francophones based on a common desire for 
                                                 
30 This section was compiled from several narrative historical sources including Conrad, Finkel, and Jaenen 
(1992); Linteau, Durocher, and Robert (1983); Mann (1982); Morton (1964); Plourde (2000); and See 
(2001). 
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liberal economic reforms was an elite alliance. Popular support for such reform-centered 
cooperation was limited by the persistence of economic stratification based on ethno-
linguistic lines. These economic divisions created the opportunity for political dissent on 
the part of conservative opponents of liberal reforms in Québec. These conservative 
nationalists relied on cultural definitions of Québec traditions and norms and provided the 
basis for a unique Québec nationalism that was based on cultural affinity and 
traditionalism.     
The Canadian response to the American Civil War and a decline in trade volume 
with both the United States (who refused to renew the Treaty of Reciprocity in 1866) and 
Britain was to promote a more politically sovereign union. The result was the 
Confederation of Canada under the British North America Act of 1867. Within Lower 
Canada, liberals and the conservative clergy celebrated the prospect of Confederation as 
an opportunity to alleviate pressures of American annexation and to establish political 
control over a provincial government. There was significant opposition to Confederation 
in the form of the Rouges who advocated a nationalistic and democratic ideal that 
mirrored that of their Patriote founders. The Rouges-led opposition could not overcome 
the liberal-clerical alliance and Confederation became a reality in 1867. The new 
parliamentary system established minimum rates of representation for provincial 
Members of Parliament (MP) and consolidated strong central federal control over 
political and economic matters. Fitzmaurice provides a useful example of this 
renegotiated trade reality: 
The Provinces of course lost their customs revenue, but the Dominion of 
Canada assumed their debt and paid them an annual subsidy (Fitzmaurice 
1985, 20).  
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This exemplifies the series of compromises made on the part of Provincial representatives 
in the hopes of creating a strong union to expand economic production and political 
protections (largely from encroaching American capital investment and population in the 
West). What it does not show is any legislative evidence of continual Canadien 
nationalism that was embodied by the Rouges opposition to Confederation.  
The newly formed Dominion of Canada was reminded of the persistent “French 
Fact” when Louis Riel led his fellow Métis31 in an open revolt against the westward 
expansion of the Canadian population and accompanying land acquisition for agricultural 
production. Riel was born in the Red River region of what is now Manitoba and received 
a clerical education in Montréal. Educated, Francophone, and Métis, Riel personified 
Canadian diversity. During the Red River and Northwest rebellions of 1869-70 and 1885 
respectively, Louis Riel became a symbolic hero throughout Québec. Although the 
actions of Riel and the Métis were antithetical to the liberal project of westward 
expansion, his resistance to an oppressive federal force that was attacking yet another 
Francophone claim of sovereignty and uniqueness generated public support for the man 
throughout Québec. The sentiment was just as strong in the opposite direction throughout 
English-speaking Ontario, as they viewed Riel as a traitor and enemy of Canadian 
economic growth (Siggins 1994).  
                                                 
31 As stated in Chapter Three, the Métis were a distinct population born of intermarriage between English 
and French fur trappers and indigenous peoples in the interior of Canada. The Métis are historically known 
for their mixed ethnicity and the fact that they are predominantly Francophone. The linguistic nature of this 
Canadian population is of primary importance in this chapter and in the relationship between the Canadien 
population of Québec and the resistance actions of Riel and other Métis in what is now Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan.  
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The political and economic union of the Confederation-era clearly did not reflect 
the cultural differences still evident between French and English Canada. While Riel’s 
actions did little to stem expansion, they did illustrate persisting frustration and a sense of 
repression on the part of French-Canadians, particularly in Québec. The Dominion of 
Canada was a political and economic compromise of the day, and not indicative of any 
cultural unification on the part of the citizens of Québec in support of a pan-Canadian 
nation.  
3a. Post-confederation 
The mid-Nineteenth Century in Québec was a time of rapid change. 
Modernization and urbanization began to weaken the traditional controls of the Catholic 
Church and the patrimonial seigneurial system of land appropriation had been abolished 
allowing individual farmers at least the opportunity to own their own land. The post-
Confederation period was also a time of massive expansion in industrial and demographic 
growth. The expansionist desires of the Macdonald (and others) government necessitated 
increased sources of labor. With a limited urban population base, particularly in English-
speaking Canada, the answer was to be found abroad32. European immigration served to 
replenish the limited Canadian labor force. Québec’s role in this process was significantly 
                                                 
32 By the mid-Nineteenth Century urban Canada was fairly limited. Two of the four major metropolitan 
areas were in Québec and both located along the major transportation throughway of the St. Lawrence 
River. Montréal (100,000) and Québec (50,000) continued to serve as trade ports and centers for Canadian 
commerce during this period. Québec could eventually lose much of its metropolitan and commercial 
power nationally due to the reorientation of trade patterns from the United Kingdom to the United States. 
Trans-Atlantic trade was facilitated by the protected ports on the St. Lawrence, but as trading patterns 
shifted southward the river system declined in relative economic importance. This shift in predominant 
trading partners is also reflected in the rise of both Montréal and Toronto as commercial urban centers.  The 
rise of Toronto (60,000) would continue unabated and ultimately become the desired destination for many 
labor migrants. Halifax (20,000) continued to be Canada’s main maritime trading center, but the fragile 
economic conditions of the Maritime Provinces as well as the transportation costs associated with domestic 
Canadian trade would ensure Halifax’s eventual decline in commercial importance.  
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determined by geography. The most logical ports of call for European immigrants were 
Halifax, Québec, and Montréal. Halifax, as Canada’s primary Atlantic seaport, offered a 
simple first-stop for European migrants on the road to Canadian economic opportunity. 
The relative isolation of Halifax and the Maritime Provinces in general discouraged many 
from settling in Halifax. The major urban centers of Québec and Montréal provided much 
more in terms of employment and transportation opportunities. As the only opportunity to 
travel from Europe to North America was by seagoing vessel the St. Lawrence once 
again provided a maritime highway for facilitating economic growth in Canada. 
 The increase in railway and canal construction in the 1850s made Québec and 
especially Montréal very attractive ports of call for European migrants. There were 
significant economic opportunities for Europeans in both cities, but the shifting trade 
relationship to the United States was already making Montréal the singular commercial 
center of the province due to its proximity to New England and New York commercial 
centers. For this reason many immigrant chose to continue down the St. Lawrence to 
Montréal. The other major factor contributing to Montréal’s importance to Canadian 
immigration was that the Grand Trunk Railway provided transportation opportunities to 
Canada’s other growing metropolitan center, Toronto, as well as to points west. Until 
well into the Twentieth Century, many immigrants to Canada used urban centers as 
stopover points on their way to the land and agricultural opportunities of the West. Many 
though stayed in Québec, with most settling in the Montréal metropolitan area. Much 
more will be said on these points of ethnic diversification later in Chapter Six The period 
of massive immigration promotion on the part of the Canadian government did much to 
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provide Montréal with a base of labor that would allow the city to continue its growth and 
economic viability in both Canadian and international economic contexts.  
The geographic position of Montréal as an island at the intersection of two major 
transportation throughways (the St. Lawrence River and the Grand Trunk Railway) 
ultimately created a multiethnic urban center in the mid to late 1800s – well before the 
well-known multicultural perception of Canada in the 1970s. Italian, German, Ukrainian, 
and Irish communities began to grow and participate in the economic and cultural life of 
the city. This did not, however, have a significant impact of the political and economic 
power structures in place in either the city of Montréal or the province of Québec. The 
shift of major trading patterns from England to the United States did little to disrupt the 
Anglophone control over commercial institutions. It also did little to alleviate persistent 
rural poverty and the inability of many poor Francophone framers to own their own land. 
This led to a massive exodus of rural (and some urban) French-Canadians to New 
England towns such as Manchester, New Hampshire; Fall River, Massachusetts, and 
Woonsocket, Rhode Island in search of employment. The reality of Francophone life in 
Québec was still a picture of income inequality and monopolistic control of wealth and 
political power by the Anglophone minority in Montréal supported by an Anglophone 
federal government in Ottawa. The sustained inequalities and rural impoverishment of 
Québec did little to reduce ethnic nationalist sentiment although little was done formally 
to protest the situation. 
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4. The War Era and the End of Traditional Québec33
 The onset of the First World War in 1914 shattered any superficial perceptions 
that Québec had been pacified. Opposition to Canadian involvement, and thus Québec’s 
involvement, in the War effort was limited to a minority of pacifist individuals and 
organizations. This was to change in 1917 with the passage of the Military Service Act 
that instituted conscription for Canadian military service. Québec vehemently rejected 
being forced to fight for a federal government that was perceived as being, at best, 
discriminatory. In fact, the stage for Québec opposition to conscription had been set in 
1913 when Ontario passed provincial legislation removing French language instruction 
from its public schools. This abandonment of the bilingual ideals of the country inflamed 
anger and resentment at English Canada in general. The federal demand that French-
Canadians serve in the national military was, in many ways, the last straw.  
Riots and protest marches occurred in Québec and Montréal from 1917 though 
1918. Added to this condition of perceived oppression at the hands of English Canada, a 
federal political alliance of Conservatives and pro-war Liberals engineered34 an election 
in 1917 that would put a new Union government in power. This government was rejected 
in Québec and added to the belief that the federal government was doing all it could to 
oppress the provincial population. In addition to the violence of anti-draft riots, 
legislative efforts toward sovereignty were unsuccessfully promoted in the Québec 
                                                 
33 This section was compiled from several narrative historical sources including Bothwell, Drummond, and 
English (1989; 1987); Brown and Cook (1974), Lacoursière (1997); Roby (1976); See (2001); and 
Thompson and Seager (1985). 
34 Robert Borden, the Conservative Prime Minister, sought to crush opposition to his government and war 
opposition by allying with selected Liberals. In 1917 he passed a series of electoral measures that allowed 
voting rights only to women who were serving in the military or who were related to male service members 
and prohibited war-opponents (broadly defined as “conscientious objectors”) from voting. The result was a 
large victory for this Conservative-Liberal Union government.  
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National Assembly. It became increasingly clear that the cooperative political successes 
of economic partnership were both falling into ruin and exacerbated by a federal 
government that was increasingly hostile to the public sentiment and demands of Québec.  
 The global interwar pattern of initial growth followed by economic depression 
was replicated in Québec. The export-orientation of liberal economic modernization 
created a domino effect as foreign orders for agricultural products and natural resources 
(primarily timber in Québec) declined and created a glut of supply with limited demand. 
The impact of the Great Depression on Canadian society was previously discussed and 
little more can be added here with respect to any possible unique conditions in Québec. 
The effects of a massive global economic depression on an already impoverished 
population were as would be expected: devastating. 
  The recovery period in Québec was assisted by the resumption of demand for 
Québec raw materials such as timber, asbestos, and refined materials such as aluminum 
and paper products. Politically, the rise of Maurice Duplessis and his Union nationale 
(UN) political party won power in 1936 and promptly began to viciously implement 
policies intended to expand foreign investment (and ownership) and repress social and 
political dissent. The platform of the UN was conservative in that it advocated a return to 
the Catholic, traditional nationalism reminiscent of the Parti canadien but augmented 
with a liberal economic strategy that actively repressed union activities and persecuted 
socialist and communist organizations throughout the province. Duplessis’ popularity 
throughout the province was due, however, to his nationalistic (albeit within a Canadian 
framework) rhetoric that reflected French-Canadian frustration with continual minority 
Anglophone control over economic institutions in Montréal and throughout the province.  
 138
 The onset of the Second World War in 1939 brought about a familiar 
disagreement. The Liberal federal government of Mackenzie King promoted active 
Canadian involvement in the war effort, while Duplessis questioned the necessity of 
Québec’s involvement. The resurgence of these positions led to the federal government’s 
involvement in the 1939 Québec provincial elections in which the Québec Liberal Party 
defeated the UN35. Duplessis and the UN would return to power in 1945 but not after a 
less-dramatic return to the conscription crisis of 1917-18.  
King won the 1939 elections by pledging not to reinstitute conscription. By 1942 
it became obvious that volunteer military contributions would not be enough to sustain 
the Canadian war effort. King called a national plebiscite to release the government from 
its non-conscription pledge. Eight provinces voted to release the government from its 
promise, while over three quarters of Québec voters held the government to its anti-draft 
promise. The government reestablished the draft in 1944. The street violence and 
sovereignty initiatives that characterized the 1917-18 era were not replicated, however 
the popular understanding in Québec continued to center on the belief that the federal 
government was ignorant of Québec concerns, desires, and will. The continued public 
statements of King on Québec were commonly antagonistic, particularly his use of the 
anti-nationalist phrase “Québec est une province comme les autres.36”  
 The post-war period of Québec history was, again relatively similar to that of 
Canada. Increased immigration, industrialization, and overall economic growth 
                                                 
35 The federal government actively promoted and financed the provincial branch (PLQ) of the Liberal 
ruling party. The high level of support and participation in this provincial election is significant and bears 
mention due to the importance King and his administration placed on national unification and a singular 
Canadian national-state.  
36 “Québec is a province like the others.” 
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characterized the post-war years. Politically, the return of Duplessis continued the 
socially conservative project of clerical social and educational service provision coupled 
with liberal economic policies. These conservative policies did little to elevate the status 
of Québec within Canada as the reference to the province as “priest-ridden” was common 
in the post-war era. Clearly, the socially conservative nature of the Duplessis regime was 
responsible for this perception but also for pushing the Duplessisme agenda37 so far that it 
generated one of the most significant cultural reactions in Western history: la Révolution 
tranquille. 
5. La Révolution tranquille and the Birth of les Québécois38
 La Révolution tranquille (the Quiet Revolution) describes the period of the early 
1960s that saw the dramatic transition of Québec political and cultural institutions shift 
from traditional norms to more state-centered proactive views of Québec nationalism. In 
short, the long dominant Catholic Church was literally removed from its position as the 
primary social service provider and replaced by the Québec state. Hinderences to 
nationalized economic institutions were removed and the state became a primary 
motivator for liberal economic reforms. Culturally, the integrative idea of a French-
Canadian was replaced by a more autonomous and independent Québécois national 
identity: neither French nor Canadian, les Québécois were a culturally distinct 
population.  
                                                 
37 Duplessisme is largely defined as having authoritarian governmental tendencies, anti-statist with respect 
to the provision of social services or economic controls, and incorporating a romanticized or lionized view 
of rural, Catholic Québec as symbolic of true French-Canadians – all tenets of the Parti canadien and thus 
staunchly conservative and nationalist. 
38 The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Bashevkin (1991); 
Bothwell, Drummond, and English (1989); Fitzmaurice (1985); Godin (1991); Pelletier (1983); See (2001); 
and Thomson (1985). 
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La Révolution tranquille was more of a cumulative effect than any sort of 
temporally distinct or spontaneous action. The evolution of this ‘cumulative revolution’ 
occurred in economic, political, and cultural facets of Québec society. Economically, the 
continued dominance of Anglophone commercial and business centers in Montréal were 
a source of constant French-Canadian ire. The traditional Anglophone monopoly was in 
decline however, as the process of economic modernization continued to unfold in the 
province. What started with the clerical expansion of educational opportunities to fill the 
demands of a growing priesthood and was secularly advanced by the political cooperative 
efforts of English and French liberals in the mid 1800s resulted in a population that was 
predominantly urban, educated, and oriented toward industrial production. In addition, 
the expansion of educational and economic opportunities for Francophone citizens in 
Québec ensured that the status quo could not be maintained. Francophone intellectual and 
economic (largely small business) elites began to attack traditional economic and social 
structures, namely Anglophone business entities and the Catholic Church, as retarding 
Francophone social and economic progress.  
The political foundations of la Révolution tranquille clearly lay in the early 
Nineteenth Century divide between traditionalists and liberals within Québec society. 
The early attempts by the Parti canadien to bridge the divide by maintaining traditional 
ties to the existing power structures of the seigneurs and the clergy were partly successful 
in winning some liberal reforms, however the efforts of the Parti patriote to secularize 
Québec society and liberalize its quasi-feudal agricultural system were met by 
reactionary forces that worked to retrench the conservative structures of authority. The 
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Duplessis regime in the first half of the Twentieth Century is an excellent example of this 
reactionary change.  
The post-World War II period of expanded global economics further stressed the 
traditional isolationism of the Duplessis and conservative political elite in Québec. 
Duplessis did invite massive foreign investment, however the expanded economic 
opportunities brought about by this liberal urbanization project reduced the traditional 
rural political base of the Union nationale and allowed for a new urban Francophone 
political consciousness to emerge. It became increasingly clear that an emphasis on 
export-orientation in terms of trade, which motivated urbanization and industrialization, 
could not be supported by rural Québec. In fact, Duplessis did sense the impending 
changes that were shifting the entire nature of the province from a rural-agrarian to 
urban-industrial society. He enacted several reformative measures intended to reduce the 
religious control over education and some social services. The problem for Duplessis was 
in finding replacements for these services as the Union nationale rejected a large-scale 
expansion of state-provided social services.  
   The cultural organization of Québec underwent significant change in 
conjunction with the structural changes of the period. Statistically the province was one 
of the most religious in the Western world with upwards of 85 percent of the population 
regularly attending Catholic Mass. This superficial description belied a continual conflict 
between those who promoted a progressive modernization of Québec society and those 
who maintained that traditional social institutions should be maintained and strengthened. 
The process of cultural change is difficult to articulate and can only be viewed through 
the persistent instances of conflict between liberal and traditional groups that has been 
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briefly presented in this chapter. Perhaps the most striking statistic is that active Catholics 
in Québec dropped from the aforementioned 85 percent prior World War II to less than 
30 percent by 1970 (Fitzmaurice 1985, 60). This massive and rapid cultural shift cannot 
be simply attributed to rapid, short-term action. The decline of Catholic hegemony in 
Québec was a process that simply required an alternative support structure in order to 
complete the project of secularization that had begun in the early 1800s.  
That Catholic controls over social and educational services were gradually eroded 
cannot be disputed. Even the staunch traditionalist Duplessis and the UN were resigned to 
continue these liberal reforms. Their political decision to replace these clerical social and 
educational services with state-sponsored services opened the door to the possibility of 
Keynesian state-centered strategies for economic modernization. 
 The confluence of economic, political, and cultural history in Québec created an 
industrial infrastructure while maintaining political and economic restrictions on its 
expansion, a political structure that attempted to maintain legitimate authority through a 
dubious mix of traditionalist ideology and tacit liberal reforms, and a cultural system in 
the Catholic Church that had been declining with respect to its cultural authority for 
decades. The stage was set for large-scale social change. All that was required was a 
stagehand to raise the curtain on a new Québec. 
5a. Lesage and the Institutionalization of Change 
Jean Lesage and the Parti Liberal du Québec (PLQ) were elected to power in the 
1960 provincial elections. Lesage’s message was liberal and progressive in both rhetoric 
and action. The PLQ leadership began to implement the state-centered strategies of social 
service provision and an expansion of nationalized controls over utilities and 
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transportation that were avoided by the Duplessis administration. Hydro-Québec39, the 
state-owned electricity producer, represents the most successful example of this process 
of nationalizing the utility infrastructure. It is doubly significant in that was also entirely 
Francophone in its leadership and, most importantly, considered French its language of 
business. 
 The provincial educational system was significantly reformed with the opening 
of tuition-free secondary education and the expansion of a Francophone university 
system with the founding of the Université de Québec system with campuses in Montréal 
(1969), Chicoutimi (1969), Trois-Rivières (1969), and Rimouski (1973). This expansion 
of a state-sponsored educational system is merely an example of the massive increase in 
state spending that characterized the Lesage government. Civil service employment in the 
provincial government increased from 32,000 in 1960 to over 70,000 in 1966 (Pelletier 
1983). The purposes of these political economic reforms were first, the modernization of 
the Québec economy and its liberation from a stagnating traditionalism and secondly, to 
create state control and protections that would enable and facilitate Francophone 
economic participation and correct the economic inequalities that had colored urban 
Québec society for centuries.  
The promotion of secular government as responsible for the social welfare of 
Québec citizens occurred in conjunction with a rearticulation of French-Canadian 
nationalism. Gone was nationalistic promotion of tradition and a romantic past inherent 
in Duplessisme. This nostalgic affirmation of the status quo was replaced by a renewed 
                                                 
39 Hydro-Québec is the primary provider of electricity to Québec and a significant power source for the 
Northeastern United States. For a more detailed description of Hydro-Québec please see Chapter Five.    
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sense of autonomy that embraced Québec as a unique nation that was neither French nor 
Canadian but Québécois. Lesage’s oft-repeated slogan, “matres chez nous40” clearly 
differentiated this new era of political leadership from the inclusive association position 
of the Duplessis conservatives. He was not, however, an advocate of Québec sovereignty. 
In fact there was a distinct minority of Québec citizens who advocated an independantiste 
position of Québec state-hood.      
This cultural distinction from Canadien to Québécois was not simply a political 
promotion of an official nationalism. Literary journals such as Cité Libre and Maintenant 
created a public discourse and motivated debate concerning the nature and scope of social 
change in Québec. One significant articulation of this public discourse was the 
emergence of Joual41 as a class-centered dialectical alternative to orthodox French that 
became symbolic of this new Québécois identity. This dialect was the clear 
understanding that being Québécois also had political and economic components. The 
history and experience of Francophone poverty and subordinated status was reinforced by 
English Canadian authority and could not be divorced from a mere shift in linguistic and 
cultural identification. 
5b. Nation and State Development  
The relationship between the federal government and Québec provincial 
government after 1960 was culturally and politically contentious at best. One of the most 
interesting points of compromise came with Québec’s insistence on controlling its own 
                                                 
40 “Masters of our own house.” 
41 The title Joual describes a unique dialect that is French with truncated phrases and partially incorporated 
English terminology. The term is derived from the Montréal working-class use of the word “joual” in place 
of the French word “cheval,” which means “horse.” Malcolm Reid’s The Shouting Signpainters (1972) 
offers a colorful and expressive discussion of the emergence and importance of Joual to the emergence of a 
Québécois identity.  
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immigration. In 1968 the provincial government established a Department of 
Immigration that had little real power, but clearly exemplified the ability and the desire of 
the Québécois to control their own foreign policy. In 1974, the Liberal Premier Henri 
Bourassa demanded “cultural sovereignty” for Québec if relations between the federal 
and provincial governments were to be reconciled. This “sovereignty” included final veto 
power over all federal laws pertaining to language, culture, and communications 
technologies as well as expanded control over immigration decisions.  
The 1975 Ottawa-Québec agreement on immigration began the process of 
allowing provincial control over matters of migrant entry into the province, which 
ultimately led to the Cullen-Couture Agreement codifying provincial immigration 
controls. While the Cullen-Couture Agreement is fairly limited in the scope of federal-
provincial relations it does establish the important precedent of autonomy for Québec 
over matters of provincial culture. This is a point that will be revisited many times 
throughout this dissertation, although its historical importance can only be touched on at 
this point. While the nationalist sentiment of Québec can be clearly viewed through 
symbols and language it is the political codification of relationships and positions that 
gives us a greater view of the power to control and shape culture. The Cullen-Couture 
Agreement (1979) granted Québec a level of international diplomatic autonomy – a 
position normally reserved for nation-states. In a limited sense, this act is the beginning 
of legitimated Québécois statehood. 
The mixed-economic mission of the PLQ found a ready audience in a Québec 
population seeking a replacement for the weakened social protections offered by the 
Catholic Church. In many ways the state became the new Church in the lives of many 
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Québécois. Social services, education, and cultural authority quickly moved from the 
private to public spheres as the provincial government mobilized Québec society under 
its leadership. That the Québec population so quickly turned its back on the Catholic 
Church should come as little surprise when the history of anti-statism in Québec 
conservative political leadership is taken into account. With the removal of this political 
barrier and the implementation of a state “safety-net,” the Québécois were given the 
freedom to choose their own paths. The result was a secular nationalism centered on the 
government of Québec to lead their cultural shift to a national Québécois identity.     
The importance of the Quiet Revolution to the modern articulation of Québec 
nationalism is clear. The outcomes of the political economic changes under the Lesage 
government were varied. The UN wrested power back from the PLQ in 1966, but did 
little to reverse the state-centered modernization implemented under Lesage. In fact, the 
UN leadership oversaw the most internationally visible articulation of Québécois 
nationalism during a state visit of French President Charles de Gaulle in 1967. Speaking 
to a large crowd from the balcony of the Montréal City Hall he emotionally proclaimed 
“Vive le Québec libre!42” The remainder of his visit to Canada was cancelled when 
federal authorities reacted negatively to his support for additional sovereignty for 
Québec.  
This independantiste sentiment was clearly growing in the latter half of the 1960s. 
One of the architects of the PLQ’s nationalization project, René Lévesque, decided that 
the Québec liberals were not sufficiently pursuing sovereignty for the province. He left 
the party in 1967 to form the Mouvement Sovereignté-Association then the Parti 
                                                 
42 “Long live free Québec!” 
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Québécois (PQ) in 1968. The emergence of the PQ gave Québec citizens a political party 
that was clearly advocating the political sovereignty of Québec (albeit thorough 
continued political and economic association with Canada) for the first time. Lévesque’s 
frustration with the PLQ’s lack of action of sovereignty was not isolated. In 1969 a 
radical movement known as the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) embarked on a 
course of bombings and political kidnappings that culminated in the assassination of the 
provincial Minister of Labor Pierre Laporte in 1970.    
The actions of the FLQ and other radical groups prompted Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau, with the support of the Québec government, to invoke the War Measures Act 
and declare martial law in Montréal. Citizens suspected of communist or other radical 
affiliations were summarily arrested and questioned. The declaration of martial law and 
the presence of federal troops in the streets of Montréal resulted in a mixed reaction. 
While many radical student groups supported the FLQ, the majority of Québécois did not 
support their actions, although the presence of federal troops in the province was even 
less popular. Trudeau’s invocation of the War Measures Act, even though supported by 
provincial political leaders (including the PQ), directly resulted in a loss of votes in 
Québec and his minority government of 1972. 
6. The Parti Québécois and Sovereignty43  
The violence of the FLQ suppressed any revolutionary urges that may have 
existed within the majority of the Québécois, however it did little to stem the tide of 
independantiste sentiment. Growing frustration with the UN and PLQ on the subject of 
                                                 
43 The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Bernard (2000); 
Fitzmaurice (1985); Linteau, Durocher, Robert, and Ricard (1991); and See (2001).  
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federal intrusion (with respect to the 1970 crisis and successive legislative attempts by 
the Trudeau government to promote pan-Canadian nationalism) brought the Parti 
Québécois to power in 197644. The PQ was elected on a platform supporting provincial 
sovereignty that greatly worried the Trudeau government in Ottawa.  
The new government that settled into control in Québec City sent shivers 
down the spines of Canadians, essentially because the PQ had been elected 
with a promise to negotiate a new relationship with Canada. The PQ 
believed that Québec was already a nation. What it lacked was the 
sovereignty to pursue its own destiny (See 2001, 172-73).  
 
The PQ government, led by René Lévesque, continued the provincial project of 
modernization and state-sponsorship of social services. It was in this economic arena that 
the contending political parties of Québec agreed. This is not surprising, as the desire to 
promote liberal capitalism has long provided grounds for political cooperation, as 
evidenced by the Anglo-Franco cooperative organizations of the mid-1800s. Throughout 
the Quiet Revolution and to the present day there is little disagreement over issues of 
provincial economic development.  
A useful example of this common economic project between the PLQ and PQ in 
spite of divergent political and cultural goals is the massive James Bay Hydroelectric 
project. This project was begun in 1971 under the watch of the PLQ and has been of 
central concern for subsequent liberal and sovereigntists governments. Massive political 
and social pressure was put on the provincial government by the local James Bay Cree 
who received little to no compensation for the loss of land or disruption of traditional 
ways of life. In 1975, Hydro-Québec and the James Bay Cree signed an agreement that 
                                                 
44 This frustration existed despite the PLQ’s passage of Bill 22, which established French as the language of 
government and business in Québec. Bill 22 would be the precursor to better-known language legislation in 
Québec, but this was the first time that the linguistic culture of Québec was codified.  
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could compensate the Cree but left other ownerships claims unresolved. Successive 
provincial governments to this day have dealt with continual construction, legal, and 
commercial problems with the James Bay Project. For instance, in 1992 the State of New 
York withdrew a $17 billion purchasing contract with Hydro-Québec, largely due to the 
efforts of Cree leaders who embarked on an informational tour that showed the negative 
social effects on the local Cree due to the massive project. This setback led to a 
cooperative effort on the part of the Québec government that enabled Hydro-Québec to 
sell to the entire North American electricity market in 1997. Agreements in 2002 and 
2004 between Hydro-Québec and the James Bay Cree resolved many of the legal issues 
surrounding the project and provided substantial compensation for the local Cree. This 
continual support of the James Bay Project serves as a cursory illustration of the common 
liberal attitudes and economic orientation of the ruling provincial parties or Québec.   
Also common among Québec political parties was a desire to see French 
nationalism codified. The PLQ and the PQ differed significantly on the issue of 
sovereignty, but were in agreement with respect to the position of Québécois supremacy 
in the province. Bill 101 (Charter of the French Language) was passed in 1977 that 
allowed English language public education only if both parents were educated in English 
in Québec. Basically, all new arrivals to the province would be forced to send their 
children to French-language schools. The Charter also required that French be the 
language of business in Québec. The implementation of Bill 101 was a victory for 
Québécois nationalism as it protected the culture and language of the province and 
ensured that the children of immigrants would be able to linguistically integrate into 
Québec society. Conversely, Anglophone citizens of the province rejected both the 
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platform of the PQ and the intent of Bill 101. Many left Québec for Ontario and other 
English speaking provinces in the late 1970s as a result of these political actions.  
The PQ decided to press their political hand in 1980 with the first referendum on 
political sovereignty. While the referendum would not declare independence for Québec, 
it would give the PQ authority to negotiate for full control over taxation, legal 
institutions, and foreign relations. The federal response of the Trudeau administration 
was immediate and aggressive. The federal government attacked the wisdom of the PQ 
leadership in advocating increased sovereignty and offered Québec the opportunity 
renegotiate the British North America Act and develop a new constitutional agreement. 
The result was a resounding 60 to 40 percent defeat of the referendum. Despite this sound 
defeat on sovereignty Lévesque and the PQ were returned to power in the 1981 provincial 
elections.  
With national sentiment against Québec, Trudeau pressed ahead with his plan for 
constitutional repatriation. This was a referendum promise to the citizens of Québec but 
the process of writing a new constitutional agreement met with disapproval by the 
Québec delegation. In November 1981, Trudeau reached an agreement with nine other 
provinces on a Canadian Constitution that circumvented Québec’s objections to the 
document. Known as the “La Nuit des Longs Couteaux,45” the resultant Constitution Act 
of 1982 remains unsigned by Québec despite the resumption of constitutional 
negotiations between Lévesque and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1984. These “beau 
risques” negotiations resulted in a split within the PQ and Lévesque’s resignation the 
following year.  
                                                 
45 “Night of the Long Knives” 
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The PLQ regained power in 1985 and attempted to restart constitutional 
negotiations with the Meech Lake Accords in 1987. The failure of Meech Lake to be 
ratified in 1990 further convinced many Québécois that Canada was comfortable in their 
refusal to accept Québec’s unique history and place in the country. The continuation of 
these age-old frustrations led Lucien Bouchard to found the Bloc Québécois, a federal 
level political party intended to bring about Québec sovereignty. The following year Bill 
150 was passed by the PLQ-led National Assembly that asserted Québec’s right to secede 
from Canada and called for another referendum on sovereignty in 1992. This was highly 
significant as it represented the level of frustration and discontent in Québec. If the PLQ, 
who had opposed the PQ in their calls for sovereignty, was endorsing Québec right of 
secession then it can be safely assumed that federal-provincial relations in the early 1990s 
were, at best, strained. The federal government quickly responded with calls for another 
round of constitutional negotiations in Charlottetown on Prince Edward Island. The call 
for a sovereignty referendum was shelved to allow for the national referendum on the 
Charlottetown Accords, which failed in the fall of 1992.  
The failure of both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords illustrates the 
persisting divide between English and French Canada. English Canadians resented the 
claims and demands of a unique and sovereign Québec and seem convinced of 
Mackenzie King’s sentiment that Québec is a province like any other in Canada. The 
Québécois, on the other hand, rejected Charlottetown on the basis that the constitutional 
revisions did not go far enough in ensuring their cultural and ultimately national 
sovereignty. The “French Fact” again proved an irreconcilable divide in the quest for 
Canadian nationalism and national unity. The return of the Parti Québécois in 1994 under 
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the leadership of Jacques Parizeau would again bring about the question of whether the 
“French Fact” could stand alone within its own nation. 
In 1995 a second referendum was put to the Québec electorate and asked a single 
question: “Do you agree that Québec should become sovereign after having made a 
formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of 
the bill respecting the future of Québec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?” 
 The referendum was defeated by less than one percent of the vote (50.58% non 
against 49.42% oui). The close vote prompted many to dispute the balloting procedures 
of the PQ and to claim voter intimidation on both sides of the issue. The number of votes 
in the oui camp, however, led many to believe that the sovereignty issue was far from 
being defeated in the minds of the Québécois. In 1998 the Supreme Court of Canada 
unanimously resolved that the province did not have the authority to leave Canada 
although the Court left open the possibility of future constitutional renegotiation. The 
federal government of Jean Chretien made the issue even more muddied by passing the 
“Clarity Act (C-20)” that gave the House of Commons authority to edit any proposed 
sovereignty referendum and to unilaterally determine if an “acceptable majority” had 
been obtained by the referendum. The definition of “acceptable majority” was left 
ambiguous. In response the Québec Assemblée nationale passed legislation that defined a 
majority as “50 percent plus one.” The legacy of these attempts at legislative clarification 
remains to be seen. To date, no logistical discussion or planning has taken place in the 
province to bring about another referendum on Québec sovereignty. Neither has a 
concerted effort to challenge either the Supreme Court decision, the Clarity Act, or 
Québec’s definition of sovereignty been launched by either federal or provincial parties. 
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7. Conclusions 
 The purpose of this and the previous chapter is to present the dually 
interdependent yet independent histories of Canada and Québec. The historical inter-
relationship in social, political, economic, and cultural terms cannot be ignored. In fact, 
the independent nationalist projects inherent in Canadian and Québec histories rely in 
large part on defining respective projects in contrast to the other. That is, both Canadian 
and Québécois nationalism (and nationalist histories) are driven by their definitional 
existence as mutually antithetical.   
 As such, these chapters should read as somewhat redundant in their content, but 
also inherently distinct with respect to perspective and emphasis. These chapters are 
designed to illustrate the duality of nationalist perspectives in telling what is essentially 
the same history.  
 The role of Part II in the larger dissertation project is to (1) support the overall 
methodological position that Canada and Québec are comparable nation-state entities and 
(2) to provide adequate understanding of the perspective and independent historical 
development that allows for divergent approaches to the challenge of globalization. This 
second point is significant as global market integration affects both Canada and Québec 
in similar fashion, as will be shown in Chapter Five. The methodological foundation of 
this dissertation supports the view that analyzing state policy response to a similar 
political economic challenge will allow the analyst to understand the capacities and 
abilities of respective states (in comparative context) to respond to this singular 
challenge. This is, of course, the purpose of Part III. 
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 To this point we have established a series of conceptual definitions and a 
methodological framework for understanding how to understand and examine the 
contemporary capacities of the core nation-state. Chapter Two established a theoretical 
framework for understanding the nation-state, globalization processes, and provided an 
excursive illustration of the interactive process of ideological justification/legitimation 
with respect to establishing non-liberal social protections within the larger context of a 
liberal political economic system. Part II is essential to both the methodlogy and later 
analytical portions of this project. We must understand the autonomous development of a 
nationalist history in both Canada and Québec. Without an understanding of the inherent 
nationalist project in Canadian and Québec histories, we cannot fully understand the 
dialectical outcome of policy decisions and strategies in response to encroaching 
globalization processes. Chapters Three and Four are essential to this project in order to 
fully embed the analysis in the larger context of historical development. The following 



































Part III Introduction 
 
Part Three, consisting of Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, contains the analytical 
portion of this dissertation. The purpose of these chapters is to provide empirical support 
for the theoretical claims made in Part One. Each chapter is compares a categorical 
process of global market integration with the end goal of providing an overall 
comparative-historical view of the transformative process of global market integration. 
The bias of the project, to investigate the role of culture in the process of defining 
contemporary state capabilities, is inherent in the subject matter of these chapters. This 
project focuses on the process of ethno-cultural diversification as a primary requisite of 
core state integration into the global economic system. Therefore, from this perspective 
the question of culture becomes central to understanding the contemporary role of the 
nation-state. I would defend this “bias” by stating that the process of ethno-cultural 
diversification is a requisite outcome of economic growth and not simply a singularly 
cultural process. 
 Chapter Five compares the actual experience of Canada and Québec in the 
process of global market integration. The intent of the chapter is to illustrate the process 
of integration, the policy shifts that accompany state desire to integrate into the global 
market economy, and to ensure that both Canada and Québec are, in fact, integrated into 
the global market economy at some level. 
 Chapter Six examines the process of ethno-cultural diversification as a function of 
systemic labor migration. The chapter compares immigration policy change in Canada 
and Québec to determine the role of the state in determining immigration levels and 
 157
ethno-cultural composition of respective immigration populations. This chapter illustrates 
the role of labor migration in the project of national economic expansion due to increased 
global market integration. Chapter Six provides empirical evidence in support of claims 
made in the previous chapter; namely, that global market integration is a desirable goal 
for both Canada and Québec and resulting ethno-cultural diversification is a necessary 
outcome that must be reconciled. 
 Chapter Seven examines this process of state reconciliation. That is, the 
promotion of global market integration by both Canadian and Québec state institutions 
has qualitatively altered the demographic composition of each respective national 
population. This chapter examines the policy efforts by each state to address national 
population demands for greater national cohesion, labor market stability, and a 
reaffirmation of a singular nationalism.  
 Part Three analyzes the comparative experiences of Canada and Québec as they 
integrate into the global market economy. First, the level of respective global market 
integration is determined. Secondly, the results or outcomes of these integrative processes 
are determined. Finally, the response of each respective state institution is evaluated. 
Chapter Eight concludes the dissertation by integrating the analytical findings of Part 
Three and the previous four chapters for the purpose of gaining greater insight into the 




Chapter Five  
The Global Market Economy: History and Impact on Canada and Québec 
 
 How has the global market economic system in the post-World War II era 
developed and how has it impacted the economic autonomy of Canada and Québec? 
Chapter Five provides this answer by examining the process of global market integration 
in Canada and Québec. The chapter itself is divided into three sections.    
The first briefly chronicles global market economic history from 1870 to the 
present. As this dissertation is concerned with explaining globalization’s impact on the 
nation-state, I constrain my definition and view of the global market economy to the 
period of institutional international global financial and trade control. This perspective 
begins with the institution of the gold standard in the late 1800s46. The purpose of this 
section is to illustrate the dynamic nature of global market development and the 
requirement of stable systemic proponents (state institutions).    
 The second and third sections examine the impact of global market integration on 
Canada and Québec, respectively. I examine the actions and policy responses of the 
Canadian and Québec governments with respect to issues such as tariff reduction, export 
expansion, and market integration. The general contention among political economic 
scholars is that economic globalization, defined as the post-1973 political economic 
environment, has decreased the political economic autonomy of the individual nation-
                                                 
46 This starting point is not consistent with either world-system or economic globalization approaches, 
which begin their analyses in the 1500s and 1970s, respectively I use this starting point because this project 
utilizes social practice, in the form of policy, as a medium of analysis. Thus I am interested in how states 
and political economic institutions manage and control the global market economy, not necessarily in the 
analytical nature of the global market economic system in its entirety.  
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state (Albrow 1996; Kennedy 1993; Robinson 2004; Sklair 1995; Spruyt 2002). The 
purpose of this chapter is the identification of historical change in the global economic 
system and the role of the nation-state in this system as well as the deeper examination of 
how these changes have affected Canada and Québec47.  
1. The Global Market Economic System48
 The existence of a governed global market economy can arguably be traced back 
to the institution of the International Gold Standard in the late-1800s49. The standard was 
predicated on two major prerequisites: the fixed, standard value of gold and the 
hegemonic economic power of a lender of last resort. Due to its position as the dominant 
capitalist economy, Great Britain assumed the role of lender-of-last-resort with the Bank 
of England serving as the principal control over interest rates, supply of credit, and issues 
of trade.  
The establishment of a fixed currency valuation system created the stability 
necessary for international trade and financial exchanges that define an international 
liberal market economic system. The system worked relatively well in maintaining a 
stable medium of exchange for financial and trade exchanges due largely to the economic 
and political hegemony of Great Britain. The relative decline of British hegemony in the 
                                                 
47 This chapter is concerned with demonstrating global market integration and not in evaluating the benefits 
or drawbacks from such integrative processes. As such there have been no efforts made by the author to 
evaluate performance or efficacy of growth such as increasing socio-economic stratification or inequality 
exacerbation in health care provision, education, or vocational inequalities. 
48 General background information for this section was compiled from various sources including Best 
(2005), Cerny (1996), Gilpin (2000;1987), O’Brien and Williams (2004), and Woods (2000).   
49 The exact date for the adoption of a global gold standard is difficult to establish as individual nation-
states adopted the monetary practice at different times such as Germany (1871), France and Italy (1873), 
1879 (Austria), and Russia (1893). Another problematic issue is that practical adoption and political 
affirmation are often dissociated evidenced by the case of the United States. The U.S. was practically tied 
to the international gold standard in 1873 with the US Coinage Act that ended the silver dollar standard, 
however it was not until 1900 that the dollar was officially tied to the American dollar to the international 
gold standard with the passage of the US Currency Act.   
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late-19th and early 20th centuries created a level of instability in the global economic 
system, particularly affecting confidence that the British administration could administer 
credit levels and interest rates. 
 World War I effectively ended the International Gold Standard. The years of 1914 
through 1945 were not good ones for a stable global economic system. Global warfare, 
economic depression, and national economic isolationism ensured that a resumption of 
the global trade system in existence before World War I would not occur.  
 The coming end of World War II prompted allied nation-states to consider options 
for revitalizing global trade. In 1944, delegates from forty-five nation-states met at 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire determined to establish a stable international 
commercial medium to revive the global market economy. The conference was led by the 
United States and Great Britain, but in reality the United States held the key to reviving 
the international economic system. By this time the United States controlled fully three-
quarters of the world supply of gold and had emerged from the War era as the sole global 
economic power. A compromise solution50 to the problem of economic leadership and 
agreeable management came with the establishment of a “dollar standard.” The 
agreement required the United States to peg the value of the dollar to a $35 per ounce 
                                                 
50 The initial proposal, put forth by John Maynard Keynes, was for the creation of an international non-
governmental central bank. The purpose of this bank would be to “monitor trade imbalances and with the 
power to force deficit countries to adjust their economic policies any time deficits were out of line” (Pool 
and Stamos 1989, 3). This proposal was soundly rejected by the United States, as it offered no incentive for 
their economic leadership. This position was a replication of previous British positions in 1870 and again in 
1922 when the British, in exchange for the responsibilities of managing and supporting the gold standard 
and gold-exchange system, respectively, were granted the power of monetary policy power. In short, the 
British and later American hegemonic economic leadership was not selfless and carried several national 
economic advantages.  
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standard, which made the American dollar the official currency of the Bretton Woods 
global market system. 
 Another outcome of the Bretton Woods Conference was the establishment of two 
nongovernmental institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank. The former was tasked with the responsibility of monitoring commercial activity 
within the global market system and be available for short-term, deficit-reduction lending 
purposes. The latter was established as a fiscal management institution for the rebuilding 
of Western Europe after World War II. For the first time the global market economic 
system was supported by international nongovernmental institutions albeit under control 
of donor states (Best 2005; Endres 2005). 
 This revived global economic system collapsed in the 1970s. Faced with a 
number of domestic political pressures (demands for protectionism, a trade deficit, and a 
pending election) and international pressures (a decline in confidence due to the 
expansion of an inflated dollar and the inability of the US to match its gold-convertibility 
responsibilities), Richard Nixon ended dollar to gold convertibility in 1971. This action 
effectively ended the Bretton Woods system by abandoning the primary disciplinary 
mechanism designed to stabilize the global currency unit (the U.S. Dollar). 
 Once again, those promoting a global market economic system were required to 
find a means to administrate and discipline such a system. A solution was sought by the 
seven largest industrial economies (G-751) at successive international economic summits 
in New York (Plaza Agreement of 1985), Tokyo (1986), and Venice (1986). The 
agreements varied in content and scope, but one central feature emerged: policy 
                                                 
51 Canada, France, (West) Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States 
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coordination. In short, the G-7 agreed to “coordinate their macroeconomic policies and in 
effect formulate a macroeconomic policy for the entire world…. Collective leadership of 
the world economy would be substituted for the decline of American leadership” (Gilpin 
1987, 151; see also O’Brien and Williams 2004; Schaeffer 2005; and Slaughter 2005). 
 The resurgence of national economic foci that occurred following the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system began to decline in the mid-1980s. The demise of Keynesian 
state-centered economic strategies conversely ushered in the beginning of the so-called 
current era of neo-liberalism. In short, the ebb and flow of laissez-faire liberal economic 
theory, policy, and institutionalization that has occurred since the late 1800s once again 
flowed toward a liberal market system – at the expense of national economic controls. 
 The major development centers on the emergence of a supranational 
organizational structure that reflects the contemporary climate of policy coordination. 
The Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) have been reoriented to 
facilitate the ideological and structural conditions necessary for global market integration 
in the developing world. In addition, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT), which provided a significant level of trade discipline, was institutionalized in 
1995 with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) after the Uruguay Round 
of the GATT in 1993. The WTO was granted powers of adjudication as well as a central 
mandate to eliminate national (and other) barriers to liberal trade and financial flows. In a 
very real sense, the WTO represents the most explicit institutional manifestation of neo-
liberal political economic ideology. The fact that developed and developing nations are 
members of the WTO lends credence to the contention that international non-
governmental organizations (and their non-governmental actors) have usurped economic 
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policy-making power from individual states on a global scale. Member states must adhere 
to the mission and rulings of the WTO, thus the capability of respective states to enact 
national protections is restricted, albeit by choice. 
 The purpose of this cursory history of the modern global economic system is to 
show the evolutionary nature of systemic development. Simultaneously, we are able to 
see that systemic development and maintenance is an active process of adaptation by 
group and institutional proponents. This is important with respect to Canada and Québec 
in that their active institutional participation and support is necessary for the global 
economic system to survive. The following sections illustrate the process of global 
market integration and institutional support for the global economic system in both 
Canada and Québec.  
2. Canada52
   Canada was an autonomous participant in the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference 
and continued to set its own political and economic agendas independently of British 
control. Canada’s political image as an independent mediator in international disputes as 
well as its expanding economic sectors led to a series of appointments to high level 
political economic posts (autonomous membership in the League of Nations (1919) and 
the International Labour Organization as well as appointment to the United Nations 
Security Council in 1947). These appointments and recognitions culminated in Canada 
being named as the seventh member of the powerful Group of Seven (G-7) economic 
powers in 1976.  
                                                 
52 General background information for this section was compiled from various sources including Bothwell, 
Drummond and English (1989; 1987); Chodos, Murphy and Hamovitch (1993); See (2001); and Urmetzer 
(2003). 
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Economic globalization can be roughly defined as the integration of national 
economies into a global liberal market economic system. Thus, the primary mechanism 
for the expansion of such a global economic system is the incorporation of liberal market 
economic structures to govern national economic systems. In other words, integration of 
national economies into the global economy requires that individual states relinquish a 
level of economic policy autonomy. As previously stated, a global market economy 
cannot function without a centralized control structure. In the era of globalization this 
structure has shifted from American hegemonic control to a more liberal system of policy 
coordination (albeit under strong American influence). In most cases, national economic 
integration requires that state economic policy conform to the rules of the liberal market 
system – with the most obvious consequence being an inability to protect national 
markets. 
Given that Canada is one of the seven most powerful economic nation-states, we 
can safely make two assumptions. First, that the economic policies of Canada will be 
consistent with those made by other G-7 countries and in accordance with the Bretton 
Woods system of dollar hegemony and later the position of policy coordination. This 
consistency is limited to Canada’s support for a stable global economic system not stating 
that global market integration is an egalitarian or consistent process in and of itself. In 
other words, the ebb and flow of the international global market system should be easily 
observable in the economic policies of the Canadian government. Second, as one of the 
few economic powers in the world, Canada should have a greater ability to institute 
national socio-economic protections to benefit its population from the predatory effects 
of liberal market economic integration. This section will examine the role of international 
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economic policy development, foreign direct investment (financial capital flows), and 
trade flows in Canada to test these assumptions.  
2a. Canada: International Economic Policy 
 The issue of liberal trade in Canada has been a long and contentious one. From 
early liberal reforms that mirrored global economic reforms in the 1800s to efforts to 
entrench national economic protections in the post-war era, Canada has been a reflection 
of international political economic shifts. The post-war era is most helpful in providing a 
nation-state level example of global market integration and the problematic acceleration 
of this integrative process due to demands for national socio-economic protection during 
periods of transition. 
 Prior to World War II, the bilateral trade relationship between Canada and the 
United States was the most active in the world. This relationship continues to grow in the 
post-war era and remains the largest trade partnership in the world. This relationship 
would come at a cost, evidenced by the 1951 Massey Commission which concluded that 
Canadian culture was being compromised by encroaching American interests. The 
Massey Commission report offers an important early example of the concern for the 
effects of trade integration.  
 The economic reality of Canadian-U.S. trade could not be ignored, nor could the 
geographic proximity of many manufacturing centers such as Detroit, Michigan and 
Windsor, Ontario. Both were significant automotive manufacturing centers, yet trade 
between the two was restricted by tariff and trade restrictions. In 1965, the Canada-
United States Automotive Agreement (Auto Pact) would liberalize trade in the 
automotive sector between the two countries.  
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 The Pact eliminated tariffs on most automotive products produced in both Canada 
and the United States. The Pact had an immediate effect in expanding the market for 
Canadian automotive products. In 1964, only 7% of Canadian automotive sales went to 
the world’s largest automotive market (the U.S.), but by 1968 fully 60% of Canadian 
automotive manufactures were exported to the United States. The success of the Auto 
Pact in expanding Canadian industrial production and American production cost 
decreases have led many to label the 1965 Auto Pact as the precursor to later bilateral 
liberal trade agreements (Anastakis 2005; Perry 1982). This agreement was significant, 
yet focused on a limited economic sector. The idea of opening Canadian markets to 
American capital was seen as highly lucrative but problematic53. 
The legacy of the Massey Commission report and the increasing integration of 
American and Canadian economic and cultural spheres led to a period of nationalist 
rhetoric and protectionist positions by the Trudeau administration, particularly in the 
1970s. Efforts to expand the Auto Pact and increase trade liberalization with the U.S. met 
an unreceptive federal administration54 occupied with national protectionist demands to 
resolve several issues such as ethno-cultural unrest (including First Nations and 
                                                 
53 In 1967, a Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry was commissioned. Their findings were 
published in a then-confidential report chronicling the “double-edged” nature of foreign investment in 
Canadian industry. Economic analysts clearly saw the advantages of increased foreign capital in promoting 
economic growth, however they consistently warned that economic autonomy would be the major 
casualty/cost of such a growth strategy.  
54 This national protectionist tendency should not be construed as an isolated event in Canadian economic 
history. Many economic historians have commented on the global period of the 1950s through the mid-
1970s as a period of national economic retrenchment (Gilpin 1987; O’Brien and Williams 2004; Strange 
1985). Therefore, the fact that Canada engaged in a political economic period of protecting its national 
economic interests should be viewed as neither surprising nor unique with respect to global political 
economic trends. However, we must consider the national protectionist demands made on the Trudeau 
administration and the similarities in their occurrence throughout the Western world. The 1960s in 
particular saw a global explosion of nationalist demands for increased state protection of cultural rights, 
economic prosperity, and general demands for retributive and social justice.  
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Québécois nationalism), urban ethnic and racial diversification, and social change rooted 
in increased urbanization and economic growth. It was not until the election of Brian 
Mulroney and the Conservative Party in 1984 that this resistance to liberal market 
economics faded. The Mulroney Administration’s embrace of liberal trade agreements 
(despite campaigning against such agreements in 1983) effectively ended federal 
resistance to liberal market integration. The federal Liberal Party (as well as the National 
Democratic Party) attempted to rally anti-CUFTA support in 1988, but Mulroney was re-
elected comfortably on a platform supporting liberal economic reforms and the expansion 
of free-trade agreements. The benefits, it was seen, outweighed national protectionist 
concerns and in 1994 the Liberal administration of Jean Chrétien finalized the expansion 
of Canadian free-trade to Mexico with the NAFTA agreements. 
Proposals for a North American Trade Agreement were made in the United States 
as early as 1979. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and his administration’s push to 
liberalize trade created a necessary political pre-condition for such an agreement. It was 
not until 1985, after the election of the Conservative Mulroney administration, that talks 
on creating a regional zone of “managed trade” was politically feasible from a Canadian 
perspective. In 1988, both countries signed the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CUFTA), with agreement implementation occurring on January 1, 1989.  
Soon after the CUFTA agreements took effect, Canada was included in ongoing 
trade talks with United States and Mexico. The negotiations resulted in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was signed in 1993 with full 
implementation in 1994. The basic agreement was similar in structure to CUFTA with the 
main thrust being the elimination of trade tariffs and other national protectionist 
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strategies. This culmination of liberal market political negotiations marked the effective 
end of political resistance to liberal ideological and structural reforms –the only federal 
Canadian political party in opposition to liberal market trade policies was the NDP, 
whose opposition has waned since 1994. In fact, even the NDP has embraced limited 
“free-trade” in advocating a reduction of inter-provincial trade barriers as well as 
reorienting NAFTA toward a “fair trade” focus (National Democratic Party 2005). If 
CUFTA opened the gates to liberal market expansion in North America, NAFTA ensured 
that those gates would remain open. The past ten years has seen a marked expansion of 
liberal political economic agreements. Chile recently lobbied for inclusion in the NAFTA 
agreement and bilateral trade agreements were brokered between Canada and Chile 
(1995), Costa Rica (2001), and Israel (1997)55.  
These regional and bilateral agreements, while illustrative of increased global 
political economic cooperative efforts, are limited in scope in comparison with the 
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The WTO was created as an 
organizational alternative to the series of liberal trade agreements known as the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Briefly, this organization, of which over 145 
countries are members, establishes rules for trade to which all participating member 
states must adhere. This participatory organization is, in effect, the nongovernmental 
administrative, adjudicative, and political control mechanism for the global market 
economic system. Trade disputes and macro-economic policy decisions are made, in 
                                                 
55 Agreements such as CUFTA, NAFTA, FTAA (proposed), and numerous bilateral trade agreements show 
that the process of global market integration and neoliberal market reforms are a contentious and fluid 
process. Adaptation in reaction to national protectionist demands require constant attention and flexibility. 
This section, and indeed this chapter, is designed to present the structure of global market integration, not 
to imply that these processes are static. 
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most cases, within the negotiating structure of the WTO. Canada’s active participation in 
the WTO and its push to increase bilateral trade negotiations (active negotiations are 
currently underway with Korea, Singapore, El Salvador, Guatamala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, the European Free Trade Commission, as well as continuing negotiations to 
establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)) show that Canada has fully 
integrated itself into the liberal market economic system. An examination of (1) trade 
balances and (2) foreign investment will provide a clearer picture of what this global 
market integration looks like and how is has impacted the Canadian economy.    
2b. Canada: Balance of Trade 
 A main argument of liberal economic proponents is that export-orientation must 
be a primary focus of national economic development (O’Brien and Williams 2004; 
Woods 2000). In other words, the more integrated a national economy is in the global 
market economy the higher its exports and, in the best case scenario, the lower its 
imports. This optimal situation theoretically results in a trade surplus providing capital 
for additional economic growth. This simplistic theoretical exposition can best be viewed 
in the construction of the Bretton Woods system and the development of American 
Dollar hegemony. Only the United States, as the financial keystone of the global market 
economy, was encouraged to run a trade deficit due to issues of liquidity (Gilpin 1987, 
135). All other nation-states were encouraged to work towards a positive balance of 
payments. This emphasis on positive trade exchanges is a central focus of liberal market 
economics: barriers to trade are barriers to economic growth.  
 Canadian integration into the global market system offers interesting insights as to 
how a core state can profit from favorable global trade. Canada in the immediate post-
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war period experienced modest economic growth due to increases in industrial 
production, but ran trade deficits throughout the 1950s. After 1961, Canadian balance of 
trade experienced only one deficit year in 1975. This consistent surplus should be viewed 
as a success of liberal market adherence. However, a closer look at specific trends is 
necessary to determine a commensurate decline in state policy autonomy as a result of 
economic growth due to global market integration. 
   One of the major components of the Trudeau administration in the 1970s was its 
nationalist emphasis both in terms of culture and economic autonomy. This was a 
difficult road as the United States was (and remains) Canada’s largest single trading 
partner. The stagnant growth of a trade surplus in the 1970s is reflective of increases in 
domestic spending as well as the stagflation period within the global economy due to 
high energy costs. Pressure from business and economic interests led to talks on the 
establishment of a regional managed trade bloc in 1979. Increases in United States deficit 
spending, as well as reduced energy costs led to a massive increase in Canada’s early 
1980s trade surplus, with the most massive increase being a jump of $10 billion from 
1981 ($7.7) to 1982 ($17.6). The Canadian balance of trade would oscillate from a high 
of $19.8 billion in 1984 to a low of $7 billion in 1991. Interestingly, the signing of the 
CUFTA agreement and its implementation in 1989 provided no positive growth in the 
trade surplus. In fact, the average trade surplus in the four years following the CUFTA 
agreement was approximately $8 billion. This number was well below the massive 
surplus number of the early 1980s, but still a relatively significant trade surplus.  
 The implementation of the NAFTA agreement in 1994 seems to have had a much 
more dramatic impact on Canadian trade surplus growth than the bilateral CUFTA 
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agreement. In the first three years of NAFTA’s existence, the Canadian trade surplus 
grew from $20 billion (1994) to $42 billion (1996). It must be noted that the creation of 
the WTO and its governing structure in 1995 also opened up many markets to Canadian 
goods. In effect, wholesale Canadian participation in the global market economy began in 
the mid-1990s and provided an incredible profit to the nation-state of Canada. The trade 
surpluses reflected in figure 1 are indicative of Canadian integration into the global 
market economy. As Canada has acquiesced to regional and global trade agreements, its 
share of global capital from trade transactions has increased.  
This rise in production and export-orientation is, however, only part of the story. 
Labor demand to fuel this trade surplus has led to net increases in immigration to Canada 
since 1990 and will be discussed in the following chapter. The focus of the following 
section is an additional measure of global market integration, foreign direct investment, 
or foreign investment/control of Canadian economic and production entities.   
2c. Canada: Foreign Investment 
 Foreign direct investment is a reliable measure of global market integration due to 
its reflection of the transnationalization of production (Robinson 2004, 22). As 
production in core capitalist states increasingly deals in matters of finance, high 
technology, information, and service provision, the transnationalization of production 
processes in Canada must be understood as more than simply industrial or manufacturing 
production. This point is important, as sociological attention to the integrative function of 
FDI has been focused on the developing world as an impetus for modernization. The 
contention is that increasing rates of FDI in the developing world is a direct measure of 





















































Figure 1. Canada: Balance of Trade 
 
I do not disagree; however, the power of this measure also illustrates the effect of global 
market integration on national populations in core states, particularly with respect to 
national protectionist capacities.  
Concerns about the effect of foreign investment and ownership of national 
economic entities is reflected in documents such as the Massey Commission report 
(1951) and the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry (1967). These concerns, 
that Canada was losing the capacity to protect its national economy, persisted despite 
very low levels of FDI as reflected in figure 2. 
 These economic protectionist concerns, however, have not been reflected in the 
post-Trudeau era (ending in 1984). In fact, one could argue that Trudeau was less of an 
economic nationalist as his political rhetoric implies, particularly in his second term 
(1980-1984). Beginning in 1983, FDI inflows into Canada began a relatively rapid yet 
consistent climb through 2004. The pending WTO and NAFTA agreements accelerated 
FDI growth in 1994 ($13 million increase) and FDI continued to advance at a greater 
pace following these regional and global trade agreements. Interestingly it was the 
founding of the WTO that had the most immediate impact on Canadian financial flows. 
In 1997, Canada first became a capital-exporting nation. In keeping with theories of 
liberal economic growth, the exportation of capital is designed to encourage trade in 
specific regions. If we compare Canada’s trade balance with the increase in FDI outflows 
in the period 1997-200 we see a steep drop in the trade surplus in 1997-1998. The years 
1999-2001, however, saw the most dramatic historical increase in Canada’s trade surplus 
(see figure 1). This evidence suggests that this increase in Canadian investment abroad 





































Canada’s growth in both trade surplus and investment outflows has increased. 
Interestingly, FDI inflows have not decreased in any year since 1983.  
The concurrent increase in FDI and export-led trade surplus growth is reflective 
of Canada’s increasing integration into the global market economy. Canada’s complete 
support for WTO regulations and trade authority, its active promotion of the NAFTA 
agreements, and continuing support for the FTAA portray a willing and active participant 
in the global market economic system. Canadian liberal trade policies have been 
consistent with increases in trade surplus growth and FDI inflows. Clearly, Canadian 
integration into the global market economic system has been beneficial to the general 
Canadian economy.  
A closer look at Québec’s integration will offer a comparative example of a state 
with strong institutions and commensurate spending although with an equally strong 
desire for full global market integration.    
3. Québec56
 Understanding the role of globalization in Québec is more problematic, primarily 
with respect to data collection, but also due to the fact that economic controls in Québec 
are a relatively new phenomenon. The role of the Quiet Revolution in changing the 
culture and political power of Francophone Québécois is reflected in the predominant 
economic concerns of the 1960s and beyond. The push to eliminate the income inequality 
that existed between Francophone and Anglophone Quebeckers required increased 
control over the economic mechanics of the provincial economy. This legacy of the Quiet 
                                                 
56 General background information for this section was compiled from various sources including Bothwell, 
Drummond and English (1989; 1987); Chodos, Murphy and Hamovitch (1993); Fitzmaurice (1985); Fry 
(2000); Pacom (2001); and Urmetzer (2003). 
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Revolution was massive state-intervention and the nationalization of select provincial 
industries.  
 The Canadian federal-provincial economic relationship is unique in that provinces 
are responsible for funding most of their respective social welfare projects, including 
health care and education. This means that provinces are also responsible for generating 
tax income. The federal government, which is also responsible for generating tax income, 
augments provincial tax incomes with an “equalization payment” intended to ensure a 
level of provincial financial equality. The case of Québec is unique in that the financial 
resources that are expended in the province to support Québec nationalism do not exist 
anywhere else in Canada. The primary example is state support for the monitoring and 
promotion of French language legislation. Provincial taxation and the highest level of 
federal equalization payments in Canada fund these nationalist efforts, including the 
unique and autonomous educational system of Québec.  
 Ironically, while conventional scholarship on economic globalization concludes 
that the state is diminished as it integrates into the market economic system, Québec is 
actively recruiting foreign direct investment and external trade relationships for 
nationalist reasons. In effect, Québec can distance itself from Canada though its own 
integration into the global market economy. This perspective is supported by Spruyt: 
…liberalism reduces the costs of secessionism. In a mercantilist world 
with barriers to the free exchange of goods and services, scale becomes a 
decisive asset. Small states simply lack the domestic markets required for 
the efficient production of goods (hence, small states tend to rely far more 
on trade as a percentage of gross national product than large states). But if 
few barriers exist, size becomes a less important prerequisite. Some 
scholars have argued that progress on the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in fact assisted secessionist sentiments in Québec 
(Spruyt 2002, 145).  
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This perspective is complicated by the combination of liberal and social democratic 
ideologies that pervades Québec. The historical provision of social services by the 
Catholic Church prior to 1960 and by the Québec state after the Quiet Revolution 
generates significant expectations of social and state institutions. The national population 
in Québec continues to view social service provision by state institutions as a primary 
responsibility of the state. The injection of liberal ideology after the Quiet Revolution 
allowed the state to grow in strength, while at the same time maintaining the social 
democratic traditions of the province. This section will examine how increasing 
participation in the global market economy has impacted the development of a nation-
state in Québec.  
3a. Québec: International Economic Policy 
 Québec does not have the political authority to enter into international financial or 
trade agreements as an autonomous entity. It does, however, have the power to manage 
and control domestic economic matters. This situation has resulted in a massive increase 
in the state-management of economic matters since 1960. A simple look at state spending 
in Québec in the first few years after the Quiet Revolution reveals this massive expansion 
of the Québec state. Bradbury notes this expansion and describes the increase as largely 
the result of the desire to eliminate the economic inequality/stratification between 
Anglophone and Francophone populations. One of the many economic indicators he cites 
is the simple increase in state expenditures during this period. In 1960, provincial 
expenditures totaled $598 million while only twelve years later total expenditures 
reached $4.5 billion in 1972 (Bradbury 1982, 46).  
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The development of a strong nationalist economic orientation has resulted in 
several significant institutions. Québec effectively nationalized several economic 
institutional entities during and after the Quiet Revolution. Hydro-Québec and la Caisse 
de dépôt et placement du Québec are two such examples of state control over national 
economic interests in Québec.  
Hydro-Québec was created in 196357 and represented the most successful effort at 
nationalized energy production and distribution in North America. In fact, initial growth 
of the state corporation was so rapid that existing production facilities quickly became 
insufficient to meet demand. Hydro- Québec began to import additional energy supplies 
in 1969 when it signed an agreement with the Churchill Falls Corporation in Labrador 
(Newfoundland). Production continued to increase with the development of the James 
Bay project (see chapter four) and the focus on energy exportation was formalized in 
1978 with the creation of Hydro-Québec International (HQI). This focus on exporting 
(primarily) hydroelectric power culminated with the opening of the Hydro-Québec 
distribution system to the North American energy market in 1997. This agreement 
created a new Hydro-Québec division, Hydro- Québec TransÉnergie, and an American 
subsidiary, HQ Energy Services, to market energy in the United States. The current net 
income in 2005 was reported at nearly $2.5 billion spread across four divisions 
(production, distribution, equipment, and exports)58.La Caisse de dépôt et placement du 
                                                 
57 An earlier version of nationalized energy production, in the form of Hydro-Québec, was created in 1944. 
Then-Premier Adelard Godbout partially nationalized Montréal Light, Heat, and Power in an attempt to 
begin liberal reforms intended to accelerate Québec’s modernization process. The election of Maurice 
Duplessis later in the same year put an end to the nationalization experiment.  
58 Information and data for Hydro-Québec were obtained from financial statements and historical profiles 
obtained from Hydro-Québec (http://www.hydroquebec.com). Other documents include strategic plans, 
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Québec is a financial management and investment institution that emerged from the same 
Lesage-reform period of the early 1960s. The institution was originally created in 1965 
by an official act of the Québec National Assembly to manage the newly created Québec 
Pension Plan. Again, the emergence of state supported social service provision in Québec 
illustrates an emergent state in support of national interests. This is important, particularly 
with respect to la Caisse, as one of the main goals of the Quiet Revolution was to reduce 
the Anglophone dominance over financial institutions in Québec. In the words of Claude 
Castonguay, Special Advisor to Jean Lesage (1960-1966), “it was essential to free the 
Québec government from its longtime dependence on the powerful alliance of 
Anglophone brokerage firms” (Castonguay 2002, 2). In this way, the emergence of la 
Caisse represents the institutional end of the status quo arrangement between elite 
Anglophone economic and Francophone political and clerical elites. Viewed as a sort of 
economic reclamation project, the resumption of economic control by Francophones in 
the province was clearly a primary goal of the Quiet Revolution and Québécois 
nationalists.  
La Caisse was given the responsibility of managing deposits of the Québec 
Pension Plan, but it was also given a secondary mandate to support Québec economic 
growth at the same time. The investment responsibilities of la Caisse, combined with the 
state protect of economic equalization, motivated the organization to oversee the health 
and development of Francophone business entities. The combination of the cultural and 
economic goals of the Quiet Revolution are readily apparent in the functioning of la 
                                                                                                                                                 
financial reports, and annual reports available at Hydro-Québec, 75 René-Lévesque Boulevard Ouest, 
Montréal (Québec) H2Z 1A4.    
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Caisse. The responsibility of managing priovncial pension funds occurs within the 
context of a healthy provincial economy. All of this economic interaction occurs with the 
understanding that Québec is first and foremost a Francophone province/nation. 
Therefore, the mandate of la Caisse also includes responsibilities for overseeing the 
health and welfare of explicitly Francophone, Québécois economic and business entities 
(Arbour 1993; Forget 1984; Pelletier 1989). 
This implied mandate was dramatically illustrated in 2000 when la Caisse blocked 
the multimillion-dollar acquisition of the Québec company, Vidéotron, by Ontario-based 
Roger Communications. The sale of Vidéotron (a Francophone telecommunications 
company based in Montréal since 1964) to an Anglophone corporation was, in the view 
of la Caisse, detrimental to the cultural sovereignty of Québec. The sale was effectively 
disallowed by la Caisse under the authority of their implied mandate to encourage 
Québec economic growth and protect Québec (specifically Francophone) investments. 
After a series of settlements and negotiations with Rogers Communications, the sale of 
Vidéotron to Quebecor, a Francophone communications corporation based in Montréal, 
was approved by both la Caisse and the Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) in 2001.  
The inability of the Québec government to develop international economic 
agreements and arrangements has not stopped the Québec state from participating in the 
global economy as an autonomous corporate entity. Through the creation of state-
controlled economic entities such as Hydro-Québec and la Caisse, Québec is able to 
directly control its participatory levels in various market economic activities. In fact, the 
nationalization of Hydro-Québec and the public-private cooperative structure of la Caisse 
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means that Québec participates in the global market economy in a more direct manner 
than the federal Canadian government (with la Caisse participation limited to oversight as 
a state control institution). Of course, the level of state control over various economic 
structures and entities is variable and it remains to be seen whether or not this level of 
cultural and economic protectionism is compatible with greater global liberal market 
integration. These changes will be discussed in Chapter Eight, tying Québec attempts to 
protect national economic sectors with the overall theoretical and methodological project 
of this dissertation. Our goal now is to simply illustrate the nature of global market 
integration in Québec.  
This is not to say that the Québec state is limited to social-democratic 
nationalization projects. As previously stated, the federal-provincial relationship is 
largely defined by provincial social service responsibilities and taxation authority. 
Québec, with its unique political economic structures and nationalist demands, has a tax 
structure that reflects these state funding requirements; its provincial personal income tax 
is one of the highest in Canada59. Recently, the Québec National Assembly passed a 
unique anti-poverty measure, Bill 112, designed to both reduce poverty and eliminate 
social exclusion. The bill is unique in its dual emphasis and in its drafting by members of 
both the Québec National Assembly and a collection of community movement activists.  
The bill will not come into effect until 2006, but its construction and ambitious agenda 
(chief amongst being the halving of poverty levels by 2015) are reflective of the national 
economic power of the Québec state.  
                                                 
59 Interestingly, Investissement Québec, the state-sponsored promotional institution for foreign investment 
in Québec, cites the rate of corporate taxation is the lowest in not only Canada, but also North America at 
31.02 percent. This illustrates the desire of the Québec state to attract investment and business entities 
while at the same time maintaining existing levels of state spending on social service provision.   
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Clearly, the commitment to social service provision and national protection 
through economic means remains a significant motivation for the Québec state. This 
political economic climate seems to show a situation of limited global market integration. 
However, we must understand that Québec’s ability to apparently integrate into the 
global market economy and maintain national economic protections is highly contingent 
on the equalization payments it receives from the federal government. Due to this source 
of additional state income, Québec is able to both facilitate global market integration as 
well as maintain high levels of national economic protections. Recent events have cast 
doubt on Québec’s ability to maintain this contradictory environment and will be 
illustrated in Chapter Eight. It must be noted that from this perspective, Québec 
sovereignty would undoubtedly mean the end of federal equalization payments and 
therefore the end of additional state income to support such programs. One must question 
the ability of an independent Québec to profit from global market integration as well as 
maintain non-liberal national economic protections. Again, these issues will be revisited 
in the project conclusion.  
The power of the Québec state to control its domestic economy and to participate 
in the global market economy cannot be disputed. In fact, it is the strong state control 
over a national economy that troubles critics of Québec economic protectionism. New 
political parties such as the Equality Party have sprung up to directly challenge the 
sovereignty agenda and social democratic, state-centered national protections. Liberal 
critiques point to Québec’s chronic unemployment and relative rates of poverty as being, 
per capita, among the worst in Canada. These (and other) problems are exacerbated, 
 183
according to such critiques, by Québec’s refusal to engage in total liberal economic 
reforms (McMahon 2003). 
On the other hand, Québec has recently taken extraordinary efforts to promote 
foreign investment through active marketing and institutional support from such public-
private cooperative groups as Investissement Québec. Québec also is a public supporter 
of free-trade agreements on both regional and global levels. Jacques Parizeau, then 
Premier of Québec, argued that Québec had been the strongest Canadian supporter of 
both NAFTA and WTO participatory negotiations and that Canadian participation in both 
regional and global trade liberalization was due to Québec’s unfailing support (Parizeau 
1995).  
Québec international economic policy is, undoubtedly, contradictory. Many argue 
that Québec is missing an opportunity to grow its economy at much higher rates due to its 
protectionist policies. Québec nationalists argue that without these non-liberal national 
protections their very culture and social structures would collapse under the onslaught of 
free-market capital and culture. But what has the effect of globalization been on Québec? 
Have its national protections inhibited economic growth and discouraged foreign 
investment? Has Québec been able to encourage investment while still maintaining 
demanded national protections? 
3b. Québec: Balance of Trade 
 A look at Québec’s balance of trade since the early 1980s shows marked 
similarities and differences with Canada. The first major difference is the fact that 
Québec ran substantial trade deficits for most of the 1980s. The second difference is the 
fact that when Québec has been able to run trade surpluses, the level of these surplus 
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exports have not provided decreased Québec  import reliance to a significant degree 
(particularly in comparison with the whole of Canada) . These differences are illustrated 
in figures 3 and 4, respectively.  
The major similarity when comparing Québec and Canada trade balances is the 
increase in trade surpluses at two points: 1995 and 2000, respectively. The pattern of 
trade is nearly identical when both are compared in scale (see figures 1 and 3). The initial 
1995 growth in Québec of over $3 million mirrors the surplus growth in Canada at 
approximately $35 million. Both show a marked decline until 1998 for Québec and 1999 
for Canada when rapid growth led to the largest trade surpluses for both Québec ($6.8 
million) and Canada ($70.7 million) in 2001.  
This similar pattern is reflective of the subordinate economic role of Québec in 
Canada, but it also shows that, in terms of trade, Québec is similarly embedded in the 
global economy, as is the whole of Canada. It would seem that, from this information that 
Québec’s socio-economic protectionist policies have done little to retard the integration 
of the province into the global market economic system. 
On the other hand, this also suggests that high rates of protectionist legislation 
(Bill 122, Provincial tax laws) and state control over economic production (Hydro-
Québec) and oversight (la Caisse) organizations have not hampered Québec’s economic 
growth to the extent that some would believe. This, however, is a conclusion that cannot 
be addressed with simple balance of trade statistics. It should also be noted that the 
massive trade surplus growth of the Canadian national economy provided a significant 





























































































Although the trade surplus dropped significantly in the years 2002-2003, Canada 
retained a healthy surplus and has shown a $9 billion growth in the trade surplus in 2004. 
Québec was similarly affected by the most recent recession (showing a decrease in 2002-
2003 but a similar increase in both imports and exports in 2004). A major difference in 
Québec, however, is the fact that despite this most recent increase in imports and exports, 
Québec ran a trade deficit in 2004. This would suggest that Québec’s economy is not yet 
capable to fully mirroring global economic trends, as is the national economy of Canada. 
It would seem that Québec’s socio-economic protections do, in fact, hamper the ability of 
trade to ebb and flow in conjunction with larger trends.  
On the other hand, Québec does not have the economic resources available to the 
Canadian federal government. While the whole of Canada can buffer provincial poverty 
in regions such as the Maritimes, Québec has a limited capacity to address persistent 
poverty in regions such as Gaspé and la Côte-Nord. This debate is important, but not the 
focus of this project. The conclusions we can make are that Québec has benefited from 
neoliberal trade policies (NAFTA) but not to the degree of Canada as a whole.   
3c. Québec: Foreign Investment   
 Mapping FDI in Québec is problematic. Official investment statistics for Québec 
are not available to the public, and other FDI monitoring institutions such as UNCTAD 
and OECD do not keep statistics below the nation-state level. This makes a statistical 
comparison impossible. There is, however, a practical solution that can lead to inferences 
being made. First, a simple overview of Québec investment recruitment and management 
will illustrate the problematic nature of foreign investment in Québec. Second, statistics 
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demonstrating recent growth in foreign-owned capital expenditures offers a simple but 
interesting view of Québec’s future in this area.  
 Foreign investment is traditionally more problematic politically in Québec than in 
Canada. Due to Québec’s close relationship with the United States with respect to trade, 
investment flows would logically follow the same pattern. This would, obviously, mean 
that English would be the dominant language of business and investment in Québec. The 
relatively contemporary nature of the Quiet Revolution and the need to reinvigorate 
Francophone Québécois business and economic sectors led some to argue against 
encouraging increases in foreign investment and ownership in Québec economic 
institutions. This view of economic nationalism, or more pointedly economic 
decolonization, persisted to the point that actual tangible gains were made in improving 
Francophone income equality (Vaillancourt 1985)60. Once these economic disparities 
were effectively reduced, the emphasis on economic nationalism has decreased.   
  It became increasingly apparent to sovereigntist leaders (primarily in the PQ and 
Bloc Québécois) that encouraging foreign capital investment in Québec would 
accomplish two goals: (1) increase Québec’s participation and integration into the global 
economy as an increasingly autonomous entity and (2) show support for liberal economic 
policies and create a more positive bilateral political economic relationship with the 
United States as a result. In other words, increasing global market integration and 
                                                 
60 Albouy (2005) supports this conclusion by measuring change in the log annual earnings gap between 
Francophones and Anglophones. In 1970, the gap within Québec was -.270 (representing the relative gap 
between the lower group (Francophones) and the dominant group (Anglophones). In 2000, this gap had 
been reduced to -.070 (Albouy 2005, 29). Additionally, his research cites annual earnings figures that offer 
descriptive illustrations of this earnings gap. In 1970, Francophone average annual income was 
approximately $34,272 while Anglophone annual income averaged $46,857. In 2000, the Francophone 
average was $43,418 while Anglophone annual earnings averaged $46,656 (Albouy 2005, 30)  
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recruiting foreign investment, as a unique and autonomous entity, is viewed in Québec as 
a strategy to expand Québec’s economic base in a more autonomous fashion than simply 
as a Canadian province. Of course, the extent of arguments promoting FDI as a 
sovereignty issue varies by political party and ideological affiliation. The interesting 
point here though is that regardless of whether Québec political leadership is 
sovereigntist (PQ) or federalist (PLQ) in orientation, the encouragement of FDI remains 
constant.  
 The universality of FDI promotion by the Québec state is apparent in the 
institutional state support of investment recruitment through organizations such as 
Investissement Québec61. This organization is based on the same public-private 
cooperative model that structures la Caisse and other partners of the Ministère du 
Développement économique, de l’Innovation et d l’Exportation62. Through such 
institutional programs, the Québec state is able to encourage and manage foreign 
investment specifically directed in Québec. These efforts have resulted in positive FDI 
increases (see table 1). A recent evaluation of venture capital investment found that 
inflows of foreign capital into Québec economic entities were among the highest in North 
America; in fact, Québec ranks third in North American biotechnology, information 
technology, and venture capital investment behind only California and Massachusetts. 
The rapid increase in growth, $49 million in 2002 to $51 million in 2003 to $88 million 
in 2004 (and growing), occurred after implementation of liberal economic reforms 
                                                 
61 Investissment Québec is a public-private cooperative organization that is organized in a way similar to la 
Caisse. The Board of Directors is comprised of Québec state ministers and officers as well as private 
business leaders in the province. The goal of the organization is to promote and facilitate foreign 
investment in Québec as well as Québec investment abroad.    
62 Ministry of Economic Development, Innovation, and Exportation 
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Table 1. Québec: Capital Expenditure under Foreign-Control by Industry, 2003-2005 (In 









by the Charest administration in 2002 (King 2005)63.  
 Geography and increased governmental recruitment of foreign investment provide 
significant motivation. This increase in venture capital is reflected in more material 
construction and material goods investment in the province. The growth in capital 
expenditures by foreign-owned businesses has greatly expanded in the past three years.  
The foreign investment and venture capital growth achieved in the past three to 
four years raises significant attention to the effect of liberal reforms undertaken by the 
Charest government. The economic policies of the Parti Québécois and the federal Bloc 
Québécois have largely mirrored those of their liberal counterparts in both provincial and 
federal politics. As was previously stated, it seems that the political position on 
sovereignty/federalism is more of a determining difference than is the common desire to 
integrate Québec into the global economy through both trade and increased foreign 
investment.  
The current PLQ government in Québec is, in fact, attempting to decrease these 
national economic protections and adhere to orthodox liberal economic demands. The 
                                                 
63 “It was just a drop in the bucket in the context of U.S. venture investments - which came to $15.5 billion 
in the first three quarters of 2004 - but with just under C$500 million in disbursements in all of Canada in 
the third quarter, the increase in Québec is substantial.” (King 2005). 
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success of these down-sizing and privatization efforts remains to be seen, however the 
fact that Québec has utilized policy as a tool to historically promote national economic 
institutions and protections is significant in defining respective state capacities. More 
specifically, a corporatist model of the state may reflect Québec while a more traditional 
political model may be more reflective of the Canadian state.  
4. Comparative Growth and Conclusions  
 Canadian economic growth in the post-WTO and NAFTA era has been 
impressive. Trade and budget surpluses, at the federal level, have proven to be some of 
the largest in the world. In comparison with other G7 countries, Canada was alone in 
posting a budget surplus in 2004 (CBC 2004). Québec, on the other hand, has struggled 
to register consistent trade surpluses and has posted consistent budget deficits. This stark 
position would seem to imply that Canada, exclusive of Québec, was experiencing an 
economic boom, while the province of Québec remained mired in economic stagnation. 
A quick look at overall GDP growth illustrates this trend. 
The problem, however, is that measurement at these levels is problematic due to 
the diversity and levels of economic inequality within Canada. For example, natural 
resource rich provinces such as Alberta and capital rich provinces such as Ontario tend to 
show rates of growth that are much higher than poorer provinces such as the Maritime 
provinces and (relatively) Québec. In addition, regional disparities within provinces are 
not taken into account. Québec, for instance, has areas of high economic growth 
(Montréal and Québec) and also areas of large-scale poverty (Gaspé and Côte-Nord). A 
more accurate measure of comparison would be to examine the rates of annual GDP 
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economic growth in both Canada and Québec. Figure 6 clearly illustrates this trend of 
similar rates of growth. 
This comparison is striking in its ability to show the matching patterns of growth 
occurring in both Canada and Québec (as shown in figures 5 and 6, respectively). This 
pattern would suggest that while Québec often under-performs in terms of annual GDP 
growth in comparison with the whole of Canada, its rate of growth is higher at times. We 
can conclude that aside from rates of absolute GDP growth, the rate of annual growth 
shows a comparable economic growth trend. The conclusions that can be drawn from this 
data, with respect to determining global market integration, would imply that Québec has 
followed a similar path of economic integration (as Canada). We can assume that through 
comparable rates of annual GDP growth, trade flows, and FDI recruitment efforts that 
Québec and Canada have achieved at least comparable levels of global economic 
systemic integration. 
This modest conclusion is somewhat contradictory to liberal critics of Québec 
social spending. The relatively low rate of overall growth and the inability to post 
significant trade surpluses is tempered with consistent and comparable rates of GDP 
growth. In other words, Québec is experiencing comparable growth rates to one of the 
most powerful economies in the world, and doing so with high levels of state social 
spending. Québec maintains a solidly social democratic statist position in which health 
care, education, childcare, cultural-linguistic programs, intercultural, and many other 
social programs are supported by the Québec state. The maintenance of non-liberal state-
centered spending is cited by liberal critics as the main cause for Québec’s lower level of 




























































































Two significant issues emerge from this analysis. First, the national population of 
Québec continues to demand that the state maintain traditional levels of spending. This is 
in reaction to pressures to decrease state spending by advocates of greater liberal market 
reforms. Spending cuts and general economic reforms have been received coldly at best 
in Québec. This strength of national population demands is countered by the universal 
political will to integrate Québec into the global market economy on an ever-increasing 
scale.   
 This second issue of liberal market promotion provides an interesting 
contradictory position – and a potential problem for future Québécois politics. The dual 
position, advocated by both the PQ and PLQ, has been to promote liberal reforms such as 
increasing FDI and trade, while also maintaining traditional state-funding for social 
programs demanded by the national population. This dual position will become 
increasingly tenuous if political goals for each major provincial party are realized. The 
desire for PQ leadership to promote sovereignty (elimination of equalization payments) 
and the PLQ’s current desires to dismantle state social service institutions (as will be 
shown in Chapter Eight) both embrace global market integration as a vehicle for political 
goals; however, both will result in decreased ability to protect national economic sectors 
and social service provision. Again, these conclusions will be revised in the final chapter.  
 Overall, we can conclude that Québec’s level of global market integration has 
been facilitated by its unique position with respect to “foreign aid” in the form of federal 
equalization payments. This situation allows Québec to promote neoliberal market 
integration as well as maintain relatively high levels of state social spending. This is a 
contradictory position that is unique to Québec; however, the existence of this climate 
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raises significant questions about the Québec state and its continuation of such a 
contradictory and potentially tenuous political economic position (supporting both 
neoliberal economic reforms and maintaining non-liberal national economic protections). 
I argue that the relative power of the Québécois national population requires this 
contradictory state position.  
This “inhibited integration” occurs as a result of popular resistance to the effects 
of such integration. The political elite of Québec has shown a strong willingness to 
promote greater market integration, but have been unable to adequately reduce the state 
institutional capacities required for such reforms to fully take hold. Canada, on the other 
hand, has succeeded in integrating to a fuller extent and the effects of this integration 
have been reflected in reduced federal spending for health care (Health Canada), 
education, and other social services once highly prized by the federal government. This 
conclusion, and the potential dangers of such a political economic position, is revisited in 
Chapter Eight.   
 Economic growth has occurred in both Canada and Québec at comparable rates. 
As Canadian history has shown, economic growth necessitates increases in labor 
availability. As an economically under-populated country, Canadian demographics 
require that economic growth be fueled by commensurate increases in labor migration. 
The following chapter will illustrate this process and the accompanying ethno-cultural 
diversification or urban Canada and Québec as a result of this economic growth due to 
increased global market integration. 
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Chapter Six  
Ethnic Diversification and Labor Migration 
 
The post-World War II period ushered in the dual conditions of expanding 
economic production in Canada and Québec and an increasingly interactive global 
political economy. These, of course, were not mutually exclusive conditions as the 
Keynesian economic growth strategies of the post-war period saw increases in national 
economic performance along with the institutionalization of global economic 
mechanisms in the form of the IMF, World Bank, and (less formally) American dollar 
hegemony. These conditions began to create a more interdependent global political 
community, dramatically demonstrated by the process of rapid ethnic diversification in 
Western capitalist nation-states during globalization’s early years.   
 We can understand this development as the causal outcome of several historical 
and economic forces culminating in the creation of a modern global labor supply system. 
First, the traditional labor migration from the source countries of Eastern and Southern 
Europe was limited in the post-War era. New sources of labor migration were required 
and subsequently filled by migration from the Global South.  
Secondly, the political economic shifts that resulted from economic 
reorganization following World War II, and again after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
institutions and the energy crisis of the early and late 1970s, created conditions conducive 
to the liberalization of immigration policies in many advanced capitalist nation-states. 
These conditions included significant motivation for source countries to participate in the 
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global labor supply system due to the same global economic pressures that were 
functioning in the developing world.  
Finally, the transnationalization of production and the expansion of centers of 
capital in non-Western areas created a new class of educated and skilled labor migrants. 
These migrants would be increasingly in demand for two reasons: (1) their skills in 
information technology, which were increasingly in demand as Western states moved 
toward information-based economies and (2) their immediate resources, as often these are 
monied migrants who possess the skills and resources to immediately contribute to the 
expanded economic growth of the receiving country. 
 This chapter chronicles the experience of both Canada and Québec in promoting 
and managing labor migration in accordance with the demands and constraints of the 
global market economic system. The development of ethno-cultural diversity as a 
significant national issue in both Canada and Québec has been a result of increasing 
integration into the global economic system. The development of ethno-cultural 
diversification in Canada and Québec must be understood as a consequence of 
globalization; an economic growth requisite that must be managed in order to maintain 
national-state stability that is essential for global economic systemic maintenance. The 
state response to these national demographic changes takes the form of multicultural and 
intercultural policies and will be examined in the following chapter. This chapter 
provides an important link demonstrating that multicultural policies are, in fact, outcomes 




1. Understanding Labor Migration 
 Labor migration and immigration have been popular topics in the post-World War 
II era. The ubiquitous nature of immigration is reflected in the many disciplinary theories 
of its origins, functions, mechanics, and outcomes. Predictably, disciplinary theories are 
concerned with respective dominant questions. For instance, economic theories of 
migration are concerned with explaining the economic motivations and conditions that 
promote or discourage migration. Sociological theories of migration are more concerned 
with social integration and incorporation into receiving societies. A focus on networks of 
labor and ethnic affinity/identity complement perspective examining migration as 
motivated by the transnationalization of production (Cordero-Guzmán et al. 2001; Light 
and Bhachu 1993; Portes 1998; Sassen 1991). Political theories of migration are largely 
focused on issues of governmental control and management of immigration (Brettell and 
Hollifield 2000; Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Foner and Rumbaut 2000). 
 The discipline-specific nature of migration studies is made even more problematic 
by two trends in the literature. The first is a general attempt to develop theories of 
migration with respect to out-migration, immigration management, migrant integration, 
migration flows, and many other specific aspects of the migratory process. The second 
trend is typified by case studies intended to show the unique and historically dependent 
nature of migrations.  Russell King comments on this diversity of questions, issues, and 
approaches in the study of migration: 
A sampling of even a small portion of migration’s vast literature reveals a 
tension between attempts to create models and theories on the one hand, 
and the numerous empirical case-studies which tend to emphasize unique 
circumstances on the other. The case-studies are nearly always interesting 
but have limited theoretical validity or general application; the theories 
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either state the obvious or involve unrealistic assumptions…it is perhaps 
precisely because it is so difficult to make generalizations about migration 
that it is such an important and fascinating subject to study (King 1996, 7)! 
 
The effort to integrate these divergent approaches is a difficult one. For instance, an 
identified sociological bias is to focus on the receiving country, particularly on 
assimilationist or identity-centered questions of social integration (Brettell and Hollifield 
2000; see also Gordon 1964; Kramer 2003). While some have pointed to the inherent 
interdisciplinary nature of sociology as providing a natural position of authority in 
migration studies (Waters 1999) others have moved beyond disciplinary limitations to 
embrace a methodological common ground of systems theory.  
 Systemic perspectives of international migration are superior to the traditional 
“push-pull” models of migration due to their ability to incorporate structural variables in 
addition to traditional agent-centered choice models. Briefly, traditional models explain 
migration as a dynamic process involving “push” conditions (high population density, 
generally poor social, political, economic conditions, or extreme cases such as famine or 
war) in source countries and “pull” conditions in receiving countries (notably demand for 
labor, high economic growth, and favorable living standards, social condition, and 
political stability). While these explanations are often accurate, the methodology is 
limiting due to its emphasis on migration as a rational decision-making process on the 
part of the individual migrant. This approach is only able to tell part of the story of 
migration, specifically “the supply of foreign workers is only a necessary condition for 
the phenomenon of international labor migration. The decisive condition is the demand 
for foreign labor in the immigration country” (Straubhaar 1986, 853). In other words, 
immigrant choice is an important but limited portion of the labor migration process.    
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 Systemic studies of migration develop divergent conclusions on the motivations 
and functions of international labor migration from those of traditional rational-choice 
“push-pull” models. Straubhaar (1986; 1988) makes the case that labor demand in 
receiving countries is the determining factor in motivating migratory flows. The ebb and 
flow of labor demand can be measured through immigration controls enacted by 
respective receiving countries. The resulting conclusions of this perspective are that 
individual migrants have relatively little power as larger networks of regional and 
international migration are dictated by receiver demand and established cultural 
connections (such as lingering political colonial relationships or linguistic affinity). These 
networks are contingent on conditions of cultural affinity (generally linguistic and ethnic) 
that encourage the immigration of specific group to specific locales. The mechanical 
operation of migration networks facilitates the creation of ethno-cultural communities in 
receiving states.  
Harris further critiques traditional migration theory by pointing out its obvious 
limitations with respect to the actuality of available choices: 
International migration, with all its problems, is only for the better-off 
workers – those who have escaped the unremitting misery of labour 
experienced by the millions of workers left at home (Harris 1995, 84).  
 
These conclusions are significant advancements over rational-choice perspectives of 
traditional migration theory and allow research to investigate the emergence and 
development of labor migration as a premeditated system (Hollifield 2000; Potts 1990; 




1a. The Global Labor Supply System 
 Integrative attempts at understanding systemic international migration is best 
demonstrated in Sassen’s The Mobility of Labor and Capital (1988)64. One of the more 
important aspects of this study is the ability to examine expansion of international capital 
in conjunction with an expansion of the international labor market. Her analysis builds on 
the observations of Portes (1978) and others that international labor migration as a non-
coercive process corresponding with the “consolidation phase of the world capitalist 
economy (Sassen 1988, 31).  
 The expansion of economic globalization has resulted in a dramatic increase in 
foreign direct investment for both developed and developing countries, which Sassen 
links directly to increases in out-migration from source countries. Increases in FDI 
facilitate economic reorientation to encourage industrial production and increases in 
export-oriented production. This industrial shift from traditional economic activities also 
results in internal migration and accelerated urbanization. The process of FDI investment 
in developing countries contributes to conditions that typify contemporary international 
labor migration: 
(a) the incorporation of new segments of the population into wage labor 
and the associated disruption of traditional work structures both of which 
create a supply of migrant workers; (b) the feminization of the new 
industrial workforce and its impact on the work opportunities of men, both 
in the new industrial zones ad in the traditional work structures; and (c) the 
consolidation of objective and ideological links with the highly 
industrialized countries where most foreign capital originates, links that 
involve both a generalized westernization effect and more specific work 
                                                 
64 While Sassen’s work contributed to the initial development of the concept other authors have contributed 
significantly to an understanding of the global labor supply system including Abowd and Freeman (1991); 
Nash and Fernández-Kelly (1983); Portes (1978); Potts (1990); and Straubhaar (1986; 1988). 
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situations wherein workers find themselves producing goods for people 
and firms in the highly industrialized countries (Sassen 1988, 120). 
 
The connections between the acceleration of economic globalization and the changing of 
economic structures in the developing world are clear. The link to migration is, largely, 
due to the creation of a labor supply through modernization/industrialization funded, in 
part, by FDI. The removal of a viable market for traditional agriculture or rural economic 
pursuits encourages urban migration resulting in the proletarianization of national 
populations in the developing world.  
With a ready labor supply, developed countries are able to establish networks of 
labor migration that can be adjusted in accordance with demand. The evolution of this 
labor supply system is an outcome of economic adjustment strategies (or modernization 
processes) that are a consequence of global market integration that defines economic 
globalization. The question of why this market emerged after World War II is essential to 
understanding how Western receiving countries are ethnically diversified through the 
process of labor migration. 
1b. Source Region Shifts  
 In accordance with Portes’ (1978) contention that voluntary labor migration 
patterns begin with the consolidation of capitalism, we can view the development of 
Western labor migration networks as an outcome of the emergent liberal market economy 
of the late-1800s. Early Twentieth Century migration patterns were generally consistent 
with cultural affinity in that colonial relationships, linguistic familiarity, and political 
management ensured established networks of labor supply. In the case of Canadian labor 
migration the common denominator was a European lineage. That is, Europe was the 
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source region for labor migration to Canada and Québec until the mid-Twentieth 
Century. These patterns are easily observed and follow a general historical pattern of 
Western European migration shifting to Southern and Eastern European sources in the 
expansionist period of the mid to late 1800s (Bailyn 1986; Games 1999; Hansen 1940). 
European (read: Caucasian) migration typified immigration to the West. This pattern of 
European out-migration would come to a halt as a result of World War II and the re-
emergence of a global economic system.  
The reconstruction and recovery of European industrial production and 
accompanying economic growth by the 1950s effectively reduced European labor 
migration to Canada and Québec. At that point labor demand within Europe was 
sufficient to motivate continental migration patterns between European nation-states and 
stem the flow of out-migration. In addition, the political stalemate of the Cold War 
ensured that migration from Eastern European countries tied to the Soviet Bloc would be 
restricted, if not eliminated. If labor demand was to continue in both expanding North 
American and European markets, new supplies of labor migration were required.  The 
result was a global shift from the traditional source countries of Eastern and Southern 
Europe to the developing countries of the Global South. 
This shift to the Global South for labor supply needs brought a rapid and dramatic 
demographic change to many advanced capitalist nation-states. While ethnic diversity has 
been a hallmark of (voluntary) labor migrations, much of this diversity was Caucasian, 
Judeo-Christian, and European in general cultural orientation. Shifting global labor 
supply sources to the Global South resulted in a more true diversity of culture, traditions, 
values, and race/ethnicity. 
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This shift is reflected in Sassen’s description of the mechanics of the global labor 
supply system. Economic relationships and capital flows influence emigration. Briefly, 
capital investment facilitates modernization and industrialization of developing countries. 
The modernization/industrialization of the developing world is further fueled by the 
resultant proletarianization of national populations. This predictable pattern follows the 
same history of European industrialization as identified by Marx (1964) and Thompson 
(1968) – the mechanical capitalist process of creating a centralized (urban) supply of 
manual labor out of disparate, rural, and agrarian populations. Thus, for Sassen and 
others, individual receiving countries are able to influence migration by increasing FDI 
flows into individual source countries or regions. In addition, Sassen alludes to the 
existence of certain perceptual “pull factors” that influence the destination of labor 
migrants. For example, the image of the United States as a “land of opportunity” works in 
conjunction with massive foreign investment in several source countries to motivate and 
support this modern global labor supply system (Sassen 1988, 20).  
Migratory flows to countries experiencing economic growth, and thus labor 
demand, demonstrate a network logic (Light and Bhachu 1993; Portes 1998; Salt 1989). 
In the case of Canada and Québec, these networks follow traditional lines of cultural 
affinity, and will be demonstrated in later sections of this chapter. It is the role of the state 
in the creation and maintenance of these networks that is of primary importance in 
understanding the role of the nation-state within the global economy.  
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1c. General Canadian Immigration Prior to 194565
 As mentioned in Chapter Three, early Canadian migration was colonial in nature 
and predicated on mercantile relationships with respective mother countries. The first half 
of the 1800s saw small numbers of emigrants from Western Europe, mainly from the 
United Kingdom (most notably Scotland and Ireland). British colonial authorities actively 
promoted a pro-British immigration policy that encouraged loyalist migration, 
particularly following the War of 1812. The pre-Confederation years were, however, ones 
of relatively low migration to Canada.     
 The political autonomy afforded the Canadian government following 
Confederation in 1867 allowed greater flexibility in matters of immigration, specifically 
with respect to source county selection. It also provided Canada with a powerful ability to 
promote autonomous economic expansion through increased industrial and agricultural 
production. Immigration and economic development/growth are inexorably connected in 
Canada. Economically, Canada is an under-populated country requiring inflows of 
migrants to supplement a limited domestic population. 
This focus on migration as essential to the manpower needs of the Canadian 
economy is well documented (Danysk 1995; Green 1994; Green and Green 2004; 
Hawkins 1972; McInnis 1994). The chronic Canadian economic problem is that vast 
natural resources and the economic potential that represents meets a low national 
population. This need for external labor to fuel economic growth has led to Canada being 
an excellent case to illustrate the “tap-on/tap-off” pattern of immigration policies that is 
                                                 
65 Background information for this section was derived from several sources including Cameron (2004); 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2000); Halli and Driedger (1999); Hawkins (1972); and See (2001). 
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able to manage labor migration (Ongley and Pearson 1995: 767; Straubhaar 1986). This 
pattern is quite simple. In times of economic recovery or growth, immigration policy is 
altered to allow greater numbers of immigrants to enter the country. Conversely, in times 
of economic recession or depression, the “tap” of immigration policy is turned off to 
reduce migration inflows (Cameron 2004; Green and Green 2004; 1999; Hawkins 1972). 
The reality of labor demand in times of economic expansion is pronounced in Canadian 
history. The fact that economic expansion can be documented through immigration 
policy is significant and adds empirical credence to the methodology of this project; 
namely, that state action and motivations can be discerned through embedded policy 
analysis.  
The traditional focus on loyalist emigration from the UK was replaced with a 
more expansive focus on labor market expansion in the latter half of the century. 
Westward expansion and the desire to increase Canada’s agricultural production 
dominated Canadian immigration policy during the late 1800s to the early 1900s. The 
Dominion Lands Act of 1872 allowed free land grants to those willing to settle the 
interior of Canada. The Sifton policies during the turn of the century effectively reversed 
years of targeted UK immigration to Canada. American and later Eastern European 
sources were targeted. A less typical case was that of Chinese migration in response to 
the construction of a Trans-Canadian railroad (1881-1885). These migrants had a 
different experience as several anti-Chinese legislative actions created conditions of 
official discrimination not felt by Caucasian ethnic communities.   
 World War I effectively ended the large flows of UK and Eastern European 
migration to Canada. Intermittent attempts were made by both Canadian and United 
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Kingdom authorities to restart immigration flows. The Empire Settlement Act of 1922 
was the British governments answer to lagging immigration throughout the British 
Commonwealth by providing financial and logistical assistance to UK citizens wishing to 
migrate. The Depression years of the 1930s saw a near complete shutdown of Canadian 
immigration. High unemployment and limited growth opportunities represented the most 
extreme historical example of the “tap-off” tendency in Canadian immigration policy.  
 The end of World War II ushered in an era of dramatic growth in industrial 
production and economic growth in Canada. This growth was made possible by large 
numbers of European (Western, Eastern, and Southern) immigrants in the immediate 
post-war period as Canada encouraged massive migration to fuel this economic 
expansion. As previously stated however, European reconstruction in the mid-1950s 
would restrict this source of labor for Canada and Québec. Demographic change and 
immigration policy designed to facilitate labor migration necessary for economic growth 
are the two foci of the remaining sections on Canada and Québec, respectively. 
2. Canada: Immigration Policies66
 The Canadian legacy of discriminatory immigration policies began to dissolve 
shortly after the end of World War II. In 1947, the Chinese Immigration Act was 
repealed, eliminating such racial measures such as the provincial “head tax” and outright 
limits on Chinese immigration. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration was 
created in 1950, yet preferences based on race continued to be enforced. Small changes 
occurred in the early 1950s when agreements with Ceylon, India, and Pakistan allowed 
                                                 
66 Background information for this section was derived from several sources including Cameron (2004); 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2000); Halli and Driedger (1999); Hawkins (1972); and See (2001). 
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limited numbers of immigrants necessary to sustain Canada’s post-War economic boom. 
This limited “de-racialization” would not be sustained as recession in the late 1950s 
created high unemployment and reduced immigration levels until 1962. It was not until 
the 1960s that wholesale change began to emerge in Canada’s immigration policies.  
 By 1960, Canada was confronted with the reality that their traditional sources of 
labor migration were evaporating. Western investment in European reconstruction proved 
successful and by the mid-1950s the European economy began to require its own sources 
of labor. What was formerly a trans-Atlantic migration system began to shift to an intra-
continental system (Potts 1990; Straubhaar 1988). Canada, along with the rest of the 
Western World, was faced with the need to develop and encourage new sources of labor 
migration. As previously shown, that solution was found in the developing states of the 
Global South.  
 In 1962, Canada began the process of facilitating migration from the largely non-
Caucasian regions of South Asia, Africa, South America, and the Caribbean. Immigration 
regulations were significantly liberalized with the elimination of race as a selection 
criterion, although other criteria such as education and “desirable” skills were granted 
higher selective authority. Canadians of European-descent also retained greater ability to 
sponsor immigrants from primarily European sources. This system also began to break 
down in 1966 when the Assisted Passage Loan Scheme (APLS)67, formerly limited to 
European immigrants, was extended to Caribbean migrants. Finally, in 1967 the 
                                                 
67 The Assisted Passage Loan Scheme was effectively a way for the federal government to subsidize 
immigration and encourage targeted economic growth. Loans were provided, interest-free, to desirable 
migrants with the understanding that the loan would be repaid within a two-year span and that the migrant 
would work for at least one year in a selected employment category. The expansion of this system in 1966 
prompted the Canadian government to begin charging interest on these loans in 1967.   
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Canadian immigration system was fully de-racialized with the implementation of 
selection criteria based on a systems of points with no preference to region or racial 
category. In 1970, the APLS was extended to all potential Canadian immigrants with an 
established interest rate of six percent.   
 These reforms led to massive increases in immigration, particularly from source 
regions of the Global South. The facilitatation of immigration was extended beyond 
traditional labor categories with the development of Canadian refugee protection 
programs. Canada’s support of the 1969 Africa Refugee Convention created a distinct 
category of refugee migrants with distinct selection criteria. These selection criteria were 
essential in allowing humanitarian migration from Czechoslovakia (1968), Tibet (1970), 
and Uganda (1972), to name a few. Domestic support for the liberalization of Canadian 
immigration was also expanded. Federal funding of immigration was expanded in 1974 
with the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program, which provided funding for new 
Canadian immigrant initial settlement.  
 The importance of labor migration to the health of the Canadian economy is 
indisputable, however larger national concerns would come to define issues of labor 
migration. Nationalist concerns over the increasingly diverse nature of immigrant 
populations and the potential for destabilizing existing legitimating structures became 
increasingly vocal. Nowhere in Canada was this more immediate than in Québec. The 
main point of contention from Québec was that the federal government did not 
understand the unique and distinct nature of Québec society and therefore could not make 
commensurate selection decisions. Many Québécois pointed to the potential for 
destabilizing French language and Québécois culture due to an immigrant base 
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determined to use English as their primary language of Canadian integration. The lack of 
selective control was a significant point of contention between the federal and provincial 
governments. In 1978, the Cullen-Couture Agreement gave Québec the power to select 
its own immigrants, albeit an autonomy with ultimate oversight by the federal 
government. 
 A new Immigration Act in 1978 continued large-scale organizational reforms by 
establishing four migrant categories: independent, family, assisted-relative, and 
humanitarian. The Act also eliminated migratory prohibitions for homosexuals, certain 
criminal convictions, and those with particular health problems such as epilepsy.  
 The Foreign Domestic Workers Program was implemented in 1982 as a way to 
provide a pool of temporary service workers to areas of demand in Canada. These 
temporary visa holders could apply for permanent resident status after two full years in 
Canada. Liberal immigration reforms experienced a political backlash in 1987 with 
debates over Bill C-55 and C-84. The former would create a separate Immigration and 
Refugee Board to evaluate credibility claims of those requesting refugee status. The latter 
was a legislative attempt, sponsored by the Mulroney administration, to discourage 
additional refugee claimants from arriving in Canada. Proponents viewed both measures 
as necessary to prevent potential migrants from taking advantage of Canadian refugee 
status designations. Québécois critics saw this as an opportunity for the federal 
government to increase its control over the immigration process and determination of 
migrant “desirability” (Hardy and Phillips 1998). Both bills were implemented, in less 
contentious forms, in 1989. 
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 In 1986, the business class designation of desirable immigrants was expanded to 
include an investor category. In effect, immigration was approved based on the migrant’s 
ability to invest in Canadian business or economic sectors. As Green and Green state: 
While business classes have never become more than a small part of the 
inflow, this represents a philosophical shift toward an idea that 
immigration could be used as a source of capital and as a means of 
establishing trade links (Green and Green 1999, 434; see also Head and 
Ries 1998). 
 
The minor demographic, but significant economic role of these business-class migrants 
offers an excellent insight into the economic nature of Canadian immigration. An 
example of this process was the desire to attract wealthy Hong Kong emigrants following 
the Chinese resumption of political authority in 1997 (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002; 
Green and Green 2004; Harrison 1996). Fears of economic repression led many monied 
residents of Hong Kong to consider leaving for more economically friendly 
environments. The facilitation of this movement through the business and investor 
categories led many of these migrants to choose Canada over other destinations.  
The early 1990s was a period of economic recession, but despite this traditional 
discouraging condition, the federal government announced its Five-Year Plan (1990) to 
increase immigration. This was the first time the federal government engaged in long-
term immigration planning and only the second time that immigration was promoted 
during a time of economic recession (the first being in 1962). The Québec-Canada 
Accord was also signed in 1991. The Accord gave full authority over immigration 
selection and settlement to Québec.  
 Refugee immigration was again restricted in 1992 and 1993, although in 1993 
Canada became the first state to issue gender-based guidelines designed to identify 
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gender persecution. The mid-1990s was a period of active reduction in immigration 
levels as well as a resumption of the Right of Landing Fee in which $975 was charged to 
all immigrants seeking permanent residency. 
 Problems of refugee detention, definition, and settlement largely defined 
Canadian immigration at the turn of the century. Canadian labor migration continues to 
be dominated by sources of the Global South with issues of integration and settlement 
being significant contemporary issues. In 2002, the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act was passed to reorganize and codify immigration changes and refugee claimant 
status.  
These policy shifts, including various mechanisms to manage immigration flows 
by the federal government, provide a brief overview of the changes in Canadian 
immigration after World War II. The reduction of European migration, development of 
Global South labor sources, and development of refugee and business class designations 
all denote managed contributions to the contemporary ethnic diversity existing in urban 
Canada. The following section examines, in detail, the changes that have resulted from 
these immigration policy changes. 
2a. Canada: Immigration Trends68
 The history of European immigration to Canada can be traced back to the 
beginnings of the country. The post-World War II era presented Canada with a rapidly 
changing world in which European labor migration was no longer viable in isolation. As 
                                                 
68 Statistical information used in this chapter (including sections on Canada and Québec immigration 
trends) was obtained from Citizenship and Immigration Canada statistical collections, archival collections, 
and databases.  Database information can be obtained electronically at 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/index-2.html#statistics.  
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figure 7 shows, several trends can be identified since the mid-1960s when Canadian 
immigration began to become a more open and inclusive process.  
The two most obvious trends are the dramatic decrease in European immigration 
from 1966 through 1985 and the equally striking increase in immigration from Asia. The 
decrease in European immigration is the result of continuing European economic 
recovery and growth that inhibited further labor emigration from the continent. 
Interestingly, European immigration rises in 1990 due in part to Soviet social and 
political economic reforms (Perestroika and Glastnost) in the mid-1980s and later by the 
pending dissolution of the Soviet Union. These changes greatly increased out-migration 
opportunities for many Eastern Europeans. 
 The massive increase in Asian migration is reflective of Canadian (along with 
most other core countries) liberalization/deracialization of immigration policies and its 
embrace of the Global South as a new source of labor migration. China and India are 
consistently at the top of Canadian immigration source countries both in terms of 
independent and business-class migration, with Pakistan, the Philippines, and South 
Korea ranked as the most recent top five source countries (see table 2).  
Table 2. Canada Immigration by Top Source Countries69
Source 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
China 17,533 18,526 19,785 29,119 36,723 40,328 33,237 36,116
India 21,286 19,614 15,372 17,430 26,103 27,869 28,822 24,560
Pakistan 7,760 11,239 8,090 9,297 14,196 15,345 14,156 12,330
Philippines 13,158 10,872 8,185 9,171 10,091 12,921 11,003 11,978
South 
Korea 3,157 4,001 4,917 7,216 7,635 9,604 7,324 7,086
 
                                                 
































Conversely, the top European source countries are, on average, Romania and 
Russia. The former Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina also appear as top source 
countries due to recent warfare and civil unrest in the region. This is reflective of 
Canada’s liberal refugee program, which also allowed similar increases in African 
emigration. Canadian refugee policy has been at the forefront of assisting African 
refugees since the 1969 Africa Refugee Convention. 
Deteriorating political economic conditions in many African regions have made 
this humanitarian immigration designation an important component to Canadian 
immigration as well as foreign policy. This is not to imply that all or even the majority of 
African migration is refugee based. In fact, African migration provides an interesting 
point of difference when Canadian and Québec immigration is compared.  
3. Québec: Immigration Policies70
 In 1966, the Union Nationale provincial government created the Ministère de  
l’immigration (MIQ) under the Ministère des Affaires culturelles71. Not only was Québec 
expanding the structure and power of its state apparatus, it was also creating a political 
foundation from which to differentiate Québec from the rest of Canada. Federal control 
over immigration was viewed as insufficient for Québec’s needs. More to the point, by 
allowing federal control over immigration into Québec to continue, the province was 
actively handing Anglophone Canada the tools to effectively dilute the Francophone 
influence in Québec, and eventually Canada.    
                                                 
70 Background information for this section was derived from several sources including Rossard (1967); 
Cameron (2004); Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2000); Doran and Babby (1995); Halli and 
Driedger (1999); and Pâquet (1997). 
71 Ministry of Immigration under the Ministry of Cultural Affairs 
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 In 1968, the province struck an agreement with the federal government to place 
Québec officials in several overseas immigration offices to better monitor the selection of 
potential immigrants to Québec. This agreement led to the 1975 Entente Bienvenue-
Andras72 in which Québec immigration officials were granted the authority to interview 
and recommend the selection of specific immigrants to federal immigration officers.  
 The 1976 Immigration Act presented an additional opportunity for the federal 
government to delegate a portion of immigration power and responsibilities to provincial 
governments. Section 108 of the Act allows federal-provincial interaction with respect to 
provincial immigration and settlement patterns. This allowance has led to several federal-
provincial agreements on immigration, with the 1978 Cullen-Couture Agreement 
representing the most significant agreement to result from this policy provision. This 
agreement allowed greater autonomy in the selection of immigrants destined for Québec. 
The Cullen-Couture Agreement represented a significant step toward autonomous 
Québec immigration policy, but the goal of fully Québec control over immigration 
processes would not come until 1991.  
The Agreement was a victory for the PQ (elected in 1976) as it explicitly 
recognized that Québec immigration must contribute to Québec’s cultural and social 
health. This statement of federal recognition was accompanied by practical reforms 
allowing Québec immigration officials more authority in selecting immigrants bound for 
Québec. In addition, the Agreement granted Québec greater authority in establishing 
financial, skill, and other selection criteria. The Cullen-Couture Agreement was a 
                                                 
72 The Entente Bienvenue-Andras was the result of continuing dissatisfaction on the part of the Québec 
government in matters of immigration control. The Entente was the result of ongoing negotiations between 
Canadian and Québec government immigration officials designed to grant increased immigration authority 
to Québec. 
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significant step in Québec’s development as a state: it had begun the process of gaining 
official autonomy in its demographic development.  
 Québec’s authority in matters of immigration was expanded in 1991 with the 
signing of the Canada-Québec Accord. This agreement grants sole authority for 
immigrant selection to Québec as well as sole responsibility to provide equivalent 
settlement and integration programs. Québec is the only Canadian province to retain 
authority over selection criteria, although there are several other federal-provincial 
agreements that grant provincial advisory authority to recommend policy and selection 
changes. Québec is also the only Canadian province to have independent immigration 
offices for the sole purpose of promoting immigration to the province. Québec operates 
such offices in Argentina, Austria, Belgium, France, Hong Kong, Mexico, and Syria that 
serve as regional administrative and recruitment centers. 
 The most recent federal Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2002) does not 
alter the Canada-Québec Accord in any way. The federal government retains authority 
over total immigration inflows and establishing overall admissibility criteria (largely 
health requirements), but selection, administration, and settlement remains the exclusive 
responsibility of Québec. This situation is one of the strongest indicators of Québec’s 
status as an autonomous state entity. The increasing authority of Québec over 
immigration policies and practices is reflected in the analysis of immigration to the 
province since the mid-1960s.   
3a. Québec: Immigration Trends 
 Immigration flows into Québec reflect the same shift in source region during the 
1960s and 1970s. High European immigration typified the Québec immigration 
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environment as it did in the larger Canadian case. In fact, until 1980, European 
immigration constituted an even greater proportion of total Québec immigration than in 
the larger Canadian total. When the immigration source countries for Québec and Canada 
are compared the proportions are strikingly similar, that is until 1995 (see figure 7 and 
figure 8). After the Canada-Québec Accord in 1991, Québec gained full control over the 
selection and recruitment process. This is dramatically reflected in the source country 
shift that occurs in Québec immigration starting in 1995. As total immigration from Asia 
rises for Canada, the total Asian immigration flow into Québec actually decreases (from 
21,567 in 1990 to 9,329 in 2000). Instead of the trend of increased Asian migration, 
Québec shows increases in African (from 4,732 in 1990 to 9,680 in 2000) and South and 
Central American (including the Caribbean) (from 4,314 in 1990 to 7,830 in 2000) 
migration.  
This difference in immigration source regions is made more explicit when 
Canadian immigration is controlled to exclude Québec (figure 9). This comparison shows 
a similar pattern of source region shift from Europe to the Global South in both Canada 
and Québec, thus confirming the initial contention that a shift in global labor supply due 
to increasing economic globalization has effectively diversified the demographic 
composition of core states, in this case Canada and Québec respectively. 
The power of states to control regional migration patterns is an additional 
observation that can be made from the comparison of Canadian and Québec immigration. 
Canadian immigration reforms in the 1960s contributed to the rapid growth in migration 





























































replicated in Québec until the early 1990s when Québec immigration controls could be 
fully enforced by the Québec state.  
The result is a concerted effort to recruit and promote migration from regions 
(also of the Global South) with Francophone cultural and linguistic affinity. 
This has led to increased recruitment and migration from former French colonies in North 
and Western Africa and the Caribbean. It is also interesting to note that European 
immigration to Québec has also increased in recent years, although African migration 
constitutes the dominant source region for Québec immigration (14,082 in 2004, 
representing 32% of total Québec immigration). 
From this cursory comparison of Canadian and Québec immigration we can 
conclude that both have, in fact, conformed to the dominant systemic shift in the global 
labor supply system and encouraged increased migration from regions of the Global 
South (as shown in figures 8 and 9, respectively). 
Québec, in line with its nationalist project and state development since the Quiet 
Revolution, has worked within this systemic change to recruit and encourage migration 
from specific regions of the Global South. The result in both cases, however, has been a 
rapid and consistent increase in the ethno-cultural diversity of new arrivals in Canada and 
Québec. This dissertation argues that ethno-cultural diversification in Canada and Québec 
is the result of increased global market integration and shifts in global labor supply. 
Economic growth opportunities afforded by increased global market integration in core 
states is made possible through increased labor migration.  
This is particularly true in Canada and Québec where regressive population 
growth presents long-term economic problems with respect to labor market 
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maintenance73. Diversity in Canadian and Québec immigration is the result of shifts in 
source regions in the global labor supply system. Therefore, ethno-cultural diversification 
is the result of labor market demand motivated by economic growth that is, in turn, 
motivated by increasing global market integration.     
This rapid ethnic/racial diversification (only in the past 40 years) has created a 
situation of social change and a series of national demands to which the state must 
respond. These social changes have been dually motivated by integration into the global 
market economy and changes in the global labor supply system, thus globalization-
motivated change has pressured the individual state to react in turn. Major questions that 
must be answered are how the impact of these changes has affected state policy-making 
processes? If global market integration inhibits state economic policy, what avenues for 










                                                 
73 In order to maintain current population levels, exclusive of immigration, in Canada and Québec the 
native fertility rate must be 2.06. Current birth rates in Canada are 1.5 and in Québec, 1.46. Neither rates 
are sufficient to sustain current population levels nor meet increased labor demands resulting from 
continued economic growth (Statistics Canada 2003; Dai et al. 1996). 
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Chapter Seven  
Multiculturalism, Interculturalism, and the Management of Culture 
 
 The confluence of international political economic and domestic demographic 
change poses a challenge to both Canada and Québec. On the one hand, demand for labor 
continues to exceed domestic Canadian supplies with the expansion of source migration 
to the Global South providing an immediate remedy. On the other hand, the rapid urban 
diversification that accompanied this solution carried significant problems for both 
Canadian and Québec nationalist projects. The development of multicultural policies in 
Canada, and later intercultural policies in Québec, offer an explicit example of the 
Polanyian “double movement” in which the state must actively work to maintain balance 
between the demands of a neo-liberal market economic system and a national population 
demanding protections from these systemic forces. This chapter chronicles the emergence 
and evolution of both Canadian multicultural policy and Québec intercultural policy in 
the context of this “double movement,” albeit with a focus on culture that is much more 
explicit than in Polanyi’s original thesis.  Figure 10 provides a brief chronology of 
Canadian multicultural policies and institutional development in support of the following 
section.   
1. Canada: Multicultural Policy74
 Canada’s unique multicultural policy (the first of its kind among capitalist 
democracies) was the result of the 1963 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and  
                                                 
74 Background information used to compile this section was derived from sources including Abu-Laban and 
Gabriel (2002); Hawkins (1988); Jansen (2005); and archival sources from Heritage Canada, the Ministry 
of Multiculturalism, and the Ministry of State.  
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Chronology of Canadian Multicultural Policies and Institutions 
 
1963 – Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism commences 
1971 – Policy Statement by Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau, “Multiculturalism within a  
Bilingual Framework 
1972 – Creation of the Multicultural Directorate under the Department of the Secretary of  
State 
1973 – Creation of the Ministry of Multiculturalism 
1982 – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms officially recognizes the multicultural  
character of Canadian society (Section 27) 
1984 – Special Parliamentary Committee on Visible Minorities produces the Equality  
Now! report emphasizing the need to enforce non-discrimination legislation 
1985 – House of Commons Standing Committee on Multiculturalism is created 
1987 – Standing Committee on Multiculturalism publishes a report advocating for the  
creation of a Department of Multiculturalism and a stronger policy of 
multiculturalism designed to address discrimination.  
1988 – Multiculturalism Act provides singular legislative support for defining Canadian  
society as multicultural and reinforces anti-discriminatory language of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. 
1991 – Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship is created with a mandate to  
improve race relations and cross-cultural understanding as well as support 
minority community development and cultural preservation. 
1993 – Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship is divided. Multicultural  
programs would be subsumed within the Department of Canadian Heritage and 
Citizenship programs would be subsumed within Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada. 
1994 – Liberal administration of Jean Chretien eliminates federal settlements payments  
for federal actions deemed illegal and grievous by various groups (including 
formerly interred Japanese-Canadian and several Native Canadian groups). This 
action reversed years of settlement payments by Liberal and Conservative 
administrations to aggrieved groups. 
1996 – Canadian Race Relations Foundation is created by the federal government with an  
initial endowment of $24 million. The CRRF assumed race relations research and 
monitoring responsibilities formerly of the Department of Multiculturalism. 
1997 – Comprehensive review of Canadian multiculturalism revised the federal goals of  
multiculturalism to include: identity (recognition of ethno-cultural diversity 
within a Canadian national context), civic participation (promoting democratic 
participation among immigrant and minority community groups), and social 
justice (with respect to equality and non-discrimination). The federal institutional 
capacity to meet these goals must now be accomplished with a staff of three 
within the Multiculturalism section of Heritage Canada. 
 
Figure 10. Chronology of Canadian Multicultural Policies and Institutions  
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Biculturalism (B&B Commission), which was in turn the result of the equally unique 
dual colonial legacy of French and English “founding peoples” (Jansen 2005). The 
dramatic and immediate changes that occurred in Québec as a result of the PLQ-led Quiet 
Revolution75 motivated the federal government to “explore new approaches toward 
greater Canadian unity” (Canada 1973). Canada’s long history of promoting a 
specifically Eurocentric76 nationalism through immigration regulations and nationalist 
cultural policies was increasingly challenged by its entry into global economic and labor 
systems after World War II. Marc Lehman points to the post-war changes as being the 
end of Canada’s traditional national definitions: 
For the most part, central authorities dismissed the value of cultural 
heterogeneity, considering racial and ethnic differences as inimical to 
national interests and detrimental to our character and integrity. Only the 
massive influx of post-Second World War immigrants from Europe 
prompted central authorities to rethink the role and status of “other 
ethnics” within the evolving dynamic of Canadian society (Lehman 1999, 
3).  
 
This post-war reality was, on the whole, not a significant challenge to the Canadian 
national “vision” due to the fact that these were largely Caucasian migrations from 
various regions in Europe. It was not until the 1960s that shifts in labor supply to the 
Global South resulted in a more racially and ethno-cultural diverse immigrant population. 
                                                 
75 As a final statement of clarification, the Quiet Revolution is the historical culmination of long-standing 
Québécois nationalism, not a singular and isolated event denoting the beginning of any Francophone 
nationalist project. The political economic reforms undertaken by Jean Lesage and the PLQ begin the 
process of building an autonomous Québec state. The existence and cohesion of the Québec nation is not in 
question.  
76 This Eurocentric nationalism was specifically Western European and it could be argued, British. Ethnic 
diversity was not viewed as a positive social trait. In fact, Canadian leaders such as King and Diefenbaker 
consistently lionized the British nature of Canadian political, legal, social, and cultural national structures. 
The shift in immigration by Sifton at the turn to the 20th century brought thousands of Eastern Europeans to 
Canada. The active recruitment of Ukrainian groups for agricultural settlement in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan would return in the 1960s as larger number of Southern and Eastern Europeans immigrated 
to Canada following the war.   
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 Lehman’s focus is on what would be termed the “Third Force” of Canadian 
political demography: those who did not claim aboriginal, English, or French ancestry yet 
did claim Canadian citizenship. The formation of the B&B Commission in response to 
the acceleration of tension between English and French Canada and its framing as a 
bicultural conflict in a bicultural nation-state irked the many “Third Force” citizens of 
Canada. The most visible and vocal of these groups self-identified as Ukrainian and many 
traced their “Canadian-ness” back to the opening of the Canadian West in the late-1800s. 
Their stake in the Canadian nation, it was argued, constituted more than a subservient 
role in the greater national society (Bibby 1990; Kelner and Kallen 1974; Smith 1981). 
Their vocal opposition resulted in the production of an additional section to the B&B 
Commission’s report, Book IV, “The Cultural Contribution of other Ethnic Groups” 
(Canada 1970). 
 The role of Ukrainian advocacy groups in the “Third Force” response to the B&B 
Commission has been well documented and the existence of a well-organized Canadian 
population of non-aboriginal, English, or French ancestry was essential to the success of 
the movement. I would argue that Lehman’s point that the influx of European post-war 
immigration be taken more seriously as a motivating force in generating Book IV of the 
B&B Commission Report. Commonly, studies of the B&B Report view existing Eastern 
and Southern European groups as primary motivators for the inclusion of Book IV 
(Armour 1981; Bell 1992; Brooks 2002; UCC 1968). This fact is not in dispute. I would 
add that the changes in Canadian immigration policy and shifts in global labor supply 
also contributed to the Commission’s decision to add Book IV to its official report. 
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Passaris comments on the inexorable connection between immigration and economic 
growth: 
Economic considerations have always been a paramount influence over 
the scope and substance of Canada’s immigration program. Indeed, it is 
those economic considerations that have determined the gradual change in 
the multicultural composition of immigrations to Canada in the post World 
War II period and are likely to define the more substantive ethnocultural 
diversity and racial pluralism of immigrants admitted to Canada in the 
future (Passaris 1986, 17). 
 
In fact, by the time Book IV was published, Canadian immigration had been completely 
de-racialized and the cumulative effect of these policy changes resulted in gradual 
increases in Asian and South and Central American immigration as early as 1970 (see 
Chapter Six). The combination of a more diverse European immigrant population and the 
expansion of immigration policies to include migrants from the Global South resulted in 
a rapid increase in Canadian diversity. The fact that Canada’s national demographic 
composition was rapidly changing as a result of its core political economic position in the 
post-World War II world could not be ignored.   
The confluence of issues organized around ethnic recognition movements 
presented a significant problem for the Canadian government. Not only was Québécois 
nationalism a significant threat to Canadian stability and cohesion, but Third Force and 
First Nations groups were also demanding recognition. Federal attempts to examine and 
recognize the bilingual and bicultural nature of Canadian society seemed to be expanding 
into a multicultural context in which all Canadian ethno-cultural groups were contending 
for recognition. The development of Canadian multicultural policy, however, embraced 
these contending demands in the creation of a national cultural framework intended to 
promote a singular Canadian nationalism.    
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1a. The Institutionalization of Multiculturalism 
The diversification of the Canadian population was underway by the early 1970s; 
however, it is important to note that the initial implementation of the Multicultural Policy 
in 1971 had little to do with diversifying immigration trends. This policy was, in effect, a 
statement of Canadian nationalism that was intended to address lingering issues and 
complaints of ethnic minorities with respect to their cultural identification and survival. 
In other words, the 1971 Multicultural Policy was a direct result of the three forces 
(aboriginal, Québécois, and the diverse “other” category, largely comprised of Eastern 
European groups) and their potential to disrupt the national stability of Canada77. More 
importantly, the Trudeau administration’s focus on national economic development 
required a consistent and stable definition of Canadian nationalism to harness the 
productive capacity and potential of the Canadian labor force, including non-Anglo 
Canadians.    
 In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced a new federal government 
framework designed to foster a unique and inclusive form of Canadian nationalism: 
multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. The policy had four central components: 
(1) to allow minority cultures the opportunity to retain traditions and self-identification, 
(2) an equal opportunity mechanism to facilitate the removal of economic stratification 
                                                 
77 Polanyi refers to these destabilizing effects in economic terms; specifically, his “tension of classes” 
phrase refers to social strain and instability produced in times of high unemployment, high prices, and other 
conditions producing socio-economic hardships. The same argument is made in Piven and Cloward’s 
(1993) conceptualization of the rise and fall of welfare regulatory efforts on the part of the advanced 
capitalist state. In this case, the effects of global market integration are increasingly articulated through a 
cultural medium namely, ethno-cultural diversification. As the state increases its capacity to manage and 
control national cultural definitions and symbols, maintaining a stable national cultural environment 
becomes necessary for ensuring control over these universal (and monolithic) definitions of national 
culture. Strong ethno-nationalist sentiment (outside of the “official” national culture) is destabilizing 
because it withdraws legitimacy for a universal, state supported nationalist definition. 
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based on race and ethnicity, (3) to increase inter-group communication for the purpose of 
education and fostering understanding, and (4) to facilitate the acquisition of either 
English or French language skills by immigrants (Trudeau 1971).  
 In order to support these policy initiatives, the Multicultural Directorate was 
created under authority of the Department of the Secretary State in 1972. One year later 
the Directorate was expanded into an autonomous Ministry of Multiculturalism with the 
added responsibilities of monitoring governmental compliance with non-discrimination 
measures prompted by the Multicultural Policy.  Almost immediately, the institutional 
responsibilities of the Ministry of Multiculturalism began to shift. While the initial policy 
statement focused on recognition and the protection of relative cultural autonomy within 
the context of a bilingual Canadian nation-state, the primary mission of the Ministry 
became the facilitation of equal economic opportunity and economic integration of newly 
arrived immigrants. These responsibilities were hampered by the lack of legislative 
authority to enforce the edicts of non-discrimination.  
   The need for non-discrimination legislation grew exponentially in the decade of 
the 1970s. Although shifts in immigration source regions did not provide a primary 
motivation for the initial 1971 Multicultural Policy, these shifts would come to define 
both Canadian diversity as well as drive multicultural policy shift in response to this rapid 
demographic transition. Lehman makes a particularly direct connection between the rise 
in ethno-cultural diversity and changes in multicultural policies: 
The architects of the 1971 policy had perceived barriers to social 
adaptation and economic success largely in linguistic or cultural terms. 
The marked increase in the flow of visible minority immigrants whose 
main concerns were employment, housing, education and fighting 
discrimination required a shift in policy thinking. Equality through the 
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removal of racially discriminatory barriers became the main focus of 
multicultural programs and race relations policies and programs were put 
in place to discover, isolate and combat racial discrimination at personal 
and institutional levels (Lehman 1999, 5). 
 
 The need to match ethno-cultural protections with economic development would come to 
define Canadian multicultural policy. Until 1982, however, the Multicultural Policy was 
simply a federal initiative with no legal authority. The larger goal was to encourage the 
national population to accept the reality of Canadian multiculturalism, while at the same 
time promoting a unified Canadian nationalism. In 1977, the Minister of State for 
Multiculturalism, Norman Cafik, commented on the motivation for official 
multiculturalism: 
We don’t have a second class culture or a first class culture in Canada. We 
have a multicultural society not because we created it that way as a 
government, but because that’s the way it is (Cafik 1977). 
 
Cafik’s statement is typical of policy defenses in that his arguments present a state 
seeking to support the nation during a period of dramatic social change. That is, the state 
is simply reacting to socio-economic changes outside of its control and therefore must 
respond in a reactionary fashion to protect its national population. His implication that the 
state did not create a multicultural society is flawed as evidenced by the previous chapter. 
This implies that the “reactionary” nature of multicultural policy is not accurate.  
Multicultural policy supports the diversification of Canada and therefore 
maintains a proactive function. By presenting multicultural policy as reactionary, the 
Canadian state is able to publicly absolve itself of complicity in facilitating socio-
economic conditions requiring political attention. In other words, the Canadian state 
presents itself as protecting Canadian national populations from social changes motivated 
 232
by external forces and processes. The fact that the multicultural policy also facilitates 
ethno-cultural changes promoted by global market integration is overlooked in the public 
presentation of Cafik’s policy statement.  
 Cafik was correct in his assessment of the historical nature of Canadian 
multicultural society. At no time in Canada’s post-colonization era was there a single 
ethno-cultural entity that existed without challenge. Cafik was incorrect in his general 
statement about the lack of culpability on the part of the Canadian state. As chapters five 
and six have shown, the Canadian federal state actively promotes ethno-cultural 
diversification in support of economic growth. From the recruitment of Ukrainian and 
other Eastern Europeans in the Western Expansion era to the current shift of the global 
labor supply system to the Global South, the federal government has relied on 
immigration to fuel economic growth. The labor required to produce economic growth is 
increasingly of an ethnic and culturally diverse nature. Therefore, the Canadian federal 
government had a strong role in the ethno-cultural diversification of Canada due to its 
willingness to integrate into the global market economic system. The collapse of any 
semblance of national economic protections in the late 1970s (after the first Trudeau 
administration) required that expanded economic growth be accompanied by continued 
immigration and accelerated ethno-cultural diversification. The task of the federal 
government, unencumbered by economic protections, would be how to manage this rapid 
diversification while ensuring a stable economic (production) environment.  
 The 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as part of the Constitution Act, gave 
legal support and authority to the Ministry of Multiculturalism with respect to the 
enforcement of non-discrimination. For the first time, Canada was legally able to 
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prosecute discriminatory actions in hiring, housing, and public interaction. The Charter 
defined Canadian society as being one of equal opportunity, particularly with respect to 
the demographic composition of the country. Section 27 of the Charter specifically 
codifies the multicultural character of the Canadian nation, while Section 15 specifically 
provides legal discriminatory protection for all individuals “in particular…based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religious, sex, age, or mental or physical disability” 
(Canada 1982). 
 The Charter provided important legal authority for anti-discrimination goals of the 
revised multicultural policy78. As the face of Canadian immigration continued to grow 
increasingly diverse, the federal government began to realize that the official recognition 
of cultural diversity and legal protection from discrimination required additional 
augmentation. In 1984, the Special Parliamentary Committee on Visible Minorities was 
commissioned and one year later the House of Commons created a Standing Committee 
on Multiculturalism. On the recommendation of these two Committees, Canadian 
multiculturalism was officially codified by the 1988 Multiculturalism Act. 
 The Multiculturalism Act did not institute any new changes to Canadian 
multicultural policy. What it did was provide specific legislation officially defining 
Canada as a multicultural society, protecting individuals from discrimination, continuing 
the process of cultural diversity education and understanding, and facilitating cultural 
preservation for ethno-cultural minorities. The specificity of the Multiculturalism Act 
meant that the sporadic mention of multicultural and diversity protection in the Charter of 
                                                 
78 Enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation was limited within the Ministry of Multiculturalism. The 
Ministry was able to monitor compliance and cite offenders, but had no adjudicative authority. Ultimately, 
the institution of official multiculturalism was enforced by the court system through adherence to both the 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Multiculturalism Act.   
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Rights and Freedoms was superseded. The Act also created the Department of 
Multiculturalism and Citizenship that eventually commenced full operations in 1991. The 
responsibilities of the Department were three-fold. The primary mission was monitoring 
race relations (for example, receiving and evaluating discrimination complaints) followed 
by cultural preservation (largely through grant support for cultural education programs 
and celebratory functions) and then community support (facilitating integration activities 
and sponsoring events designed to encourage inter-group dialog). This emphasis on race 
relations is an important shift that was prompted by the rapid diversification of urban 
Canada and reflective of the changing nature of national demands in the face of these 
local changes wrought by global market integration.  
Where early multicultural policies concentrated on cultural preservation 
and intercultural sharing through promotion of ethnic presses and 
festivals, the rejuvenated multiculturalism program emphasized cross-
cultural understanding and the attainment of social and economic 
integration through removal of discriminating barriers, institutional 
change and affirmative action to equalize opportunity (Lehman 1999, 7). 
 
1b. The Decline of Institutional Multiculturalism 
The institutional position of multiculturalism led many neo-liberal critics to 
question the effectiveness of state spending on multicultural programs. The nearly 
universal neo-liberal calls to decrease state spending on social service provision heavily 
affected the state decision to downsize the mission and institution of official 
multiculturalism. As the Canadian state became more and more integrated into the global 
market system, the more intense and persistent the calls to reduce and/or privatize the 
state’s role in social services.    
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As a result, the institutional emphasis on official multiculturalism was revised yet 
again in 1993 as the Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship was downsized to 
become a subdivision within the Canadian Heritage Department. The administration of 
federal multicultural policies was removed as a primary emphasis and placed on par with 
official language programs, among many other programs of national interest (media, 
national park administration, and support for the arts). 
 Canadian multicultural policy was revised again in 1996 as a result of increased 
criticism from many neo-liberal and national interests. The renewed emphases returned to 
the original 1971 policy statement in that Canadian multiculturalism would increasingly 
emphasize the recognition of cultural identity while de-emphasizing the authoritative role 
of multiculturalism in managing issues of discrimination and diversity. The new policy 
focused on the development of community-centered initiatives to promote inter-cultural 
understanding and cooperation. The multicultural program within the Canadian Heritage 
Department was largely divorced from larger race relation issues with the establishment 
of the public-private Canadian Race Relations Foundation (CRRF) in 199779. Initially 
funded by a federal grant, the CRRF is now a completely self-financed organization that 
is responsible for generating research and awareness of racial/ethnic relations and 
problems in Canada. The CRRF has no legal enforcement authority and the federal 
                                                 
79 The Canadian Race Relations Foundation was established by an act of Parliament in 1996 and initially 
funded by a $24 million grant. The Foundation is run on a corporate model with a Board of Directors with 
day-to-day operations administered by an executive officer. A descriptive statement on the CRRF website 
(www.crr.ca) offers a more complete view of the public-private model of operation:  
CRRF is a Crown corporation with a national mandate operating at arms length from the 
federal government from which we receive no funding. Our primary operating funds are 
derived from the investment income on the one-time endowment fund.   
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government has largely returned to the general non-discrimination statements inherent in 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
This de-institutionalization of multiculturalism in Canada was the result of neo- 
liberal attacks on perceived excesses in both state spending and state involvement in 
market economic processes (Frow 1999; Joppke 2004). In fact, Mitchell goes even 
further in declaring multiculturalism and neo-liberal ideology incompatible (Mitchell 
2004). This conclusion is consistent with the excursus on liberalism and multiculturalism 
in Chapter Two illustrating attempts to reconcile these seemingly contradictory forces. I 
argue in this dissertation that the conflict between (neo) liberal ideology and 
multiculturalism is, in fact, indicative of the “double movement” process of neo-liberal 
market encroachment and national protectionist demands. The incompatibility of 
liberalism and multiculturalism (as evidenced by Taylor, Kymlicka, Joppke, Mitchell, 
and others) is the manifestation of neo-liberal (global political economic) pressures 
generating a non-liberal (national protectionist) reaction.  
The issue of multicultural (and later intercultural) policy is that it is designed to 
mediate these impulses (liberal and non-liberal) – thus we can view the mechanics of the 
“double movement” through such policies. In other words, the effects of global market 
integration encourage social destabilization at which time national populations demand 
protections from these destabilizing effects. The state must negotiate these dual pressures 
through policies intended to meet both demands (global market integrative and national 
protectionist). This dynamic will be revisited in the final section of this chapter as well as 
in the following chapter.     
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 Returning to the example of Canadian multicultural policy, the return to the 
liberal foundations of the Charter is a significant development. In view of neo-liberal 
critics, the institutionalism of federal multiculturalism could be easily replaced with a 
simple judicial adherence to the liberal equality espoused in the Charter. The pressures of 
adherence to the neo-liberal ideology of limited state spending and control have been 
identified as a ubiquitous condition of global market integration (Baiman et al. 2000; 
Boyer and Drache 1996; Harris and Seid 2000). The case of multiculturalism’s decline as 
an institutional entity in Canada seems particularly telling of this process.    
This decentralization of multicultural responsibilities beginning in 1993 is a direct 
result of these neo-liberal pressures to reduce social spending. Increasing criticism of 
multicultural programs in general centered on program costs (Breitkreuz 1997), the 
inability to enforce non-discrimination legislation (Jansen 2005), the incompatibility of 
multicultural ideology and Canadian social welfare distribution (Barbaro 1995) and the 
ideological danger to a cohesive Canadian nation-state (Barry 2001; Bissoondath 1994). 
The declining role of multicultural policy in Canada is reflected in consistent decreases in 
federal funding and the privatization of one of the once central responsibilities of the 
Department of Multiculturalism. Of course, one of the central tenants of neo-liberal 
economic governance is decreased state spending for social services that hinder economic 
growth.  
The decline of institutional multiculturalism in the 1990s represented a success 
for neo-liberal critics; however the program continues to play a significant role in support 
of Canadian immigration goals. In fact, Canadian business entities now support the ideal 
of multiculturalism as being a facilitator of skilled and monied labor migration (Abu-
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Laban 2003; Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002). The current challenge is no longer from neo-
liberal global market proponents, but from national popular groups claiming that 
multiculturalism as a state policy has failed to adequately provide a common socio-
cultural medium. Critics argue that national cohesion and stability (see footnote 4 in this 
chapter) are threatened by a policy that, in fact, creates divisions and separation as 
opposed to provided its promised unity under a common nationalist environment (Bibby 
1990; Bissoondath 1994; Gwyn 1995).     
Before I enter into a discussion of increasing national popular dissatisfaction with 
multicultural policies, it is necessary to compare the emergence and decline of 
multiculturalism with that of interculturalism in Québec. This comparison will illuminate 
one of the central nationalist pressures facing the federal multicultural policy and provide 
a more fluid transition into the final concluding section of this chapter.      
2. Québec: Intercultural Policy 
 Official Canadian multiculturalism, particularly the 1971 policy framework and 
the 1988 Multiculturalism Act, is a significant achievement. Both the policy framework 
and the legislation of official multiculturalism were the first of their kind in the world. 
The promotion of official multiculturalism on the part of the federal government was 
initially intended to define the parameters of the Canadian nation and promote a specific 
articulation of Canadian nationalism as inclusive and culturally egalitarian. Specifically, 
the federal government understood the changing nature of the Canadian population as an 
inevitable outcome of larger socio-economic forces.  
Canada should set its immigration levels on the basis of long-term 
objectives, rather than on that of short-term considerations…Given the 
uncertainties involved in deciding both on an appropriate population size 
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and on its fellow age composition, Canada should follow that course 
which…is, a less restrictive policy than that currently in place…In 
recommending this approach to immigration policy, this Commission is 
fully aware of the cultural, linguistic, economic and racial implications 
(Canada 1985, 668). 
  
The threat of globalization, it would seem, played an important role in the initial 
conceptualization of Canadian multiculturalism – as did Québec nationalism. In fact, the 
original motivation for official multicultural policies as a protection against the dangers 
of cultural homogenization: 
…Central to the Government’s philosophy is the belief that cultural 
diversity throughout the world is swiftly being eroded by the impact of 
industrial technology, mass communications and urbanization. Much 
attention has been given to the denaturing and depersonalization of man by 
mass society, mass-produced culture and entertainment and the ever-
increasing development of large impersonal institutions.  
 
One of man’s basic needs is a sense of belonging and a good deal of 
contemporary social unrest, at all age levels, exists because this need has 
not been met. Ethnic groups are not the only way in which the need for 
belonging can be met, but they can be an important one in the development 
of Canadian society…Ethnic loyalties need not, and usually do not detract 
from wider loyalties of community and country. Canadian identity will not 
be undermined by multiculturalism. Indeed, the Government sincerely 
believes that cultural pluralism is the very essence of Canadian identity 
(Canada 1973, 1-2). 
 
Trudeau’s 1971 policy framework included two non-stated but implied nationalistic 
goals. The first was to differentiate Canada from the United States with respect to its 
national culture and independent nature. The second was to address the threat of 
Québécois sovereignty by clearly defining Canada as a diverse nation within a singular 
nationalist framework.  
 The first aspect of differentiation from the United States is more overt. Kelner and 
Kallen (1974) point to numerous statements made by Trudeau concerning the nation-
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building nature of the 1971 Multicultural Policy. Of significance is the desire of the 
Trudeau administration to distinguish Canadians from Americans through ideological 
uniqueness, which could be represented by social policies reflecting the recognition of a 
recognized cultural pluralism in contrast with the “melting pot” model of assimilation to 
the south (Bibby 1990; Breton 1986).  More to the extreme, scholars have pointed to past 
animosity toward Americans due to perceived “economic and cultural imperialism” 
(Richmond 1978, 120) as a broader cultural motivation for incorporating such a 
diametrically different policy on diversity and culture. 
 The second implied goal of the 1971 multicultural framework was to reduce the 
legitimacy claims of the Québec sovereignty movement.  
He [Trudeau] repudiated dualism; the concept of two nations or of a 
binational Canada; and even biculturalism, as advocated by the B&B 
Commission…He was implicitly asking his fellow Quebecers to trade 
their identity as a people against the promise of bilingualism. 
 
He [Trudeau] advanced the concept of multiculturalism…thus reducing 
the global culture of French-speaking Québec to one ethnic component of 
the Canadian mosaic. They (Québécois) would have accepted 
multiculturalism if it had not confused their own global culture with the 
ethnic cultures of immigrants (Balthazar 1995, 47). 
 
This was understood implicitly by the Québec government and national 
population, but largely denied by federal government officials (Gendron and 
Sarra-Bournet 1998; Maclure 2003; Vachon and Langlais 1983). 
Public opinion in Québec about federal multicultural policy ranges from skeptical 
to suspicious to openly hostile (Charbonneau and Maheu 1973; McRoberts 1997). The 
announcement of the federal policy in 1971 by a Trudeau administration already critical 
of Québécois nationalism motivated a string of protective measures in Québec.  
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Figure 11 provides a brief chronology of Québec language legislation and 
intercultural policy development in support of the following two sections.  
2a. Québec Language Legislation 
 In 1974, Bill 22 (Loi sur le langue officielle80) was passed by the Québec National 
Assembly. The primary purpose of the law was to grant French official language status. 
The law also created an administrative body, Régie de la langue française81, to oversee 
enforcement of language legislation and other requirements such as making French the 
official language of provincial administration, legal contracts, provincial advertisement, 
and encourage French as the primary language of business. The law contained protections 
for English-speakers, including the ability to “opt-out” of French-only requirements at the 
behest of both parties. The law was widely criticized by the Anglophone minority for its 
promotion of French as an official provincial language while the federal policy required 
both French and English as official languages. Many Francophones were disappointed in 
the law due to its compromises in allowing Anglophones to opt-out of the dominant 
culture and language.  
 The election of the PQ in 1976 provided additional opportunity to increase the 
dominance of French throughout Québec. Bill 101 (Charte de la langue française82) was 
passed in 1977 and eliminated any question of the linguistic or cultural nature of Québec. 
The measure required that all public administrative, legal/judicial, educational, and 
business entities use French as its operational language. All public advertisements were 
required to be posted in French only. The most far-reaching aspect of Bill 101 was its  
                                                 
80 Official Language Law 
81 Office of the French Language 
82 Charter of the French Language 
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Chronology of Chronology of the Québec Intercultural Policy Framework 
Language Legislation 
1969 – Loi pour promouvoir la langue française au Québec (Bill 63) (Law for the  
Promotion of the French Language) is passed by the Québec National Assembly 
giving parents the right to have their children educated in the French language. 
1974 – Loi sue le langue officielle (Bill 22). The “Official Language Law” establishes  
French as the single official language of Québec 
1974 – Establishment of the Régie de la langue français (Office of the French Language) 
1977 – Bill 101, Charte de la langue français (Charter of the French Language), is  
passed requiring French as the legal, political, and public language of Québec. In 
addition, the children of new arrivals (immigrants) to Québec were required to be 
educated in French-language educational institutions. 
1982 – Supreme Court of Canada rules that Loi 101 is discriminatory under the  
multiculturalism and equality sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. 
1984 – Bill 142 is passed ensuring that basic social services, including health care, are  
available in English. 
1991 – Bill 120 is passed, reaffirming the right of English-language social service  
provision in the province. 
1992 – Bill 20 is passed, again re-affirming the bilingual nature of social service  
provision but also reaffirming the dominance of the French language in Québec. 
1993 – Bill 86 allowed English language advertisement and business service provision,  
granted that French be given a position of priority. 
 
Intercultural Policies 
1975 – Charte des droits et libertés de la personne (Charter of Human Rights and  
Freedoms) is passed in response to the increasingly diverse nature of Québec 
immigration and designed to encourage an equal socio-economic environment. 
1981 – Autant de façons d’etre Québécois (Many Ways to be Québécois) is published  
stating that Québec is legally an egalitarian society and officially recognizes the 
right to diverse ethno-cultural communities and traditional adherence. This policy 
statement also stresses the idea of “convergence” that requires the public language 
and culture of the province be explicitly French and Québécois, respectively. In 
other words, traditional (non-Québécois) culture is recognized and encouraged; 
however, this recognition does not extend to public affirmation of these languages 
and culture in a public context, particularly government and education.   
1990 – Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble: énoncé de politique en matière d’immigration et  
de l’intégration (We are Building Québec Together: Policy Announcement on 
Matters of Immigration and Integration) is published affirming three main 
defining features of Québec society: democracy (particularly the requirement that 
all citizens participate in shared governance), cultural pluralism (or the 
recognition of ethno-cultural diversity), and French as a common language. 
 
Figure 11. Chronology of the Québec Intercultural Policy Framework 
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focus on the public education system. The only students allowed to attend English-
language institutions were those already in attendance, siblings, or the children of 
existing Québec citizens who were both Anglophone. This meant that all new immigrants 
and those with mixed-cultural parentage were required to receive a Francophone 
education. The educational requirements of Bill 101 are arguably the most far-reaching 
cultural protectionist legislation enacted by the Québec National Assembly.  
 In 1982, the federal government and all provinces, except Québec, signed the 
Constitution Act and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter explicitly 
recognized the multicultural character of Canadian society and gave the Supreme Court 
legal authority to declare many portions of Bill 101 unconstitutional, which it did in 
198283. Several legislative reforms were implemented in later years in response to the 
legal rulings deeming Bill 101 unconstitutional. Bill 142, passed in 1986, provides 
additional linguistic rights to Anglophones by making health and general social service 
provision available in English. In fact, today most governmental institutions in Québec 
offer at least reception services in both English and French, although French is practically 
and legally the official language of the province. Further legislation, Bill 120 (1991) and 
Bill 20 (1992), further solidified the right of Anglophone service provisions, but clearly 
articulated the granting of English-language rights as a process governed by the 
Francophone government and national population of Québec. 
                                                 
83 This is an excellent example of the ambiguity surrounding federal-provincial relations in Canada. Québec 
has, to this date, not signed either the 1982 Constitution Act or the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This 
was of little consequence as the Supreme Court ruled on the legality of Bill 101 as if Québec was an 
operational member of the Canadian Federation. In fact, Québec operates as an inclusive Canadian 
province from receiving equalization payments to participating in national political, military, and cultural 
institutions. It would seem that the inclusion of Québec as a member of the Canadian Federation is a given 
despite the provincial refusal to officially recognize its subordinated place in Canada.   
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 Bill 86 was passed in 1993 and reduced the emphasis on reducing English as a 
public language. English advertising and service provision was allowed with the 
provision that French be given a priority position. This is largely accomplished through 
order and size. French phrases are listed first (or above) English phrases and are generally 
in a larger font size than the English phrases. English language education was made 
available to the children of Anglophones, provided that the parents or child previously 
received English-language education in Canada. 
 Québec enacted protectionist policies that would ensure the dominance of a 
singular linguistic and cultural medium in the province. The promotion of a singular 
cultural medium becomes increasingly problematic given the labor migration 
requirements of global market integration. Increasing ethno-cultural diversification of 
Québec immigration makes the autocratic promotion of a singular cultural nationalism 
practically impossible. Thus, the protection of the French language and a distinctive 
Québécois culture must occur in accordance with the recognition of cultural pluralism 
and the multicultural realities of increased global market integration.    
The provincial response to the Supreme Court ruling and the demands of global 
market integration is telling. Québec refused to rescind protectionist language legislation, 
but instead created a largely intercultural policy framework that would define Québec as 
distinct within a larger Canadian legislative context. The intercultural distinction is an 
important one and shows the unique manner in which Québec has developed a state 




2b. Québec Interculturalism 
 While federal Canadian multiculturalism maintains equal protection and 
recognition for all cultural, ethnic, and racial groups it does so within a bilingual 
framework. In short, the federal government makes a clear distinction between language 
and culture by maintaining a multicultural outlook that is designed to facilitate inter-
ethnic relations and immigrant accommodation but requiring economic and political 
functions to operation within either an English or French linguistic context. This has led 
some to question the reality of Canadian multiculturalism as simply providing a “choice 
of two dominant cultures to assimilate to” (Kymlicka 1995, 14).   
 The initial multicultural policy framework comments specifically on the 
multicultural yet bilingual social nature of Canada, although this is viewed through the 
perspective of a singular national population and nationalist ethos: 
We may have two official languages in this country, but we do not have 
two official cultures (Canada 1973). 
 
The province of Québec responded to this and many other claims of ethno-cultural 
pluralism by the federal government by questioning both the distinction between 
language and culture as well as the logic of multiculturalism, itself.  
In Canada the “national” government recognizes linguistic rights to the 
Francophones. But these are linguistic rights only and not cultural rights 
(Québec 1984, 3) 
 
The various ethno-cultural communities do not really inter-communicate. 
This results in stratification whereby some groups are at the top of the 
ladder and others at the bottom. The Canadian policy on multiculturalism 
which seems to appeal to many New-Quebecers can only accentuate this 




The difficulty in implementing federal multiculturalism in Québec centers explicitly on 
the federal position that Québec, while distinct linguistically, is not culturally distinct 
from any other ethno-cultural group in Canada. This implied critique of Québécois 
nationalism was not only deemed unacceptable by the Québec nation and state, it 
contributed to the solidification of French as the official language of the province. That 
is, federal multiculturalism and the reduction of Québécois culture to “equal status” 
among Canadian ethno-cultural groups contributed to the election of the sovereigntist 
Parti Québécois in 1976 and allowed French language legislation to be passed in the latter 
half of the decade (Fitzmaurice 1984; See 2001; Vineberg 1987). Recently, the threat of 
federal multiculturalism has been articulated within the context of cultural survival and 
labor migration: 
Indeed, the bilingualism policy allows them to integrate into the English-
speaking community anywhere in Canada, and this includes Québec, 
while the multicultural policy conceals the existence of a welcoming 
community in which French is a common language. Their primary loyalty 
is to the country that welcomed them, Canada, a country which 
incidentally still makes its new immigrants swear allegiance to the Queen 
when they become citizens. Some of them mistakenly fear that the same 
problems that led them to leave their native countries will recur in their 
new country, and for this reason mistrust Québec nationalism (IPSQ 
1999). 
 
The active promotion of Canadian mulitculturalism by the federal government, linked 
with the financial resources expended by the federal government in failing to defeat the 
PQ in 1976, was viewed in Québec as another attempt to dominate and reduce Québécois 
culture. The socio-economics of increased labor migration and its connection to ethno-
cultural survival make this position both salient and immediate, as show by the previous 
IPSQ quote.    
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The issue that soon faced the Québec state was, however, not an attack on its 
national sovereignty by the federal government. Rather the larger challenge was the 
increasing ethno-cultural diversity in Québec as a result of global market integration. As 
shown in the previous chapter, the ethnic and cultural face of Québec grew increasingly 
diverse as a result of the larger global shift in labor source regions. The autonomy for 
immigration selection and acculturation granted by the Canada-Québec Accord provided 
Québec with a unique opportunity to produce a nationalist social policy of its own. 
Québec’s focus on interculturalism is distinct from the Canadian model in its explicit 
endorsement of French as the dominant language while recognizing and protecting 
cultural pluralism. 
    Québec’s intercultural framework is more of a collection of legislation and 
policies that simultaneously strengthens the dominant position of the French language 
while facilitating the accommodation and integration of immigrants commonly referred 
to as “neo-Québécois.” As is often the case, the impetus for this policy position is derived 
from the ideological nationalism and structural state apparatus developed during the 
Quiet Revolution. The recent history of the Quiet Revolution and the growth of the 
Québec state contributed in part to Québec’s strong involvement in the process of global 
market integration. In fact, it could be argued that the Québec state responded to 
demographic and cultural changes in a timelier manner than their Canadian federal 
counterparts.  
From the 1960s on, Québec pressed the federal government for more control over 
immigration to Québec, and in 1975 the National Assembly officially responded to the 
challenges posed by this integrative process (ethno-cultural diversification) with the 
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Québec Charte des droits et libertés de la personne84. This policy document officially 
protects the rights of all citizens of Québec and protects individuals from discrimination 
based on race, ethnicity, gender, age, and pregnancy (Québec 1975). This document was 
modeled on the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and 
predates the federal Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by seven years. 
 In 1981 the Québec state again addressed the diversification of Québec 
immigration and demography with the Autant de façons d’être Québécois (Québec 
1981)85. This document provided an overview of provincial cultural integration without 
reverting to the assimilationist patterns of past Canadian efforts at national construction. 
The policy position stresses “convergence86” of culture and community in the desire to 
create a strong, stable, yet ethno-culturally diverse Québec national population (Québec 
1981).  
The provincial government adopted an official policy of interculturalism with the 
publication of Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble: énoncé de politique en matière 
d’immigration et de l’intégration (Québec 1990)87. This document established a clear 
guiding framework for defining the nation of Québec. Three main points create this 
general nationalist definition: the democratic nature of Québec, a pluralist society that is 
protected by law, and finally that French be the “langue commune” (common language) 
                                                 
84 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms 
85 “Many Ways to be Québécois.” Author’s Translation. 
86 Cultural “convergence” in this context refers to the process of cultural integration. Specifically, 
“convergence” occurs in Québec as diverse ethnicities and cultures maintain traditional cultural norms and 
practices however do so within the integrative context of a common language (French). 
87 “We are Building Québec Together:  Policy Announcement on Matters of Immigration and Integration.” 
Author’s Translation. 
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of the province. Gagnon and Iacovino clearly describe the purpose of this document and 
general intercultural framework. 
This view contends that the incorporation of immigrants or minority 
cultures into the larger political community is a reciprocal endeavor-a 
“moral contract” between the host society and the particular cultural 
collectivity with the aim of establishing a forum for the empowerment of 
all citizens… (Gagnon 2002, 326-327).   
 
Québec interculturalism recognizes the contemporary fact of cultural pluralism through 
its very political existence. The Québec state must politically facilitate the integration of 
an increasingly diverse labor migrant population if it (Québec) is to continue to benefit 
from the economic growth opportunities assisted by global market integration. National 
protectionist demands, however, require that the Québec state also enact high levels of 
cultural protections to ensure a common national socio-cultural medium.  
Intercultural policy clearly promotes the liberal ideal of social equality and the 
multicultural ideals of diversity recognition, although the institutional framework 
supporting these ideals is focused primarily on the Francophone social medium in which 
these ideals reside. 
 The institutions supporting the intercultural framework are the Secrétariat à la 
Politique linguistique under the Ministère de la Culture et des Communications88 and les 
Relations civiques et Interculturelles under the Ministère de l’Immigration et des 
Communautés  culturelles89. It is important to note that the current institutional 
framework supporting intercultural policies in Québec remain strongly supported by the 
state. Contrary to Canadian multiculturalism, whose institutional support has been greatly 
                                                 
88 Language Policy Secretariat under the Ministry of Culture and Communications 
89 Civic and Intercultural Relations under the Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities 
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reduced, Québec continues to fund and support both support of French language 
legislation oversight and intercultural programs designed to facilitate immigrant 
“convergence.”    
At first glance, it would appear that this understanding of interculturalism reflects 
the goals and mechanisms of Canadian multiculturalism, although privileging French as 
the language of common and official interaction. The most glaring difference between 
Canadian multiculturalism and Québec interculturalism is the belief (in Québec) that 
language is inexorably connected to culture.  
But the logical consequence would be that a language is the expression of 
a way of life. Therefore if French is the common language in Québec this 
implies that French culture although not “abolishing” other cultures, would 
become the “focus of convergence” for the various communities (Québec 
1984, 4). 
 
Clearly, Québec society, while embracing pluralism, is an enclave of Francophone 
language and culture under the protection of the state.  
This difference represents a clear ideological division between the two social 
policies, but also mirrors each respective history. That is, both are experiencing a 
demographic shift that is effectively diversifying the ethno-cultural nature of Canadian 
and Québec societies. This fact is the common denominator between both state entities; 
however the divergence of independent histories works to create independent policy 
solutions. For Canadian nationalists, the greatest threat to national cohesion is Québec 
sovereignty (Carens 1995; Doran 2001; McRoberts 1988; Richler 1992). Therefore, any 
policy designed to address the increasing ethno-cultural diversity of the nation can also 
be designed to reduce the threat of Québécois nationalism.  
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For Québec nationalists, the greatest threat to an autonomous Québec is the threat 
of cultural homogenization or colonization on the part of a dominant English Canada. 
Therefore, any policy designed to address the increasing ethno-cultural diversity of 
Québec can also be designed to strengthen French linguistic and cultural dominance and 
authority. Both policies were driven by global market integration, however the 
development of both policies are, by necessity, defined by distinct national histories and 
different nationalist goals.  
 The interesting aspect of Québec’s intercultural framework is its relative stability 
in comparison with Canadian multiculturalism, with respect to institutional support and to 
policy revision. While federal multiculturalism has undergone significant growth, 
reduction, reorientation, and redefinition, Québec’s broad intercultural framework has 
remained constant. The only significant alteration to the policy position has been a 
reduction in the universal dominance of French as a public language. This change (see 
Bills 142, 120, and 20 in the previous section) has been limited to social service provision 
and the production of relevant government documents in both French and English. Thus, 
the dominance of French as the common language of Québec has not been seriously 
threatened.  
3. Conclusion 
 A focus on the commonalities and differences between multicultural and 
intercultural policy frameworks is important. The similar political economic patterns of 
increased integration into the global market economic system in addition to full 
integration into the global labor supply system illustrate a common goal and therefore 
similar social consequences of increasing integration. The differences, described in the 
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previous two sections, are numerous; however there is a trend of policy convergence that 
seems to be occurring. This process of policy alteration and evolution can provide a more 
telling picture of how states respond to the challenges of the neo-liberal global economic 
system and, perhaps the power of that system. 
3a. Policy Decline and the Role of National Populations 
 The decline of multicultural policy in Canada has been debated by those who 
view this policy position as being successful in its political positions (Kymlicka, Jansen) 
and those who view this policy as being an anti-liberal political position that hinders 
social integration and exacerbates stratification (Barry, Bissoondath). Christian Joppke 
addresses this “debate” by showing a distinct pattern of multicultural policy “retreat in 
the liberal state” (Joppke 2004).  
 Joppke points to three indications of the decline or “retreat” of multicultural 
policies: (1) a lack of public support for multicultural policies (but not necessarily 
programs), (2) the practical failure of multicultural policies to reduce ethnic conflict or 
socio-economic stratification based on factors of ethno-cultural diversity, and (3) “a new 
assertiveness of the liberal state in imposing the liberal minimum on its dissenters” 
(Joppke 2004, 244). A cursory assessment of these three factors would point to a direct 
connection between the first two. Policy failure and popular support often coincide. The 
third aspect of liberal retrenchment raises a more pertinent question with respect to the 
relationship of these policies to the double movement of neo-liberal economic demands 
and national protection.  
 The initial motivation for federal multicultural policy was clearly nationalist in its 
intent. That is, it provided a political definition of Canadian nationalism as diverse, 
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multicultural, and egalitarian. This definition worked to elevate “Third Force” ethno-
cultural groups to positions of equal social standing while simultaneously de-emphasizing 
the claims of ethno-cultural uniqueness and claims of sovereignty by Québécois 
nationalists. The initial goals of multicultural policies as tools for building minority 
community support structures and ideological national cohesion was altered by 
demographic changes resulting from increased ethno-cultural diversification. 
Multicultural policy shifted to address growing conflicts and tensions that accompanied 
rapid ethno-cultural diversification, primarily with respect to non-discrimination 
initiatives. The recent de-centralization and privatization of multiculturalism marks yet 
another policy shift. As Joppke points out, the contemporary policy shift (to de-
centralized and privatized organization) is indicative of a global reduction, or “retreat,” 
from multicultural policies. I would argue that this “retreat” on the part of the state is 
reflective of double movement tension resulting from continued struggle between global 
neo-liberal market pressures and national protections. A brief revisitation of Québec 
interculturalism supports this claim. 
 The unique historical and demographic nature of Québec motivated the 
development of an alternative policy to Canadian multiculturalism. The common 
experience of ethno-cultural diversification as a result of migration shifts and national 
population demands for domestic stability required some form of policy on the part of the 
Québec state to maintain national stability. As previously mentioned, Québec’s 
intercultural policy framework (comprised of language and cultural legislation) has 
undergone limited changes in comparison with its federal counterpart. The changes that 
have occurred are reductions in the promotion of French as a singular language in 
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Québec, but not to the nature, scope, or definition of what it is to be a Québécois (or neo-
Québécois) or how daily communication and co-habitation should function in the 
province. Why has Québec’s intercultural policy framework remained relatively 
unaltered? I believe that the answer is exposed with closer attention to the dynamics of 
the double movement.  
 Global market integration is a desirable goal for both Canada and Québec, as 
evidenced by their policy initiatives and support for neo-liberal economic policy reforms. 
Both Canada and Québec are active participants in the global labor supply system and 
have experienced rapid ethno-cultural diversification as a result of the systemic shift from 
European to Global South sources for labor migration. Multicultural and intercultural 
policies are largely responsible for promoting a comfortable atmosphere and stable 
environment for these new arrivals and ensuring that the destabilizing potential of rapid 
ethno-cultural diversification does not affect economic growth or productive capacity. In 
this light, multi/intercultural policies are an outcome of national market integration into 
the global market system. Several scholars have commented on the economic benefits of 
multi/intercultural policies, particularly with respect to attracting business-class migrants 
whose capital, skills, and education are highly valued by competing core states (Abu-
Laban 2003; Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002; Li 2003).  
 Conversely, the reality of ethno-cultural diversification is uneven and often 
conflictual. “Native” groups are often hostile to new residents whose language, religion, 
traditions, values, and even appearance may differ from conventional national norms. 
Added tension often arises in times of economic recession or depression when ethno-
cultural minorities are often targeted as “causes” or “contributors” to general conditions 
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of hardship. In addition to these ethno-cultural tensions national populations continue to 
construct and negotiate national identities within the context of the neo-liberal nation-
state90. The issue of liberalism is an important one, as the basic tenant of liberal political 
ideology is egalitarianism. The promotion of equality, however, is problematic. There are 
few regions where a particular group (often based on ethnicity or culture) has not 
maintained some form of dominance or hierarchical authority. The “equalization” process 
inherent in multicultural policies inevitably causes a backlash by those fearful of losing 
their positions of prominence. The result is commonly an attack on these multicultural 
policies as privileging a specific group or groups over traditionally dominant groups. This 
is the case in Canada where attacks on multicultural policies are increasingly articulated 
in nationalist language and context. The lack of a common cultural medium in Canada 
and the promotion of a common nationalist discourse/identity by the state has resulted in 
increased dissatisfaction by national popular groups (Barry 2001; Bibby 1995; 1990; 
Bissoondath 1994; Frow 1999) 
 The demand of true economic neo-liberals for limited, if not non-existent, state 
intervention is an added problem for multicultural policies. State spending on social 
services, particularly those that make demands on business entities and economic 
institutions, is an anathema to neo-liberal market ideology…the same market ideology 
that currently maintains a dominant position in this era of globalization. As such, 
multicultural programs that seek to attain social and economic equality outside of the 
market system are, in effect, non-liberal. Thus, the national protections (of “native” 
                                                 
90 This is, of course, a limited view of national identify construction. This project is limited to the 
discussion of the effects of global market integration on a specific type of nation-state: Western, advanced 
capitalist, and republican/democratic. This project makes no theoretical claims outside of this limited 
empirical scope. 
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populations and immigrant populations) of multicultural policies run counter to the 
demands and requirements of pure neo-liberal market ideology.  
 Interculturalism, on the other hand, has emerged relatively unscathed from both 
neo-liberal and conservative critiques. The requirement that new arrivals in Québec 
participate in Québec society through conformity to a common linguistic and cultural 
medium is distinct from the policy requirements of federal multiculturalism (although not 
from the reality of Canadian integration). This focus on a common medium of public 
exchange provides a level of ideological stability and cohesion not possible in a pure 
multicultural environment.  
 It would seem that the “retreat” of multicultural policies means that neo-liberal 
market ideology has become supreme in the context of the double movement. If we 
attribute some level of legitimate power to national populations, however, the dominance 
of neo-liberal market ideology seems less obvious. National popular support for federal 
multicultural policies has waned. Criticism of state multicultural policies reflect 
previously mentioned failures in policy efficacy; however, a notable observation is that 
attacks on multicultural policy are increasingly focused on the need to protect Canadian 
national culture. The demands have largely centered on populist critiques of national 
deterioration or the potential divisive outcomes of diversity recognition. That is, national 
demands for a common cultural medium have grown as both ethno-cultural diversity and 
multicultural policies have expanded. While the decline of neo-liberal criticism of 
multicultural policies has contributed to the idea that multicultural ideology is “good for 
business” (Abu-Laban 2003), national support for these programs has deteriorated: 
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Back in 1985, 56% of Canadians supported the mosaic and only 28% the 
melting pot. But in 1995, 44% supported the mosaic and 40% the melting 
pot – almost equal (Bibby 1995, 54). 
 
The ambiguous definition of Canadian nationalism is increasingly attacked as a failure of 
multicultural policy. These criticisms are heavily muted in Québec due to the emphasis of 
a common cultural medium.  
 Interculturalism on the other hand is heavily criticized by neo-liberal proponents 
on the grounds that the level of institutional support for these programs is unnecessary 
and, in fact, a deterrent to increased economic growth (Boyer 2001; McMahon 2003; 
Migué 1998; Paquet 1999). On the other hand, intercultural policy in Québec meets the 
demands of its national population to maintain the traditional social dominance of French 
language and culture. When compared with federal multicultural policy the ability of 
Québec intercultural policy to maintain its core structure, responsibilities, and overall 
framework allows us to conclude that it is better able to function in the context of the 
double movement91, largely due to the strength of national demands for Québécois 
cultural protection. Both policies are attempts by the state to address global market 
integration and labor demand; however the emphasis on recognizing difference and the 
promotion of state programs to institutionalize those differences has been received coldly 
by both national populations and neo-liberal market proponents. Interculturalism, while 
providing a level of state involvement that is not desirable for most neo-liberal 
                                                 
91 Federal multiculturalism, as a political institution, grew throughout the 1970s and early 1980s to 
ministerial status (Ministry of Multiculturalism), but was dismantled in the late 1980s and early 1990s and 
subsumed under the Department of Canadian Heritage. Québec interculturalism is still institutionally strong 
and supported by the Ministère de l’Immigration and Communautés culturelles and the Ministère de la 
Culture et Communications. 
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ideologues, facilitates global market integration and meets the protectionist demands of 
its national population through cultural means.  
 The ability of a state-centered policy to negotiate the conflicts of the double 
movement is clearly necessary for policy survival. The final chapter will expand on this 
conclusion and integrate it into a larger examination of the initial theoretical propositions 
of this project. We have examined the background and conditional motivations for 
multicultural and intercultural policies, but we must now come full-circle in the attempt 


















Conclusions: The Importance of Culture in the Contemporary Nation-State 
 
This dissertation concludes that the Canadian state is increasingly reliant on the 
control or manipulation of national cultural structures to ensure stability. The Québec 
state is equally reliant on culture, but its history of linking state-formation with an 
organic (popular) national cultural definition provides enhanced stability. Stability occurs 
when national populations feel sufficiently protected from pressures and changes brought 
by increasing globalization (or the process of global market integration). Increased 
Canadian state attention to culture is an outcome of global market integration, which has 
reduced or eliminated state ability to control or protect national economic interests.  
As state capacity to protect national populations through economic means 
decreases, new means for meeting national protectionist demands must be found. 
Attempts by the Canadian state to create a national culture can be easy observed as “top-
down” approaches to national cultural definition. Québec is increasingly integrated into 
the global market economy and experiences the same pressures to decrease state social 
service spending and reduce economic protectionist capacity. Conversely, Québec’s 
popular, or “bottom-up” definition of national culture was the central feature of the state-
building project in Québec. The Québec national population, as the source of its national 
cultural definitions, provides greater legitimating support for state protectionist policies 
(interculturalism) focused on national culture. The Canadian state, on the other hand, has 
seen its attempts to define national culture become less and less effective as legitimating 
national support is withdrawn due to the “top-down” imposition of cultural definitions.  
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Therefore, the Québec state can better meet the protectionist demands of its 
national population and offers an explanation for Québec’s ability to resist global market 
demands for a longer period of time and ensure policy stability to a greater degree than in 
Canada. The Canadian and Québec cases show that increased globalization pressures 
decrease economic protectionist capacities requiring the state to find alternative means to 
ensure social stability. This dissertation argues that those means are increasingly found in 
the use and manipulation of national cultural structures of meaning, symbols, and 
definitions of nationalism.  
 This conclusion will be examined in further detail in the following section. The 
purpose of this chapter is to first provide a conclusion linking the empirical project to the 
methodological and theoretical issues of the dissertation. The first section examines the 
previously stated conclusion within the general “double movement” framework of the 
project. The second section examines the “double movement” as a potentially viable 
methodological tool. I argue that the dissertation project provides a sound methodological 
foundation for future research on the interrelationship between nation, state, and 
globalization processes. These future research directions are presented in the final section 
of this concluding chapter. I present several possible scenarios that reflect the 
methodological orientation of this study. The section presents hypothetical scenarios that 
require future comparative analysis in order to generate theoretical conclusions about 
state capacity and function within the context of the “double movement.” This final 
section offers examples of how this dissertation can be expanded as well as illustrating 
the conceptual strength of a reconceptualized “double movement.” 
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1. General Conclusions  
 This project concludes that the defining feature of the Canadian nation-state in the 
era of globalization is its decreasing capacity to control national economic protections 
and its increasing capacity to control national cultural protections. This section provides 
more detail to the previously stated general conclusion and serves as a foundation for the 
following two sections designed to provide analytical foundations for future research. 
 To reiterate, this project is structured by the Polanyian “double movement” 
concept. This framework requires that any analysis understand socio-political 
organization as defined by 1) external liberal market pressures and 2) internal national 
protectionist pressures. The Canadian and Québec states provide local political mediation 
between these two demands for the purpose of ensuring stability necessary for systemic 
operation. We can therefore conclude the there are three empirical actors in the 
contemporary “double movement:” the global economic system, state institutions, and 
national populations. The dissertation allows us to draw specific conclusions about each 
categorical actor as well as understand the cumulative process that leads to the previously 
stated general conclusion. 
1a. Globalization or Global Market Integration   
 We can conclude that globalization has inhibited the ability of Canada and 
Québec to enact national economic protectionist measures. The realities of NAFTA and 
WTO membership eliminate the ability to implement tariffs or other trade restrictions in 
support of national economic interests. This is consistent with many theories of economic 
globalization, particularly with respect to transnational capitalist theory (Robinson 2004; 
Sklair 2001).  
 262
 Chapter Five established global market integration as a goal and active project of 
both Canada and Québec. The requirements of global market integration limit state 
capacity to enact economic protections such as tariffs or other trade restrictions. We can 
conclude that both state entities are constrained in their ability to protect national 
populations through economic policy means. The fact that social service provision and 
funding in Canada is decreasing lends additional credence to this conclusion.  
 Health Canada, for example, has experienced declining federal funding despite 
the lack of universal private health care alternatives. Generally, neoliberal ideology and 
integration requirements discourage state spending for social service provision. This is 
particularly true with respect to privatization that encourages market integration of all 
aspects of social services, including health care, education, and pension management. 
Specifically, the decline in health care funding in Canada is linked to encroaching market 
pressures for privatization (Johnson 2002). The NAFTA agreement weakens the state’s 
ability to protect its public health care system as certain sections or categories of health 
care provision in Canada are subject to foreign investment and must conform to 
adjudicative trade rules established in the agreement. This means that the increasing 
privatization of Canadian health care is a direct result of global market integration. 
By introducing foreign investment into areas of health care service 
delivery that were previously delivered on a not-for-profit basis by the 
public sector, private clinics and hospitals open the door to trade 
challenges and foreign investor claims. These incursions may in turn have 
profound impacts on the entire health care system (Canadian Health 
Coalition 2002). 
 
Québec, on the other hand, has a similar tradition of state social service provision that has 
generally succeeded in avoiding neoliberal “reforms.” Recent events have challenged this 
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resistive capacity and raise serious questions about whether Québec can continue to 
maintain current levels of state spending, contrary to neoliberal demands. 
 The Canadian Supreme Court, in the case of Chaoulli v. Québec in June 2005, 
ruled that Québec’s ban on private insurance for private health care services was 
unconstitutional. This ruling gave the PLQ government the ability to draft legislation 
requiring the privatization of portions of Québec’s formerly public health care system. 
Representatives of Québec’s five law schools criticized this legislation as “going far 
beyond what the Supreme Court ordered” (Brun et al. 2005).  In fact, the representatives 
argue that the judgment merely required that citizens be able to purchase insurance for 
private care, not to privatize portions of the public system as the Charest (PQL) 
government is doing (Brun et al. 2005).  
 The case of declining public health care provision and the rise of privatization in 
Canada is consistent with the effects of global market integration. I would argue that the 
intentional nature of this integrative process can be seen in the actions of both the 
Canadian and Québec governments. In the case of Canada, ample budget surpluses are 
available to augment funding short falls for Health Canada. Fuller (1998) argues that 
these consistent decreases in federal health care funding, despite ample financial 
resources, is the result of intentional efforts on the part of the state to weaken public 
health care services. The purpose of intentionally under-funding Health Canada is to 
contend that public health care is untenable and thus must allow for private health care 
provision (i.e., global market integration).  
 Efforts by the Charest administration in Québec are similar in their intent. The 
Québec state is actively opening the door to health care privatization in accordance with 
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neoliberal/market demands by relying on judicial opinion that does not demand the 
privatization of the provincial health care system. In both cases, state efforts to decrease 
state spending and control over social service provision are an intentional act. The crisis 
of health care provision in Canada and Québec is consistent with conclusions made in 
this dissertation that increased global market integration decreases the state’s capacity to 
enact national protectionist legislation (namely, social service provision) that is contrary 
to neoliberal market demands. 
1b. State Political Capacity and Responsibilities 
 If the state economic protectionist capacity is, in fact, reduced as a result of the 
demands and requirements of the global economic system, what then is the purpose of the 
contemporary nation-state? The role of the contemporary state is to ensure local stability 
required to maintain a functional global economic system. This is consistent with 
Polanyi’s descriptions of the “peace interest” promoted by international financial 
institutions for international liberal market growth. 
Trade was now dependent upon an international monetary system that 
could not function in a general war. It demanded peace, and the Great 
Powers were striving to maintain it. But the balance-of-power system, as 
we have seen, could not by itself ensure peace. This was done by 
international finance, the very existence of which embodied the principle 
of the new dependence of trade upon peace (Polanyi 2001, 16). 
 
The issue of stability is a central requisite of any global economic system. Without such a 
cooperative medium trade and financial exchanges could not function as freely as they 
currently do. This case demonstrates that in the pursuit of “double movement” 
satisfaction, the state has moved into the realm of national cultural policy. The role of the 
state in ensuring social stability has shifted from economic to cultural protection; 
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however, the dynamics that govern the interaction between nation, state, and global 
economic system remain constant. The complexities of the state in addressing economic 
issues with cultural policies requires greater understanding. That is, although state 
capacity to meet national protectionist demands through cultural means has increased, the 
protectionist demand is still motivated by economic changes and demands of the global 
economic system. 
 The existing Westphalian system of nation-states provides for local political 
institutions of power that are able to legitimately control national populations and provide 
local stability that facilitates global trade, financial capital flows, transnational 
production, and consumptive patterns. The mechanics of the “double movement” ensure 
that this facilitation of liberal market forces will result in a national protectionist outcry. 
This demand for national protection was met in the post-war era with Keynesian state-
centered strategies leading to the development of the Western welfare state. Esping-
Andersen supports this contention through his understanding that “the welfare state was 
therefore also a political project of nation-building: the affirmation of liberal democracy 
against the twin perils of fascism and bolshevism” (Esping-Andersen 1996, 2). The 
welfare state, in accordance with the mechanics of the “double movement,” was the state 
response to national discontent and the threat of anti-systemic alternatives (namely, 
fascism and bolshevism). The “double movement” is a conservative mechanism in which 
the goal is systemic maintenance and stability. 
 These conditions no longer exist and state capacity to respond to national 
protectionist demands through economic means has decreased. Esping-Andersen 
comments on this shift as well: 
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The advanced Western nations’ welfare states were built to cater to an 
economy dominated by industrial mass production. In the era of the 
“Keynesian consensus” there was no perceived trade-off between social 
security and economic growth, between equality and efficiency. This 
consensus has disappeared because the underlying assumptions no longer 
obtain (Esping-Andersen 1996, 3). 
 
The core shift from industrial production to service provision is pervasive. The decline of 
welfare state protectionism in Canada and Québec can be easily mapped through 
neoliberal trade agreements signed in the 1980s and 1990s that were once shunned as 
detrimental to national economic growth (Clarkson and McCall 1990).  
 The decline of economic protectionist capacities in Canada and Québec came at a 
time of increasing ethno-cultural diversity (again, motivated by global market 
integration). This demographic transition offers the state an opportunity to shift its focus 
from national economic protection to national cultural protection. The institutionalization 
of multicultural policy throughout the 1980s occurred as hostility to free-trade 
agreements decreased (notably beginning CUFTA negotiations in 1984). As opposition to 
neoliberal trade agreements continued to wane in the 1990s (NAFTA and WTO 
leadership support was promoted by the Liberal Party, who formerly opposed free-trade 
policies – at least as a political issue) so too did the institutional power of 
multiculturalism in Canada. However, the continued diversification of urban Canada and 
the increasing inability of the state to protect national populations through economic 
means also promoted an increase in criticism of multiculturalism from a popular and 
nationalist perspective. In other words, multiculturalism as a national cultural ideal is 
increasingly attacked as being unable to promote a singular nationalist Canadian medium. 
These attacks are nearly universal in their use of culture as a discursive tool of criticism. 
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The original idea of multiculturalism as the “recognition of difference” is proving to be 
an untenable position as Canadian popular demands for protection and stability take on 
an increasingly nationalist tone, generally demanding a common cultural medium. 
 Québec’s response to global market integration is equally focused on culture, but 
its approach has proven more stable in its ability to meet the protectionist demands of its 
national population. I argue that this stability is the result of greater national legitimating 
support for state protectionist policies such as interculturalism. That is, Québec is able to 
meet the national protectionist demands of its national population in a more effective 
manner than does the Canadian state. While global market pressures are equally 
demanding of both Canadian and Québec state entities, Québec’s ability to resist such 
pressures is due to higher levels of legitimacy in its use of national culture in protectionist 
strategies.    
Urban Québec is experiencing the same rate of diversification as the whole of 
urban Canada; however the intercultural context to which Québec immigrants must 
integrate creates the common cultural medium in demand throughout the rest of Canada. 
Clearly, intercultural policies are designed to protect Francophone Québécois culture and 
the fact that its policy framework is not generally challenged by Francophone Québécois 
is telling.  
 Interestingly, the strength of the national population in Québec has allowed its 
social service provision role to be maintained in contrast to the demands of neoliberal 
proponents. The main points of attack against Québec intercultural policy have been from 
neoliberal critics who view the program as providing excessive state support for national 
protectionist measures. Again, this is consistent with the mechanics of the “double 
 268
movement” in which liberal market pressures will increase in response to increased 
national protectionist pressures. Recent neoliberal economic reforms undertaken by the 
Charest administration have been deeply unpopular and have resulted in increased 
national protectionist demands.  
An example of this occurred in the spring 2005 when the Québec government 
announced its plan to decrease state spending by converting provincial student bursary 
grants into loans. This caused a vociferous reaction among public university students 
throughout Québec, but the reaction was most vocal among CÉGEP92 students in Québec 
urban areas93. The loan conversion plan resulted in a student strike (numbering 170,000 
students) at ten Montréal area CÉGEP campuses.  The strike lasted from February to May 
and forced the capitulation of the Charest government who ultimately withdrew the 
proposal and reinstituted the bursary funds. While the fact that student action forced the 
government to rescind its neoliberal reform measure is significant, the rejection of a 
government compromise is even more applicable to the conclusions of this dissertation. 
    On March 16, the Minister of Education, Jacques Fournier, offered to replace 
the $103 million in converted grant funds with $95.5 million. Student leadership rejected 
this offer due to the fact that the $95.5 million would come from federal government 
educational funding. In the words of one student leader, “The present offer, in our view, 
                                                 
92 CÉGEP, or Collège d’enseignement général et professionel, are the relative equivalent of junior colleges 
or vocational colleges in the United States. The strengths and responsibilities of each CÉGEP campus are 
unique and ranges from general education to fine arts to mechanical vocations to information technology. 
In many cases, post-high school students are required to attend CÉGEP colleges before enrolling in a 
provincial university. In other cases, a CÉGEP vocation or technical education is the goal. 
93 Information concerning the CÉGEP strike was compiled from several sources including University 
Affairs, “Charest Government Weakened by Québec Student Strike.” (Peggy Curran, May 2005); several 
reports from daily news sources including the Gazette, Le Devoir, and the CBC from September 2004 
through June 2005. 
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is unacceptable because the extra money comes essentially from the federal government” 
(Lampert 2005).  
The rejection of a compromise effort deemed insufficient in its adherence to 
national protectionist demands illustrates the importance of culture within the context of 
the “double movement.” In other words, the economic compromise solution was rejected 
on cultural grounds. This action coincides with the overall conclusion of this dissertation; 
namely that culture has become increasingly important as a tool for meeting the demands 
of the national population for social protection. The question that arises at this point is: 
does the reliance on culture by the state in meeting challenges of an economic nature 
prove effective? Developing conclusions of the capacities of the contemporary nation 
will help answer this question.  
1c. The Role of National Populations 
 The general conclusion of the dissertation, that culture is increasingly important 
as a state legitimation mechanism, raises a serious question with respect to national 
power. This dissertation concludes that Québec has been able to resist global market 
integration demands in a more effective manner than has Canada. I argue that this is the 
result of Québec’s use of a national cultural definition that is derived from national 
popular definitions (“bottom-up”). Canadian definitions of national culture, demonstrated 
by the case of multiculturalism, are not derived from national populations but are, in 
many ways, “top-down” state dictates. This is problematic for the Canadian state due to 
the fact that culture is becoming a more salient stabilization strategy. Culture requires 
high levels of popular legitimacy in order to be effective. That is, culture is generally 
developed as a local or grass-roots cohesive control that is most effective when 
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understood and articulated by local populations which have direct affinity with respective 
cultural norms (Geertz 1983; 1973; Scott 1990). 
 This fact was recognized by the Québec government in response the perceived 
threat of Canadian multiculturalism: 
…a State cannot afford to exist without a solidly established culture. If 
there is no culture the State will “manufacture” one to serve its own 
purposes (Québec 1984, 4). 
 
This statement was made in response to the institutionalization of Canadian 
multiculturalism. From the Québec perspective, the creation of a multicultural nationalist 
ideal in contrast to a bicultural national history was an attempt to “manufacture” a 
national culture (or at least a national cultural ideal) in support of the federal position on 
Pan-Canadian nationalism. That is, the most effective way to undercut Québécois 
nationalism was to “manufacture” a culture that ignored the “French Fact” and promoted 
an equality of culture. This “equality” is of course within the context of the practical 
linguistic reality that “Canada without Québec is an Anglophone country” (Québec 1984, 
3). 
 This excursus illustrates the increasingly salient role of culture in establishing 
power relationships and maintaining the controls necessary to ensure national stability. 
The fact that multicultural and intercultural policies are attempts by the state to influence 
and control national culture was established in Chapter Seven. The above quote supports 
this contention. However, the comparative histories of multicultural and intercultural 
policies are more telling with respect to the strength of national populations. 
 Canadian multiculturalism, from the perspective of Québec critics and this 
dissertation, is increasingly under attack from the national population due in large part to 
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its inability to respond to national protectionist demands. The multicultural policy was 
intended to provide a unique and distinct foundation upon which Pan-Canadian 
nationalism could be built. Increasing dissatisfaction with the policy as an institutional 
response to demographic change promoted by globalization is centered on the 
institutional failure to generate a singular Canadian national cultural ideal/vision. The fact 
that Canada attempted to “manufacture” a cultural ideal that ultimately proved weak 
without national legitimation is consistent with the previous claim that culture is, first and 
foremost, a locally manufactured mechanism. Conversely, Québec interculturalism 
utilizes existing national cultural definitions, norms, and symbols to support its 
multicultural variant. 
 This comparative study shows that the state capacity to manipulate and 
manufacture cultural definitions, norms, and symbols is contingent on a high level of 
national legitimacy. We also conclude that state capacity to enact economic protections 
has eroded thus motivating a shift to cultural protections to satisfy the “double 
movement.” The shift of state capacity from economic to cultural spheres has resulted in 
increased national power for legitimating state policies and actions. In other words, as 
global market demands reduce state economic protectionist capacity, the state fulfills its 
stabilization requirement through increased influence, control, and attempted 
manipulation of national culture. This process results in increased potential for power in 
national populations. With respect to the Canadian state, we can observe that this process 
is fluid and requires constant alteration and adaptive capacity. Similarly, the stability of 
Québec national protectionist programs are under increasingly effective attacks by global 
market proponents.  
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 In effect, this dissertation project concludes that Castells’ conceptualization of 
decreasing state power and increasing national power is correct. A similar conclusion is 
reached in the work of Amy Chua (2003), Robert Kaplan (2000), and Thomas Sowell 
(2002) in that struggles over ideology and nationalist definitions are the new battlefields 
in this era of globalization. I would add that from the perspective of the “double 
movement” the state retains significant power as an institution of management and 
mediation. The novelty of the “double movement” approach is in its ability to illustrate 
the mechanical processes that have resulted in this situation. Two specific questions are 
raised as a result of these conclusions. First, are there problems with using the “double 
movement” in an era of such significant political and economic change? Second, what are 
the possible directions for the state?    
2. Reconceptualizing the “Double Movement” 
 The cases of Canada and Québec illustrate the role of culture and the importance 
of national populations in legitimizing culturally-oriented social policies. Respective 
policies of multiculturalism and interculturalism represent attempts by both state entities 
to ensure social stability by meeting the demands of national populations and global 
market proponents. The use of the “double movement” concept through this dissertation 
implies that a change has occurred in how states are able to these dual pressures.   
 As stated in Chapter Two, the Polanyian “double movement is a specific process: 
liberal capitalism in the form of a laissez-faire market system encroaches on a respective 
social group (i.e., national population) which in turn generates a national protectionist 
demand which is satisfied through the enacting of national economic protections. That is, 
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in Polanyi’s original conceptualization the “double movement” is an explicitly economic 
process. 
 This dissertation concludes that state stability responsibilities inherent in the 
“double movement” can no longer be met with respect to national economic protections. 
Thus, an orthodox understanding and application of the “double movement” is 
problematic. I argue that this shift in empirical conditions requires a reconceptualization 
of the “double movement” while retaining its dynamic analytical capacities. This 
dissertation argues that the capacity of the state to ensure stability by national populations 
through economic means is reduced as global market integration increases. This does not 
negate the need for state institutions to ensure the stability necessary for optimal global 
market performance. Neither does it negate national demands for protection from the 
adverse effect of global market integration.  
 The dynamic foundation of the “double movement” remains. The conditions in 
which the process operates has changed, requiring more attention to the role of culture in 
the process of state adaptation and capacity to ensure required stability. This dissertation 
shows that the “double movement” continues to have significant methodological value, 
although clearly an orthodox conceptualization can no longer be used.  
A reoriented “double movement” would retain the economic focus on predatory 
liberal market integration; however calls for national protection are increasingly reliant 
on socio-cultural means. This process, I argue, is the result of state adaptation in response 
to the pressures of the global economic system. That is, the role of the state, as the local 
control institution for ensuring social stability, remains constant. The means or capacities 
of the state to ensure social stability through explicit economic means is reduced as a 
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result of global market integration (primarily the result of state adherence to neoliberal 
political economic stipulations). This political handicap results in the state seeking 
alternative means to ensure social stability – these means have been increasingly cultural. 
Therefore, the discursive interrelationship between state and nation has shifted from one 
of political economics to one of culture.  
The implications of this shift will be briefly discussed in the following section. I 
argue that such a reconceptualized “double movement” could have substantial 
methodological value for future research. The analytical power of this approach is in its 
ability to integrate locally specific processes of cultural change or resistance with the 
macro socio-economic processes of a singular global economic system. It must be noted 
that while the global market system is a singular systemic entity, the process of global 
market integration by respective nation-states is an uneven process. Analytical 
approaches to this uneven process of integration should be able to reflect local variations. 
The diversity of local cultural differences and the alternative avenues for national 
social protectionism using such cultural vehicles leads me to conclude that the “double 
movement” is valuable as a methodological tool but not as a theoretical framework. In 
other words, this reconceptualized understanding of the “double movement” views local 
cultural variants and responses as playing a dominant role in the nation/state dichotomy. 
That is, a general theory of “double movement” applicability is difficult given the relative 
cultural diversity of each case. We can, however, conclude that the realms of state policy 
capacity have expanded beyond traditional economic protections. This conclusion offers 
a useful foundation upon which future comparative analyses can be built.    
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The value of this perspective from a methodological perspective does, however, 
allow for future theoretical generalizations to be made. By using this reconceptualized 
“double movement” methodological framework, we can then implement comparative 
case studies that will then, in turn, lead to general theoretical conclusions. This 
dissertation shows that this methodological approach is initially viable. The expansion of 
such a methodology would entail a major comparative case study, perhaps within 
regional political economic blocs (such as the EU or Latin America) or between 
divergent cases such as comparative core/periphery studies. Through additional 
comparative study we will be able to determine (1) whether culture plays an equally 
significant role in determining national protectionist strategies and (2) work toward a 
greater understanding of the contemporary state that is increasingly challenged by global 
market integration processes. The goal of advancing this methodological project would 
be to discover future potential directions for studies of the state and possibly develop a 
greater understanding of efficacious policies that allow national populations to effectively 
combat the predatory effects of globalization.   
3. Future Directions 
 From the conclusions of this dissertation we can hypothesize four possible 
outcomes that require additional study and theoretical development. This concluding 
section is the culmination of the dissertation’s theoretical project and offers avenues for 
future research on the state and the role of the “double movement” as an effective 
methodological framework. The outcomes are presented in their hypothetical form. I will 
add brief justification for their position as a potential outcome, but further analysis of 
each potential outcome will be left for future work. 
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1. The state will increase its ability and skill in controlling national cultural symbols 
resulting in the increased domination of national populations through cultural 
manipulation and control. 
  This outcome will occur due to alliance formation between national, state, and 
global market proponents. For instance, state capacity and ability to manage and define 
national culture is enhanced by cooperation from national groups who articulate a cultural 
vision or definition that supports state efforts. Leadership from the state can influence 
national culture, but this influence is most effective when it is supported by national 
popular leadership.  
 A contemporary example of this process is found in the alliance between the 
United States Republican Party and evangelical Christian groups in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. The cooperative efforts of organized national (evangelical) groups assisted 
state efforts by the Reagan administration (1980-1988) to influence and manage national 
culture through the active redefinition of American political symbols as having specific 
affiliations and connotations. This example briefly illustrates the process of national 
cultural control as facilitated by a specific national group with a specific cultural 
definition that facilitates global market integration. In other words, the national cultural 
group (evangelical Christians) gains increased power with respect to the state and in turn 
promotes national compliance despite the presence of adverse effects of global market 
integration (deindustrialization, agricultural decline). The state was then able to ensure 
global systemic operation due to a stable national population that was controlled, in large 
part, through the redefinition of national culture. 
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 This outcome results in contemporary stability in accordance with the Hegelian-
Marxian concept of false consciousness and operates in much the same manner as 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. We can assume that this outcome is probable in core 
states given the privileged position of its national populations with respect to abject and 
pervasive poverty. The relative affluence of core states facilitates additional control 
mechanisms in the form of mass media entertainment and material consumption 
promotion, both of which require tacit affirmation of the benefits resulting from global 
market integration and legitimate approval of existing control structures. This scenario 
clearly presumes a dominant position with respect to the global economic system. 
National populations, active in their own domination, are effectively controlled through 
state approved cultural definitions, symbols, and affiliations. These state controls are 
locally managed by co-operative national groups who stand to increase their power as 
they support the state project of global market integration. In this scenario, long-term 
stability is increasingly dependent on the state, its alliances with cooperative national 
groups, and its ability to manage and control national cultural definitions. 
2. The nation will gain greater understanding of cultural manipulative efforts on the part 
of the state and react negatively to this process of cultural control. 
 The second possible outcome could result if the previously stated requisites 
collapse. If state capacity to influence or control national cultural definitions and symbols 
is reduced, national populations could increase their general power with respect to the 
state and the global economic system. In this scenario national groups will recognize the 
manipulative efforts of the state and react in a negative fashion weakening state control 
capacities. This outcome would decrease the dominant position of the global economic 
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system due to the potential inability of the state to control national populations and ensure 
stability. The global economic system would have to address national protectionist 
concerns on a more direct level due to the inability of state cultural controls to meet 
protectionist demands. 
 An example of this process is arguably occurring in Latin America. Specifically, 
the most recent Bolivian election saw the rise of Evo Morales, the first indigenous 
Aymara president of Bolivia, who was elected on a platform of emphasizing indigenous 
culture (as opposed to the Bolivian tradition of ignoring) and reasserting state control 
over national economic protections. In short, the initial promise of the Morales era in 
Bolivia is built on a rearticulation of national culture (from a political ideal of inclusivity, 
“we are all Indians” with the reality being massive economic stratification based largely 
on race – to a recognition of the racial basis for this economic stratification) which has 
allowed the state political discourse to shift again toward issues of national economic 
protection. 
 In this scenario, the national population has the opportunity to transcend state 
cultural definitions and controls, reestablish these controls from a cultural perspective, 
and potentially protect itself through economic means. This, of course, is contingent on 
the group that is able to actively redefine national cultural controls and their interest in 
reestablishing national economic protections from global market integration. The 
opportunity for such a shift is possible.  
3. The state will continue its relative decline in control capacities and be replaced with 
regional or global governing structures to ensure local stability. 
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 This scenario is predicated on the observation that the Westphalian state system, 
designed to originally maintain and control national economies and facilitate international 
trade, is undergoing qualitative change. The ability for the state to control or protect 
national economic interests is eroding in the face of neoliberal market demands. If 
cultural controls prove ineffective in ensuring long-term local stability, global market 
proponents will seek alternate forms of governance. Advocates of the global polity thesis 
argue that this process is already underway (Meyer 1980; Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and 
Thomas 1997). This theory argues that a global culture based on European models of 
rationality, liberal democracy, and liberal capitalism is pervasive enough to allow a 
common political discourse to occur. This common political discourse has the potential to 
produced shared governance structures. 
 Obvious examples of this process are institutions such as the United Nations, 
which has limited political and military authority granted through international 
cooperative unions. Another example of regional governance structure could be the 
European Union, which consists of several institutions of political control including the 
European Parliament and the ministerial Council of the European Union. 
 I would argue that this scenario is least likely due to the increased importance of 
national culture as a local control mechanism. Current levels of state-national cultural 
integration make it much more difficult to argue for the relinquishment of state power to 
supranational governance structures because national culture has been explicitly tied to 
the existing state. A nation-state joined by shared culture will lose this developed 
connection resulting in national instability. Resulting national instability will negatively 
affect global economic operation and therefore represents a significant disincentive for 
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creating supranational governance at this time. One can look to recent history to see the 
function of the “double movement” in opposition to such an outcome.  
The economic cooperation of the European Union has resulted in the world’s 
strongest currency; however, the establishment of a singular constitutional system of 
governance has not matched this economic cooperation. In fact, the most recent attempt 
to ratify a European constitution was rejected by the national populations of France and 
the Netherlands. One of the more successful strategies in mobilizing support for 
constitutional reject was in appeals to national cultural sovereignty (Bordonaro 2005). 
Thus, while supranational governance structures are possible, the power of respective 
national populations and the ability of state and national actors to exploit cultural 
definitions, symbols, and histories for resistive purposes makes large-scale 
implementation unlikely. In fact, it seems more likely that attempts to implement regional 
supranational governance structures could follow the pattern of the EU, with powerful 
states or national populations resisting this impulse. Such a collapsed effort would likely 
lead to a return to either of the first two scenarios presented here. The deciding factor, it 
would seem, would be the strength of the state to manage and control national cultural 
structures (scenario one). Conversely, such a political collapse (failed regional 
governance) could present an opportunity for national populations to redefine or re-
establish control over national cultural structures (scenario two).  
4. The power of national populations will increase beyond state capacities to control 
resulting in local instability. This instability could in turn result in increased regional or 
even global conflict.   
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 This scenario is the direct result of instability generated by an unbalanced “double 
movement.” Local destabilization has the potential to degenerate into large-scale conflict 
due to the withdrawal of local structures of control and the inability of the global 
economic system to enforce stability through existing supranational institutions. This 
process can occur in two obvious ways.  
 First, the dominance of the global economic system grows beyond the ability of 
state cultural controls to pacify national populations. In this instance, the control of 
culture becomes irrelevant in the face of extreme economic inequalities and the inability 
for culture to mask such adverse economic conditions. In other words, discursive conflict 
centered on issues of national culture are overwhelmed by pervasive economic problems 
such as unemployment, poverty, and accompanying detrimental social conditions. This 
situation could result in social revolution or at least social instability that threatens global 
economic operation. In other words, the expansion of global market predation creates an 
imbalance in the “double movement” that overwhelms existing state protectionist 
capacities motivating local instability.  
 Second, national power increases to the point that it overwhelms state control 
mechanisms. Once control of the state is accomplished, the national group can choose to 
function in the way similar to the Morales administration. That is, usurped state power 
can be used to promote national economic health through diplomacy and renegotiated 
agreements within the global economic system. The possibility also exists that the 
dominant national group will chose not to protect its national populations within the 
context of the global market economy, but instead choose to expand its power through 
the forced acquisition of resources and capital of other nation-states.  
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 Both of these outcomes can result in regional or even global conflict possibly 
promoting systemic collapse. This obviously is the most undesirable outcome, but 
unfortunately not the least likely. The negative potential for regional or global conflict 
seems more likely in peripheral regions due to their position within the global economic 
system. Core states and national populations will be less likely to contribute to the 
destabilization of a beneficial systemic arrangement. The motivation for systemic 
destabilization is possibly more attractive to peripheral states. This of course is an 
unproven hypothesis as one could argue that core state action taken in a unilateral fashion 
could be viewed as being systemically destabilizing. If a core state does not act in 
accordance with the systemic demands of the global market system, there could be 
ramifications for national popular destabilization. It seems unlikely, however, that core 
states will jeopardize their privileged position with anti-systemic actions on a large scale.  
 These possible outcomes are simply a few of the many directions for future 
comparative research on the nation-state using a reconceputalized “double movement” 
framework. This dissertation is designed to develop a greater understanding of the 
capacities and roles of the contemporary state with respect to national protection and 
global market integration.  
 Canadian multicultural policies and Québec intercultural policies offer the 
opportunity to observe and analyze state action as the result of both global market 
integration and in meeting national protectionist demands. The conclusions that are made 
from this study require that additional attention be played to the role of culture in 
understanding social policy strategies in Canada and Québec. The role of the Canadian 
and Québec state in the contemporary era cannot be adequately understood without 
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attention to the role of culture as a stabilization tool or strategy. The efficacy of these 
strategies is also consistent with the “double movement” framework in that the ultimate 
success of multicultural and intercultural policies is determined by national popular 
legitimation as well as systemic global economic adherence.   
The conclusions, that state capacity to protection national populations through 
economic means has waned resulting in increased state capacity to address national 
protectionist demands through cultural means, offer an opportunity to examine the 
complex interrelationships between nation, state, and global economy in a 
methodologically sound manner. I believe that this dissertation project provides a unique 
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